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Abstract
Synchronization of pulse-coupled oscillators (PCOs) has gained significant attention recently due to
increased applications in sensor networks and wireless communications. However, most existing results are
obtained in the absence of malicious attacks. Given the distributed and unattended nature of wireless sensor
networks, it is imperative to enhance the resilience of pulse-based synchronization against malicious attacks.
To achieve this goal, we first show that by using a carefully designed phase response function (PRF), pulsebased synchronization of PCOs can be guaranteed despite the presence of a stealthy Byzantine attacker, even
when legitimate PCOs have different initial phases. Next, we propose a new pulse-based synchronization
mechanism to improve the resilience of pulse-based synchronization to multiple stealthy Byzantine attackers. We rigorously characterize the condition for mounting stealthy Byzantine attacks under the proposed
new pulse-based synchronization mechanism and prove analytically that synchronization of legitimate oscillators can be achieved even when their initial phases are unrestricted, i.e., randomly distributed in the
entire oscillation period. Since most existing results on resilient pulse-based synchronization are obtained
only for all-to-all networks, we also propose a new pulse-based synchronization mechanism to improve the
resilience of pulse-based synchronization that is applicable under general connected topologies. Under the
proposed synchronization mechanism, we prove that synchronization of general connected legitimate PCOs
can be guaranteed in the presence of multiple stealthy Byzantine attackers, irrespective of whether the attackers collude with each other or not. The new mechanism can guarantee resilient synchronization even when
the initial phases of legitimate oscillators are distributed in a half circle. Then, to relax the limitation of the
stealthy attacker model and the constraint on the legitimate oscillators’ initial phase distribution, we improved
our synchronization mechanism and proved that finite time synchronization of legitimate oscillators can be
guaranteed in the presence of multiple Byzantine attackers who can emit attack pulses arbitrarily without
any constraint except that practical bit rate constraint renders the number of pulses from an attacker to be
finite. The improved mechanism can guarantee synchronization even when the initial phases of all legitimate
ii

oscillators are arbitrarily distributed in the entire oscillation period. The new attack resilient pulse-based
synchronization approaches in this dissertation are in distinct difference from most existing attack-resilient
synchronization algorithms (including the seminal paper from Lamport and Melliar-Smith [1]) which require
a priori (almost) synchronization among all legitimate nodes. Numerical simulations are given to confirm the
theoretical results.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
Inspired by flashing fireflies and contracting cardiac cells, pulse-based synchronization is attracting
increased attention in sensor networks and wireless communications [5–10]. By exchanging simple and
identical messages (so-called pulses), pulse-based synchronization incurs much less energy consumption and
communication overhead compared with conventional packet-based synchronization approaches [11]. These
inherent advantages make pulse-based synchronization extremely appealing for event coordination and clock
synchronization in various networks [12–15]. Moreover, using a simple phase response function (PRF) which
governs how a node adjusts its phase upon receiving an anonymous pulse, PCOs do not need to store or
distinguish the source/destination of exchanged pulses, which makes pulse-based synchronization implicitly
scalable [11, 16, 17].
In recent years, due to the increased applications of pulse-based synchronization in smart grid
[18, 19], surveillance [15], wireless beam-forming [13], and motion coordination [20, 21], research on pulsebased synchronization has blossomed. For example, by optimizing the interaction function, i.e., phase response function, the synchronization speed of pulse-coupled oscillators (PCOs) is maximized in [4]; with a
judiciously-added refractory period in the phase response function, the energy consumption of pulse-based
synchronization is reduced in [22–24]; [25–27] show that PCOs can achieve synchronization under a general
coupling topology even when their initial phases are randomly distributed in the entire oscillation period. Recently, synchronization of PCOs in the presence of time-delays and unreliable links is also discussed [28–30].
Other relevant results include [31–46].
However, all the above results are obtained under the assumption that all oscillators behave correctly
with no nodes compromised by malicious attackers. Due to the distributed and unattended nature, wireless
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sensor nodes are extremely vulnerable to attacks, making it imperative to study synchronization in the presence of attacks. Although plenty of discussions exist for conventional packet-based synchronization, e.g.,
[1, 47–63], results are very sparse on the attack-resilience of pulse-based synchronization [2, 3, 64]. In [64],
the authors showed that pulse-based synchronization is more robust than its packet-based counterpart in the
presence of a faulty node. In [2], a new phase response function was proposed to improve the precision
of pulse-based synchronization against non-persistent random attacks. The authors in [3] considered pulsebased synchronization in the presence of faulty nodes which fire periodically ignoring neighboring nodes’
influence. However, none of the above results address phase synchronization of PCOs when compromised
nodes act maliciously to corrupt synchronization by applying disturbing pulses with judiciously-crafted patterns. Furthermore, the above results only apply to a priori synchronized PCOs, i.e., all legitimate nodes are
required to have identical phases when faulty pulses are emitted.
In this dissertation, we consider the synchronization of PCOs in the presence of Byzantine attacks
which may compromise oscillators with arbitrary malicious behaviors. In the pulse-based interaction framework where exchanged messages are only identical and content-free pulses, Byzantine attacks mean compromised nodes injecting pulses using judiciously crafted patterns to disturb the synchronization process.
So compared with existing results in [2, 3, 64] which address faulty PCO nodes with random or periodic
pulse emitting patterns, the situation considered in this dissertation is more difficult to deal with due to the
intelligent behavior of malicious attackers.
In Chapter 2, by using a carefully designed PRF, we characterize the condition under which an
attacker could launch stealthy Byzantine attacks without being detected and show that perfect synchronization of legitimate oscillators can be achieved under a stealthy Byzantine attacker if some initial conditions
on legitimate oscillators’ phases are satisfied. In Chapter 3, we propose a new pulse-based synchronization
mechanism to improve the resilience of pulse-based synchronization. We rigorously characterize the condition for mounting stealthy Byzantine attacks under the proposed pulse-based synchronization mechanism and
prove analytically that synchronization of legitimate oscillators can be achieved in the presence of multiple
stealthy Byzantine attackers even when the initial phases of legitimate oscillators are unrestricted, i.e., randomly distributed in the entire oscillation period. In Chapter 4, we present a new pulse-based synchronization
mechanism for general connected PCOs that can achieve phase synchronization even in the presence of multiple stealthy Byzantine attackers, irrespective of whether the attackers collude with each other or not. Under
the proposed synchronization mechanism, we rigorously characterize the condition for stealthy Byzantine
attacks and prove that perfect synchronization of general connected legitimate oscillators can be guaranteed
2

even when their initial phases are widely distributed in a half circle. The result in Chapter 4 is in distinct
difference from our results in Chapters 2 and 3 which can only guarantee phase synchronization under allto-all topologies. To relax the limitation of the stealthy attacker model and the constraint on the legitimate
oscillators’ initial phase distribution in Chapter 4, we improved our synchronization mechanism in Chapter
5 and proved that perfect synchronization of legitimate oscillators can be guaranteed in the presence of multiple Byzantine attackers who can emit attack pulses arbitrarily without any constraint except that practical
bit rate constraint renders the number of pulses from an attacker to be finite. The improved mechanism can
guarantee synchronization even when the initial phases of all legitimate oscillators are arbitrarily distributed
in the entire oscillation period. We conclude the dissertation in Chapter 6.
It is worth noting that this dissertation is comprised of four papers from our research work [65–68].
More specifically, [65], [66], [67], and [68] are included in Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively.
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Chapter 2

An Attack-Resilient Phase Response
Function for PCO networks
2.1

Introduction
In this chapter, we consider the synchronizability of PCOs in the presence of Byzantine attacks

which may compromise oscillators with arbitrary malicious behaviors. So compared with the assumption in
[3] where faulty oscillators only fail to respond to pulses, the attack model in this chapter is much stronger
because an intelligent malicious attacker can strategically drive the network away from synchronization.
Using a carefully designed PRF, we characterize the condition under which an attacker could launch stealthy
attacks without being detected. Moreover, we show that perfect synchronization of legitimate oscillators can
still be achieved under such stealthy Byzantine attacks if some initial conditions on legitimate oscillators’
phases are satisfied.
Contribution: Although plenty of discussions exist for conventional packet-based synchronization
under Byzantine attacks [1, 47, 48, 60–63], to the best of our knowledge, this chapter is the first effort dealing
with Byzantine attacks in the pulse-based synchronization framework. By using a carefully designed PRF,
we show that legitimate oscillators can still be synchronized under stealthy Byzantine attacks even when they
have different initial phases. The synchronization condition is much less conservative than most existing
attack-resilient synchronization approaches (including the seminal paper [1] and those addressing the robustness of pulse-based synchronization under attacks [2,3,64]), which require that all legitimate oscillators must
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have identical or almost identical initial phases to achieve synchronization under attacks.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 presents a new PRF which can guarantee
synchronization in the absence of attacks. Section 2.3 characterizes the condition for stealthy Byzantine
attacks, i.e., attacks that cannot be detected by a detection mechanism introduced under the pulse-coupled
interaction framework. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 show that the proposed PRF is able to guarantee synchronization
of legitimate oscillators even in the presence of stealthy Byzantine attacks.

2.2
2.2.1

Synchronization under a New PRF
A New PRF
Consider a network of N pulse-coupled oscillators whose phases are denoted as φi (t) at time instant

t for i = 1, 2, · · · , N. All phase variables evolve from 0 to 2π with a constant speed (natural frequency) ω.
Without loss of generality, we assume ω = 1 throughout this chapter. When the phase of an oscillator (e.g.,
oscillator i) reaches 2π, it fires (emits a pulse) and simultaneously resets its phase to 0. When oscillator i
receives a pulse from an adjacent oscillator at time instant t, it will shift its phase to φi (t) + l × F(φi (t)), i.e.,
φi (t + ) = φi (t) + l × F(φi (t))

(2.1)

where l ∈ (0, 1] is the coupling strength and F(•) is the phase response function (PRF) determined as follows:

F(φ (t)) :=



 0

0 ≤ φ (t) < D

(2.2)


 2π − φ (t) D ≤ φ (t) ≤ 2π
In (2.2), D is the length of the refractory period and it is assumed to satisfy π ≤ D < 2π in this chapter. When
an oscillator’s phase φ (t) resides in the refractory period [0, D), the oscillator will ignore incoming pulses
and its phase will evolve freely without perturbation. If a pulse arrives when φ (t) is outside of the refractory
period, it will induce a jump on φ (t) with value determined by the product of PRF in (2.2) and the coupling
strength l.
Remark 2.1. Different from existing PRFs in [2] and [3] (which was originally proposed in [4] to maximize
synchronization speed), the new PRF can significantly improve the resilience of synchronization to malicious
pulse attacks, as illustrated by numerical simulation results in Fig.2.1. Rigorous analysis will be substantiated
in Section 2.4 and Section 2.5 as well as numerical simulations in Section 2.6.
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Figure 2.1: Phase evolutions of an all-to-all network of three PCOs, one of which is compromised by an
attacker with firing time instants represented by asterisks. Plots (a), (b), and (c) present the phase evolutions
of the two legitimate oscillators under the PRFs in [2], [3] (which was originally proposed in [4] to maximize
synchronization speed), and the proposed PRF, respectively. l and D are set to 0.5 and π, respectively. We
can see that synchronization of legitimate oscillators can be achieved only under our PRF.

Assumption 2.1. Following [35,36,42], we assume that when a legitimate oscillator receives multiple pulses
simultaneously, it will process these pulses consecutively. In other words, no two pulses will be regarded as
an aggregated pulse.
In this Chapter, the interaction topology of the PCO network is assumed to be all-to-all in Chapter
2-Chapter 4. Generalization to general strongly-connected topologies is given in Chapter 5.

2.2.2

Synchronization Condition in the Absence of Attacks
In this subsection, we give a synchronization condition under the proposed PRF. As in most studies

[4, 6, 22–27], PCOs are synchronized when all legitimate oscillators’ phases are identical. We introduce the
following definitions to facilitate the analysis.
We assume that all oscillators’ phases rotate clockwise on a unit circle. The containing arc of
legitimate oscillators is defined as the shortest arc on the unit circle which contains all legitimate oscillators’
phases. The starting point and the ending point of a containing arc are defined as the leading point and the
terminating point of the containing arc in the clockwise direction, respectively. Moreover, the interior of a
6

containing arc is defined as the set of all points residing in the containing arc except the starting and ending
points.
When synchronization is achieved, the starting and ending points of a containing arc overlap and
the interior of the containing arc becomes an empty set. We next present the synchronization condition for a
PCO network under the proposed PRF in (2.2) when there are no attacks.
Lemma 2.1. For an all-to-all PCO network with PRF given in (2.2), if the length of the initial containing
arc is less than 2π − D with the refractory period D satisfying π ≤ D < 2π, then all PCOs can be perfectly
synchronized in the absence of attacks.
Proof. Lemma 2.1 is a special case of Theorem 1 in [24].

2.3

Byzantine Attacks and Attack Detection Mechanism

2.3.1

Byzantine Attacks
The concept of Byzantine attacks stems from the Byzantine generals problem [48]. It is used to

describe a traitor commander who sends or relays fake information to other commanders to avoid the loyal
ones from reaching agreement [47]. In the case of PCO synchronization, Byzantine attacks mean that a compromised oscillator is completely taken over by an attacker and will deviate from the prescribed behavior in
an arbitrary way, i.e., it will send out pulses at arbitrary time instants. Clearly, if an attacker keeps sending pulses continuously without rest, it will prevent legitimate oscillators from achieving synchronization.
However, such a manner of attacks will also render themselves easily detectable, just as jamming of communication channels which is easy to detect, isolate, and remove [69]. Therefore, we are only interested in
Byzantine attacks which are unable to detect in the pulse-coupled interaction framework.

2.3.2

Attack Detection Mechanism under Pulse Interaction
In this subsection, we characterize the condition for stealthy Byzantine attacks that cannot be de-

tected in the pulse-coupled framework in which all exchanged messages are identical pulses and free of
source/destination information. To this end, we first give a lemma to characterize the time-invariant firing
sequence of PCOs under the PRF in (2.2). Firing sequence is the order in which legitimate oscillators fire.
The time-invariant firing sequence of PCOs is an important property of all-to-all PCO networks, which means
that the phase of an oscillator cannot overpass another oscillator’s phase on the unit circle.
7

Lemma 2.2. For an all-to-all network of N legitimate PCOs with PRF given in (2.2), the firing sequence of
all oscillators is time-invariant.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A.
In PCO networks, since all exchanged messages (pulses) are identical with no embedded content,
conventional content-checking based attack detection mechanisms such as [1] cannot be applied. We propose
to detect potential attacks in the network by monitoring the number of the emitted pulses within a certain
time interval. The basic idea is as follows. In a short time interval, if the number of detected pulses is more
than the maximally possible number of pulses (emitted by all legitimate oscillators) in this time interval, then
it is safe to conclude that attackers or compromised oscillators are present which send the additional pulses.
More specially, under PRF (2.2), we can characterize the respective longest and shortest time intervals during
which N pulses can be emitted if all oscillators are legitimate, which is detailed in Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 2.1. For an all-to-all network of N legitimate PCOs with PRF given in (2.2), if the length of the
containing arc is no more than δ with δ < 2π − D, then
1. within any time interval [t,t + TL ) for
TL = 2π − δ + (1 − l)N−1 δ

(2.3)

and ∀t ∈ R, there can be at most N pulses;
2. within any time interval [t,t + TU ] for
TU = 2π

(2.4)

and ∀t ∈ R, there can be at least N pulses.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix B.

2.3.3

A Condition for Stealthy Attacks
Next we present a condition for an attacker to launch attacks that cannot be detected by the detection

mechanism in Section 2.3.2. We consider an all-to-all network with N PCOs wherein one is compromised.
The length of the containing arc of the N − 1 legitimate oscillators is δ < 2π − D.
Under the attack detection mechanism in Theorem 2.1, if the compromised PCO sends more than
one pulse within an arbitrary time interval of length TL , or does not send out any pulse during an arbitrary
8

time interval of length TU , the detection system will successfully detect the presence of attacks. Therefore, to
keep stealthy, an attacker should send pulses with period no larger than TU and no less than TL . In summary,
the condition for a compromised oscillator to launch stealthy Byzantine attacks can be depicted as follows:
Definition 2.1. A compromised oscillator can launch stealthy Byzantine attacks if it exerts pulses persistently
with a (time-varying) firing interval arbitrarily chosen from the set [TL , TU ].
Assumption 2.2. In Section 2.4 and Section 2.5, we assume that there exists only one attacker. The multiple
attacker case is studied in Section 2.6 via numerical simulations.

2.4

Synchronization of All-To-All PCO Networks under Stealthy Attacks
In this section, we consider an all-to-all PCO network with N oscillators, one of which is com-

promised. If all N − 1 legitimate oscillators are already synchronized, their synchronization state cannot be
disturbed by the compromised oscillator because the pulse from the compromised one (attacker) will cause
equal offsets on all the legitimate oscillators’ phases. Therefore, our work aims to synchronize all legitimate oscillators in the presence of a compromised oscillator when they are not initially synchronized. More
specifically, we can prove that the N −1 legitimate oscillators can still be perfectly synchronized if their initial
phases satisfy certain conditions. To this end, we first analyze how a single malicious pulse affects the length
of the containing arc. According to Lemma 2.1, if the containing arc is no less than 2π − D, synchronization
cannot be guaranteed even in the absence of attacks. So in order to guarantee synchronization, the length of
the containing arc should always be less than 2π − D after receiving a malicious pulse. Theorem 2.2 gives
conditions under which such a requirement can be met.
Theorem 2.2. For an all-to-all network of N PCOs with PRF in (2.2) wherein D ≥ π and one compromised
oscillator sending attack pulses according to the stealthy attack model in Definition 2.1, the length of the
containing arc will still be less than 2π − D after receiving a malicious pulse if either of the following
conditions is met:
1. the containing arc of legitimate oscillators does not have phase D in its interior or as its starting point
and its length is less than 2π − D before receiving a malicious pulse;
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2. the containing arc of legitimate oscillators has phase D in its interior or as its starting point and its
length is less than (1 − l)(2π − D) before receiving a malicious pulse.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix C.
Clearly, if a malicious pulse does not increase the length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators, it cannot disturb the synchronization process. Therefore, we proceed to analyze the condition under
which a persistent stealthy attacker with a series of malicious pulses could never increase the length of the
containing arc. If such a condition can be established, synchronization can be guaranteed even in the presence
of such attacks since the malicious pulses do not increase the length of the containing arc whereas legitimate
pulses sent by legitimate oscillators will always decrease the length of the containing arc.
Theorem 2.3. For an all-to-all network of N PCOs with PRF in (2.2) wherein D ≥ π and one compromised
oscillator sending malicious pulses according to the stealthy attack model in Definition 2.1, then synchronization of all legitimate oscillators can be guaranteed if either of the following conditions is met:
1. when the first malicious pulse is sent, the containing arc of all legitimate oscillators does not have
phase D in its interior or as its starting point and its length is less than

δ1 =

l
(2π − D)
1 − (1 − l)N−1

(2.5)

2. when the first malicious pulse is sent, the containing arc of all legitimate oscillators has phase D in its
interior or as its starting point and its length is less than

l2
δ2 = min
, (1 − l) (2π − D)
2 − l − (1 − l)N−1


(2.6)

Proof. The proof is given in Appendix D.
Based on Theorem 2.3, we have the following Corollary:
Corollary 2.1. For an all-to-all network of N PCOs with PRF in (2.2) wherein D ≥ π and one compromised
oscillator sending malicious pulses according to the stealthy attack model in Definition 2.1, if the initial
length of the containing arc of all legitimate oscillators is less than δ2 in (2.6), then synchronization of all
legitimate oscillators can be guaranteed.
Proof. Noticing δ2 ≤ δ1 , Corollary 2.1 can be easily obtained from Theorem 2.3.
10

Remark 2.2. Following [24], if the condition on initial phases are not met naturally, we can use a ‘reset’
packet to reduce the length of the containing arc of all legitimate oscillators to within a certain range.
Remark 2.3. The intentionally added large refractory period is the fundamental difference between our
PRF and existing PRFs and it is key to enable the resilience to attacks. In fact, it can be obtained that
under our PRF and initial conditions in Corollary 2.1, no attack pulses except the first one can increase the
phase distances between legitimate oscillators and hence can harm the synchronization process of legitimate
oscillators.

2.5

Synchronization of Strongly-Connected PCO Networks under Stealthy
Byzantine Attacks
In this section, we will show that the proposed PRF in (2.2) is also able to synchronize PCO net-

works under a stealthy Byzantine attacker, even when the legitimate oscillations are connected under a general strongly-connected topology. To this end, we first consider the attack-free case. It is worth noting
that strongly-connected PCOs means that there is a multi-hop path between any pair of oscillators. Due to
the reduced number of links among legitimate oscillators, synchronization of strongly-connected PCOs is
much more difficult to achieve than the fully connected all-to-all case. A mathematical model of a stronglyconnected PCO network can be found in Sec. II.B of [24].
Lemma 2.3. For strongly-connected PCOs with PRF given in (2.2), if the length of the initial containing arc
is less than 2π − D wherein π ≤ D < 2π, then all oscillators can be perfectly synchronized in the absence of
attacks.
Proof. Lemma 2.3 is a special case of Theorem 1 in [24].
Next we characterize the number of legitimate pulses that an oscillator can receive under a stronglyconnected topology. Denote the number of oscillators that can affect oscillator i as d − (i). Then we have the
following result:
Theorem 2.4. For N strongly-connected PCOs with PRF given in (2.2), if there are no attacks and the length
of the containing arc is no greater than δ with δ < 2π − D, then
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1. within any time interval [t,t + TL ) for
TL = 2π − δ + (1 − l)N−1 δ

(2.7)

and ∀t ∈ R, oscillator i can receive at most d − (i) pulses;
2. within any time interval [t,t + TU ] for
TU = 2π

(2.8)

and ∀t ∈ R, oscillator i can receive at least d − (i) pulses.
Proof. Noticing d − (i) ≤ N − 1 always holds for strongly-connected PCO networks, Theorem 2.4 can be
obtained by following the same line of reasoning for Theorem 2.1.
Based on the attack detection mechanism in Theorem 2.4, to keep stealthy, a compromised oscillator
must send pulses with an interval residing in [TL , TU ], which means that the condition for stealthy attacks is
the same as Definition 2.1.
Next, we show that the PRF in (2.2) is also resilient to stealthy Byzantine attacks even when the
interaction topology is strongly-connected. Because when the legitimate oscillators are partially affected
by the malicious pulse (some are affected but others not), they can never maintain synchronization as malicious pulses can always exert a nonzero phase shift on affected legitimate oscillators and make them deviate
from the rest of non-affected legitimate oscillators, we assume that all legitimate oscillators are affected by
malicious pulses.
Theorem 2.5. For a network of N PCOs with PRF in (2.2) wherein D ≥ π and one compromised oscillator
broadcasting malicious pulses to all legitimate ones following the stealthy Byzantine attack model in Definition 2.1, if all legitimate oscillators are strongly-connected and the length of the containing arc is less than
δ3 in (2.9), then synchronization of all legitimate oscillators can be guaranteed.

δ3 = min


l N−1
,
(1
−
l)
(2π − D)
2 − l N−2 − (1 − l)N−1

(2.9)

Proof. Proof of Theorem 2.5 can be obtained following Theorem 2.3 and is omitted.
Remark 2.4. It is worth noting that although plenty of discussions exist on the attack-resilience of conventional packet-based synchronization (e.g., [1, 47, 48, 60–63]), results on the resilience of pulse-coupled
12

synchronization to attacks are very sparse. In this chapter, we show that pulse-coupled synchronization can
be achieved in the presence of a malicious attacker even when legitimate oscillators have different initial
phases. This is in distinct difference from most existing attack-resilient synchronization approaches (including the seminal paper [1] and those addressing the robustness of pulse-coupled synchronization under attacks
[2, 3, 64]), which require that all legitimate oscillators must have identical or almost identical initial phases
to achieve synchronization in the presence of attacks.
Remark 2.5. In this chapter, a simple model in (2.1) is followed by every legitimate oscillator. It is worth
noting that the simplicity of the model is one of the main advantages of pulse-coupled synchronization protocols over conventional packet-based synchronization methods: By exchanging identical content-free pulses,
synchronization of legitimate oscillators can be achieved with much less communication overhead and energy
consumption; moreover, the simple framework restricts the attack surface, i.e., the attacker can only launch
attacks via pulse injections, which greatly facilitated the goal of synchronizing legitimate oscillators in the
presence of attacks.

2.6
2.6.1

Simulations
Performance of the proposed synchronization approach
We first simulated an all-to-all network of five PCOs, one of which was compromised. The coupling

strength was set to l = 0.4 and the length of refractory period was chosen as D = π.
According to condition 1) of Theorem 2.3, if the length of the containing arc is no larger than
δ1 = 0.46π and the phase conditions of legitimate oscillators are satisfied when the first malicious pulse is
sent, then all legitimate oscillators will synchronize despite repeated malicious pulses from the compromised
oscillator.
Setting the initial phases of the oscillators to 0, 0.15π, 0.3π, and 0.45π, respectively, we first simulated the network with malicious pulses arriving at time instant t = 0.5π. At this time instant, the phases
of the legitimate oscillators were given by 0.5π, 0.65π, 0.8π, 0.95π, which were all in the refractory period.
So according to condition 1) of Theorem 2.3, the oscillators would synchronize. This was confirmed by
numerical simulations in Fig. 2.2, which showed that the length of the containing arc converged to zero.
According to condition 2) of Theorem 2.3, the legitimate oscillators can synchronize if the length
of the containing arc is no larger than δ2 = 0.109π. So we reduced the containing arc by setting the initial
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phases of the legitimate oscillators to 0, 0.03π, 0.06π, and 0.1π, respectively, which led to a length of the
initial containing arc 0.1π. The arriving time instant of the first malicious pulse was set to t = 0.9π. Condition
2) of Theorem 2.3 was satisfied, which means that legitimate oscillators could still synchronize. This was
confirmed by numerical simulations in Fig. 2.3, which showed that the length of the containing arc indeed
converged to zero. It is worth noting that Fig. 2.3 shows that the first malicious pulse increased the length of
the containing arc, but to a value less than 2π − D = π, which confirmed Theorem 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: Phase evolution and the length of the containing arc of four legitimate oscillators in a five PCO allto-all network. One oscillator was compromised and its firing time instants were represented by the asterisks.
The initial phases of the legitimate oscillators were set to 0, 0.15π, 0.3π, and 0.45π.
We also simulated the phase evolution of a strongly-connected network of five PCOs, one of which
was compromised and launched stealthy attacks according to Definition 2.1. The coupling strength was set
to l = 0.75 and the length of refractory period was chosen as D = π. The topology of the network is shown in
Fig. 2.4, wherein the four solid black dots represent the legitimate oscillators and the red star represents the
attacker. According to Theorem 2.5, legitimate oscillators can synchronize if the length of the containing arc
is less than δ3 = 0.209π. We set the initial phases of the legitimate oscillators to 0, 0.06π, 0.12π, and 0.18π,
respectively, which leads to a length of the initial containing arc 0.18π satisfying synchronization condition
in Theorem 2.5. Numerical simulations in Fig. 2.5 confirmed that legitimate oscillators indeed synchronized.
Under all-to-all topology and the strongly-connected topology in Fig. 2.4, we also compared the
analytically obtained maximally allowable lengths of the initial containing arc with numerically obtained
maximal lengths of the containing arc, which are represented by the red and blue curves in Fig. 2.6. In
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the simulations, synchronization is defined to be achieved when the length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators becomes less than 1 × 10−5 . The comparison confirmed the limited conservativeness of the
analytical predictions.
All-to-all Case

Strongly-Connected Case
Simulation Result
Theorem 2.5

Length of the containing arc

Length of the containing arc

Simulation Result
Corollary 2.1

0.3

0.2

0.1
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0
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0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1

Coupling Strength

Coupling Strength

Figure 2.6: Comparison of the theoretically obtained maximally allowable lengths of the initial containing
arc with numerical simulations in a five PCO network. l is the coupling strength; the red lines are the
maximal lengths of the containing arc obtained from Corollary 2.1 and Theorem 2.5; the blue lines are the
corresponding results obtained via numerical simulations.
We also numerically studied the effects of coupling strength l and refractory period D on the convergence rate. We considered an all-to-all network with four legitimate oscillators and a stealthy Byzantine
attacker. The initial phases of legitimate oscillators were set to 0, 0.04π, 0.08π, and 0.12π, respectively,
which led to a containing arc of length 0.12π. Synchronization is defined to be achieved when the length of
the containing arc is less than 1 × 10−5 . The mean synchronization times of legitimate oscillators of 10, 000
runs under different l and D were shown in Fig. 2.7. It can be seen that a larger l leads to a faster convergence
rate (shorter convergence time) whereas the variation of D has no obvious influence on the convergence time.
This is because the speed of convergence is determined by the frequency and amplitude of phase shifts caused
by legitimate pulses, and a larger l increases the amplitude of phase shifts, whereas the variation of D has no
influence on the frequency of phase shifts under the specified conditions in Theorems 2.1-2.3 (since under
a given length of the containing arc δ , no legitimate pulses will arrive when a legitimate oscillator’s phase
resides in the interval [π, 2π − δ ), and hence no difference will be made on the frequency of phase shifts
when D varies between [π, 2π − δ )).
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Figure 2.7: Synchronization time of four legitimate oscillators in a five PCO all-to-all network under different
l and D. One oscillator was compromised and acts as a stealthy Byzantine attacker. The initial length of the
containing arc was set to δ = 0.12π. Synchronization of the network is defined to be achieved when the
length of the containing arc becomes less than 1 × 10−5 .

2.6.2

Performance comparison with existing results
We also numerically compared the performance of the proposed PRF in (2.2) with the PRFs in [2]

and [3]. The initial phases of legitimate oscillators were randomly chosen from the interval [0, 2π] and the
coupling strength was set to l = 0.3. The attacker(s) sent malicious pulses with a random period uniformly
distributed in [1.85π, 2.15π]. Synchronization of the network is defined to be achieved when the length of the
containing arc of legitimate oscillators is less than 1 × 10−5 . In the presence of one attacker, the probabilities
under the three PRFs were given by the red curves in Fig. 2.8. It can be seen that the proposed PRF is
more robust in enabling synchronization in the presence of attacks. Of course, the paid price is increased
synchronization time, as illustrated by the blue curves in Fig. 2.8. Similar conclusions were obtained for the
two-attacker and three-attacker cases, as illustrated in Fig. 2.9 and Fig. 2.10, respectively.

2.6.3

Application to general interaction topologies
As indicated earlier, under a strongly-connected topology, synchronization cannot be guaranteed

when only a portion of legitimate oscillators is affected by a malicious attacker. To evaluate the performance
of the synchronization approach under such a scenario, we used the synchronization error defined in [2] to
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Figure 2.8: Comparison of the proposed PRF and the respective PRFs in [2] and [3] in terms of synchronization probability (red solid marker lines) and synchronization time (blue hollow marker lines) in the presence
of one attacker.
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Figure 2.9: Comparison of the proposed PRF and the respective PRFs in [2] and [3] in terms of synchronization probability (red solid marker lines) and synchronization time (blue hollow marker lines) in the presence
of two attackers.
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Figure 2.10: Comparison of the proposed PRF and the respective PRFs in [2] and [3] in terms of synchronization probability (red solid marker lines) and synchronization time (blue hollow marker lines) in the presence
of three attackers.
compare the performance of our synchronization approach with existing results in [2] and [3].

Synchronization Error = max{min{2π − |φi − φ j |, |φi − φ j |}
i, j∈N

where N is the index set of all legitimate oscillators.
Under three different topologies illustrated in Fig. 2.11, the evolution of synchronization error under
our PRF and those in [2, 3] are shown in Fig. 2.12, Fig. 2.13, and Fig. 2.14. In the simulations, the initial
phases of legitimate oscillators were randomly chosen from [0, 2π] and the coupling strength was set to
l = 0.7. The attack pulses were sent with a random time separation uniformly distributed in [1.85π, 2.15π].
It can be seen that the proposed PRF has the smallest synchronization error.
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Figure 2.11: Strongly-connected interaction topologies used in simulation.
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Figure 2.12: Comparison of the new PRF with the PRFs in [2] and [3] in terms of synchronization error in
a strongly-connected network of five PCOs (one is the attacker) with topology given in Fig. 2.11. (1). The
coupling strength was set to l = 0.7.

PRF in [2]

PRF in [3]

Our PRF

0.9

Synchronization Error

0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90 100 110 120 130 140 150

Time (s)

Figure 2.13: Comparison of the new PRF with the PRFs in [2] and [3] in terms of synchronization error in
a strongly-connected network of six PCOs (one is the attacker) with topology given in Fig. 2.11. (2). The
coupling strength was set to l = 0.7.
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Figure 2.14: Comparison of the new PRF with the PRFs in [2] and [3] in terms of synchronization error in
a strongly-connected network of six PCOs (one is the attacker) with topology given in Fig. 2.11. (3). The
coupling strength was set to l = 0.7.
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Chapter 3

A New Attack-Resilient Pulse-Based
Synchronization Mechanism for
All-to-all PCO Networks
3.1

Introduction
In this chapter, we consider the synchronization of PCOs under multiple stealthy Byzantine attack-

ers. In the pulse-based interaction framework where exchanged messages (so-called pulses) are identical
and content-free, Byzantine attacks mean compromised nodes injecting pulses using judiciously crafted patterns to disturb the synchronization process. We consider stealthy Byzantine attacks which are intelligent
and only use pulse injection patterns undetectable by legitimate nodes. So compared with existing results in
[2, 3, 64], the situation considered in this chapter is more difficult to deal with due to the intelligent behavior
of malicious attackers. By proposing a new pulse-based synchronization mechanism, we show that perfect
synchronization of legitimate oscillators can still be guaranteed even when their initial phases are randomly
distributed in the entire oscillation period [0, 2π], which is in distinct difference from our recent results in
Chapter 2 requiring initial phases to be restricted in a certain interval. The approach is applicable even when
individual oscillators do not have access to the total number of oscillators in a network.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces a new pulse-based synchronization
mechanism. Section 3.3 characterizes the synchronization condition of all-to-all PCOs under the new syn22

chronization mechanism in the absence of attacks. In Section 3.4, under a pulse-number based detection
mechanism, we characterize the condition for an attacker to keep stealthy, i.e., mounting attacks without being detected. In Section 3.5, we prove that synchronization of legitimate oscillators can be guaranteed even in
the presence of multiple stealthy Byzantine attackers. We also extend the results to relaxed initial conditions,
i.e., arbitrary distribution on the entire oscillation period [0, 2π] in Section 3.5. In Section 3.6, we further
show that our approach is still applicable even when the total number of oscillators in a network is unknown
to individual oscillators. Simulation results are presented in Section 3.7.

3.2

A New Pulse-Based Interaction Mechanism
Consider a network of N pulse-coupled oscillators. Each oscillator is equipped with a phase vari-

able. When the evolving phase of an oscillator satisfies a certain condition, the oscillator will emit a pulse.
Receiving a pulse from a neighboring oscillator will lead to the adjustment of the receiving oscillator’s phase,
which can be designed to achieve a desired collective behavior such as phase synchronization. Motivated by
the fact that the conventional pulse-based synchronization mechanism is vulnerable to attacks, we propose a
new pulse-based synchronization mechanism to enable resilience of PCO synchronization. To this end, we
first present the conventional pulse-based synchronization mechanism.
Conventional Pulse-Based Synchronization Mechanism [24]:
1. The phase φi of oscillator i evolves from 0 to 2π rad with a constant speed ω = 1 rad/second.
2. Once φi reaches 2π rad, oscillator i fires and resets its phase to 0.
3. Whenever oscillator i receives a pulse, it instantaneously resets its phase to:

φi+ = φi + l × F(φi )

(3.1)

where l ∈ (0, 1] is the coupling strength and F(•) is the phase response function (PRF) given below:

F(φ ) :=



 −φ

 2π − φ

23

0≤φ ≤π
π < φ ≤ 2π

(3.2)

In the conventional pulse-based synchronization mechanism, every incoming pulse triggers a jump
on the receiving oscillator’s phase, which makes attackers easy to perturb the phase of legitimate oscillators
and destroy their synchronization. Based on this observation, we propose a new pulse-based interaction
mechanism to improve the resilience of pulse-based synchronization. The key idea is to let an oscillator
adjust its phase only when sufficiently many pulses are received, as detailed below:
New Pulse-Based Synchronization Mechanism (Mechanism 3.1):
1. The phase φi of oscillator i evolves from 0 to 2π rad with a constant speed ω = 1 rad/second.
2. Once φi reaches 2π rad, oscillator i fires (emits a pulse) and resets its phase to 0.
3. When oscillator i receives a pulse at time instant t, it shifts its phase according to (3.1) only when both
of the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) an entire period T = 2π seconds has elapsed since initiation;
(b) in the past quarter period, oscillator i fired and received at least λ − 1 pulses, or oscillator i did not
fire but received at least λ pulses within this past quarter period, where λ = b(N − 1)/5c holds
and b•c is the largest integer no greater than “ • .”
Otherwise, the pulse has no effect on φi (t).

Fig. 3.1 gives the evolution of one legitimate oscillator’s phase in a network of eleven PCOs. Given
λ = b(N − 1)/5c = 2, we have that a pulse can trigger a phase jump on a receiving oscillator only when 1)
it is sent after time T has elapsed since initiation; and 2) in the past quarter period, at least two pulses were
received by the oscillator, or the oscillator fired and received at least one other pulse in the past quarter period.
Therefore, in Fig. 3.1, only the 9th pulse causes a jump on the phase of the considered oscillator.
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Figure 3.1: The phase evolution of a legitimate oscillator in an all-to-all network of eleven oscillators under
Mechanism 3.1. Vertical pulses represent incoming pulses.

24

Remark 3.1. Following [35, 36, 42], we assume that when a legitimate oscillator receives multiple pulses
simultaneously, it will process these pulses consecutively. In other words, no two pulses will be regarded as
an aggregated pulse.
Remark 3.2. Compared with the conventional pulse-based synchronization mechanism, the new one is more
resilient to malicious pulse attacks, as illustrated later by the simulation results in Fig. 3.7, Fig. 3.8, Fig. 3.9,
and Fig. 3.10. Rigorous analysis will be provided in Section 3.4.

3.3

Synchronization of All-to-All PCOs in the Absence of Attacks
In this section, we will show that all-to-all connected oscillators can be guaranteed to synchronize

under Mechanism 3.1 in the absence of attacks. To this end, we first define synchronization:
Definition 3.1 (Synchronization): We define synchronization to be achieved when all legitimate oscillators
fire at the same time instants.
To facilitate theoretical analysis, we also define containing arc as follows:
Definition 3.2 (Containing Arc): The containing arc is defined as the shortest arc on the unit circle that
contains all legitimate oscillators’ phases.
When oscillators’ phases approach synchronization, the length of the containing arc converges to
zero.
We first characterize the property of all-to-all PCO networks under Mechanism 3.1.
Lemma 3.1. In an attack-free all-to-all network of N PCOs, if the firing of an oscillator can trigger a phase
jump on another oscillator, then the firing can trigger phase jumps on all the other N − 1 oscillators.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that oscillator i’s firing at time instant ti triggers the phase of
oscillator j to jump, which, according to Mechanism 3.1, implies that oscillator j either fired and received at
least λ − 1 pulses in the past quarter period, or it did not fire in the past quarter period but received at least λ
pulses within. In both cases, it can be inferred that for any oscillator other than i, if it fired in the past quarter
period, then it must have received at least λ − 1 pulses under the considered all-to-all topology; or if it did not
fire in the past quarter period, then it must have received at least λ pulses within. Therefore, in an all-to-all
topology, if the firing of an oscillator i triggers another oscillator j to jump, then it will trigger all the other
N − 1 oscillators to jump.
Now we are in place to present the synchronization condition in the absence of attacks:
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Theorem 3.1. For an attack-free all-to-all network of N PCOs, if the length of the initial containing arc is
less than π rad, then Mechanism 3.1 can achieve perfect synchronization.
Proof. First, we will show that the length of the containing arc will never increase. It can be easily inferred
that the length of the containing arc remains unchanged if no oscillator jumps in phase. So we only need to
consider the case that an oscillator’s firing triggers a jump on another oscillator. Based on Lemma 3.1, one
can know that if the firing of an oscillator triggers a jump on another oscillator, it will trigger phase jumps on
all the other oscillators.
We assume that oscillator i fires at time instant ti whose pulse triggers phase jumps on all the other
oscillators. One can easily get φi (ti ) = 2π rad, i.e., the containing arc includes the phase point 2π rad at time
instant ti . Since the length of the containing arc is less than π rad, the phases of the other N − 1 oscillators at
this time instant can only be distributed in the following three ways, as depicted in Fig. 3.2:
1. all the other N − 1 oscillators’ phases reside in (π, 2π];
2. all the other N − 1 oscillators’ phases reside in [0, π);
3. the other N − 1 oscillators’ phases reside partially in [0, π) and partially in (π, 2π].
3.2.1
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Figure 3.2: Three possible phase distribution of all oscillators when oscillator i fires at time instant ti .
Denoting δ (ti ) as the length of the containing arc at time instant ti , we next show that δ (ti ) cannot
be increased by the firing of oscillator i in any of the three cases, i.e., δ + (ti ) ≤ δ (ti ) always holds.
1. When all the other N − 1 oscillators’ phases reside in (π, 2π], at time instant ti , the length of the
3.3.1

2π 0

3.3.2

containing arc can be obtained ias follows:

j

δ(ti)

δ(ti)
j

3.3.3

2π 0
i

2π 0
i
δ(ti)

k

k

δ (ti ) = φi (ti ) − min {φ j (ti )} = 2π − φ j (ti )
j∈N , j6=i

π

π

(3.3)

π

where N = {1, 2, · · · , N} represents the index set and j = arg min j∈N , j6=i φ j (ti ). After the firing of
oscillator i, we have φi+ (ti ) = 0. Under the PRF in (3.2), one can get φ j+ (ti ) = φ j (ti ) + l(2π − φ j (ti ))
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3.4.1

2π 0 k

3.4.2
h

2π 0
k

for j ∈ N , j 6= i. The length of the containing arc becomes
δ + (ti ) = 2π − min {φ j+ (ti )} + φi+ (ti ) = 2π − min {φ j+ (ti )}
j∈N , j6=i

j∈N , j6=i

= (1 − l)(2π − φ j (ti )) = (1 − l)δ (ti )

(3.4)

Since 0 < l ≤ 1 holds, one can easily get δ + (ti ) ≤ δ (ti ) in this case (Note that the equality mark holds
only when δ (ti ) = 0 is true, meaning that the network is synchronized).
2. When all the other oscillators’ phases reside in [0, π), at time instant ti , the length of the containing arc
can be obtained as follows:

δ (ti ) = 2π − φi (ti ) + max {φk (ti )} = φk̄ (ti )
k∈N ,k6=i

(3.5)

where k̄ = arg maxk∈N ,k6=i φk (ti ). After the firing of oscillator i, we have φi+ (ti ) = 0. Under the PRF in
(3.2), one can get φk+ (ti ) = (1 − l)φk (ti ) for k ∈ N , k 6= i and the length of the containing arc becomes
δ + (ti ) = max {φk+ (ti )} − φi+ (ti ) = max {φk+ (ti )} = (1 − l)φk̄ (ti ) = (1 − l)δ (ti )
k∈N ,k6=i

k∈N ,k6=i

(3.6)

Since 0 < l ≤ 1 holds, one can easily get δ + (ti ) ≤ δ (ti ) in this case (Note that the equality mark holds
only when δ (ti ) = 0 is true, meaning that the network is synchronized).
3. When the other N − 1 oscillators’ phases reside partially in [0, π) and partially in (π, 2π], given φi (ti ) =
2π rad, we represent the set of oscillators with phases in [0, π) as N1 and the set of oscillators with
phases in (π, 2π] as N2 . One can easily get N1 ∪ N2 = N and N1 ∩ N2 = 0.
/ The length of the
containing arc at time instant ti can be expressed as

δ (ti ) = 2π + max {φk (ti )} − min {φ j (ti )} = 2π + φk̄ (ti ) − φ j (ti )
k∈N1

j∈N2 , j6=i

(3.7)

where j = arg min j∈N2 , j6=i φ j (ti ) and k̄ = arg maxk∈N1 φk (ti ). After the firing of oscillator i, we have
φi+ (ti ) = 0. Under the PRF in (3.2), we can get φk+ (ti ) = (1 − l)φk (ti ) for k ∈ N1 and φ j+ (ti ) = φ j (ti ) +
l(2π − φ j (ti )) for j ∈ N2 , j 6= i. The length of the containing arc becomes
δ + (ti ) = 2π + max {φk+ (ti )} − min {φ j+ (ti )} = (1 − l)(2π + φk̄ (ti ) − φ j (ti )) = (1 − l)δ (ti ) (3.8)
k∈N1

j∈N2 , j6=i
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Since 0 < l ≤ 1 holds, one can easily get δ + (ti ) ≤ δ (ti ) in this case (Note that the equality mark holds
only when δ (ti ) = 0 is true, meaning that the network is synchronized).
Summarizing the above analysis, we can get that the length of the containing arc is non-increasing.
In addition, if the firing of an oscillator triggers a jump on another oscillator, then the firing will reduce the
length of the containing arc to δ + (t) = (1 − l)δ (t).
Next, we proceed to prove that the length of the containing arc will decrease to 0. To this end, we
first show that every oscillator will fire at least once within a certain time period. Without loss of generality,
we set the initial time instant as t0 = 0. Since the initial length of the containing arc is less than π rad and
it is non-increasing, as analyzed earlier, there exists a time instant t1 > T at which all oscillators’ phases
reside in (π, 2π]. At this time instant, noting that the PRF in (3.2) is non-negative in (π, 2π], we can get
that exchanged pulses can only advance or have no effect on a receiving oscillator’s phase. Therefore, all
oscillators will reach phase 2π rad and fire within the time interval [t1 ,t1 + T /2]. On the other hand, since
the PRF in (3.2) is non-positive in [0, π], we can get that exchanged pulses can only delay or have no effect
on a receiving oscillator’s phase residing in [0, π]. So it takes at least T /2 time for an oscillator’s phase to
evolve from 0 to π rad. Therefore, no oscillator can surpass phase point π rad at time instant t1 + T /2. In
other words, each oscillator fired once within [t1 ,t1 + T /2] and all oscillators’ phases reside in [0, π] at time
instant t1 + T /2.
Next, we proceed to prove that there exists at least one oscillator, whose firing can trigger jumps
on all the other oscillators’ phases within the time interval [t1 ,t1 + T /2]. Assume to the contrary that no
oscillator’s firing triggers a jump on any other oscillators within [t1 ,t1 + T /2]. So condition b) of Mechanism
3.1 cannot be satisfied, which means that no greater than λ oscillators fired in any quarter period within the
time interval [t1 ,t1 + T /2]. Hence, no greater than λ oscillators fired in the time interval [t1 ,t1 + T /4] and
the same is true for the interval [t1 + T /4,t1 + T /2]. Therefore, no greater than 2λ < N oscillators fired
within [t1 ,t1 + T /2], which contradicts the fact that all oscillators fired once within [t1 ,t1 + T /2]. So we can
conclude that there exists at least one firing event that triggers phase jumps on the other N − 1 oscillators
within [t1 ,t1 + T /2].
Without loss of generality, we assume that oscillator i fires at ti ∈ [t1 ,t1 + T /2], which triggers phase
jumps on all the other N −1 oscillators. Based on the above analysis, we have that the length of the containing
arc is decreased by the firing of oscillator i when δ (ti ) 6= 0.
At time instant t1 +T /2, the phases of all oscillators reside in [0, π] and they will evolve freely toward
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(π, 2π]. By repeating the above analyses, we can get that the length of the containing arc will be decreased
by the firing of at least one oscillator in a firing round until it converges to 0. Therefore, synchronization of
the network can be achieved.
Next, we show that the initial phase distribution requirement in Theorem 3.1 can be removed, i.e.,
under all-to-all topology, the new synchronization mechanism can guarantee synchronization even when the
phases of oscillators are arbitrarily distributed in [0, 2π].
Theorem 3.2. For an attack-free all-to-all network of N PCOs, if the initial phases of all oscillators are randomly distributed in [0, 2π], then Mechanism 3.1 can achieve perfect synchronization as long as the coupling
strength satisfies l > 0.5.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we set the initial time instant as t0 = 0. First, we will show that in any time
interval [t1 ,t1 + T ] with t1 > T , there exists one firing event from some oscillator which can trigger phase
jumps on all the other N − 1 oscillators.
Assume to the contrary that no pulse can trigger a jump within [t1 ,t1 + T ]. One can get that the phase
distance between any two oscillators is invariant within [t1 ,t1 + T ]. Then every oscillator will evolve freely
with natural frequency ω for a full cycle and fire once during [t1 ,t1 + T ]. In other words, N oscillators fired
within the interval [t1 ,t1 + T ].
Under the assumption that no pulse can trigger a jump on any oscillator’s phase within [t1 ,t1 + T ],
we have that condition b) of Mechanism 3.1 cannot be satisfied, i.e., no greater than λ oscillators fired in any
quarter oscillation period within the time interval [t1 ,t1 + T ]. Hence, no greater than λ oscillators fired in the
time interval [t1 ,t1 + T /4] and the same is true for intervals [t1 + T /4,t1 + T /2], [t1 + T /2,t1 + 3T /4], and
[t1 + 3T /4,t1 + T ]. Therefore, no greater than 4λ < N oscillators fired within [t1 ,t1 + T ], which contradicts
the assumption that N oscillators fired within [t1 ,t1 + T ]. So at least one oscillator’s firing will trigger all the
other oscillators’ phases to jump in [t1 ,t1 + T ].
We assume that oscillator i’s firing at ti ∈ [t1 ,t1 + T ] triggers a jump on all the other N − 1 oscillators.
Denoting φk (ti ) as the phase of oscillator k ∈ N = {1, 2, · · · , N} at time instant ti , one can get φi+ (ti ) = 0
and φk+ (ti ) = φk (ti ) + F(φk (ti )) for k ∈ N , k 6= i. When l > 0.5 is true, the PRF in (3.2) leads to φk+ (ti ) ∈
(3π/2, 2π] for φk (ti ) ∈ (π, 2π] and φk+ (ti ) ∈ [0, π/2) for φk (ti ) ∈ [0, π]. Hence, the phase of all oscillators
reside in (3π/2, 2π] ∪ [0, π/2) and the length of the containing arc is less than π rad. Using Theorem 3.1, we
have that all oscillators will synchronize.
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3.4

Stealthy Byzantine Attacks
The concept of Byzantine attacks stems from the Byzantine generals problem [48]. It is used to

describe a traitor commander who sends or relays fake information to other commanders to avoid the loyal
ones from reaching agreement [47]. In the case of PCO synchronization, Byzantine attacks are assumed to
be able to compromise an oscillator and completely take over its behavior. So an oscillator compromised
by Byzantine attacks will emit pulses at arbitrary time instants. Apparently, if an attacker keeps sending
pulses continuously without rest, it can effectively prevent legitimate oscillators from reaching synchronization. However, such a manner of attacks will also render themselves easily detectable, just as jamming of
communication channels being easy to detect, isolate, and remove [69]. Therefore, we are only interested in
“stealthy” Byzantine attacks which cannot be detected by legitimate oscillators in the pulse-based interaction
framework.
In all-to-all PCO networks, since all exchanged pulses are identical with no embedded content such
as source or destination information, conventional content-checking based attack-detection mechanisms such
as [1] cannot be applied. We propose to let each node detect potential attacks by monitoring the number of
pulses it receives within a certain time interval. The basic rationale is as follows: In a given time interval, if the
number of received pulses is greater than the maximally possible number of pulses emitted by all legitimate
oscillators, then it is safe to conclude that an attacker is present who injected the superfluous pulses. To this
end, we first characterize the number of pulses that an oscillator can receive within a certain time interval:
Theorem 3.3. For an all-to-all network of N legitimate PCOs under Mechanism 3.1, one oscillator can
receive at most N − 1 pulses within any time interval [t,t + T /2] for t ≥ 0.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that oscillator i emits a pulse and resets its phase to 0 at time
instant t1 , i.e., φi (t1 ) = 2π rad and φi+ (t1 ) = 0. Under Mechanism 3.1 and the PRF in (3.2), one can get that
the phase evolution of oscillator i from 0 to π rad can only be decelerated (or unaffected) by received pulses.
Hence, it takes oscillator i at least T /2 time to evolve from 0 to π rad, which, combined with the fact that a
node cannot jump from π rad to 2π rad instantaneously (the value of PRF in (3.2) is −π rad at phase π rad),
further means that it takes oscillator i over T /2 to evolve from 0 to 2π rad. In other words, within any time
interval [t,t + T /2] for t ≥ 0, oscillator i can emit at most one pulse. Therefore, an oscillator can emit at most
one pulse during an arbitrary time interval [t,t + T /2] for t ≥ 0.
Based on the above analysis, we know that for an all-to-all network of N oscillators, at most N pulses
can be emitted during an arbitrary time interval [t,t + T /2] for t ≥ 0. So an oscillator can receive at most
30

N − 1 pulses within an arbitrary time interval [t,t + T /2] for t ≥ 0.
Based on Theorem 3.3, we have, under the pulse number based detection mechanism, that any
oscillator’s receiving more than N − 1 pulses within an arbitrary time interval [t,t + T /2] implies the presence
of attacks.
From the above analysis, the condition for mounting stealthy Byzantine attacks is given as follows:
Stealthy Byzantine Attack Model: For an all-to-all network of N PCOs under Mechanism 3.1, one compromised oscillator can launch stealthy Byzantine attacks as long as it injects pulses with a time separation
of length over T /2.
Remark 3.3. In this chapter, the detection mechanism only considers the minimal separation within which
one oscillator can receive at most N − 1 pulses (i.e., T /2) because it is extremely hard to find a tight maximal
separation during which one oscillator can receive at least N − 1 pulses. Another reason for not imposing a
maximal separation is that in practice, pulse dropout is unavoidable, which makes it impossible to guarantee
that each oscillator will receive at least N − 1 pulses within a certain time interval.

3.5

Synchronization of All-to-All PCO Networks in the Presence of
Stealthy Byzantine Attacks
In this section, we address the synchronization of PCO networks in the presence of stealthy Byzan-

tine attacks. Among N PCOs, we assume that M are compromised and act as stealthy Byzantine attackers.
Specifically, we will show that the proposed pulse-based interaction mechanism can synchronize legitimate
oscillators even in the presence of multiple stealthy Byzantine attackers. More interestingly, we can prove
that legitimate oscillators can synchronize even when their initial phases are randomly distributed in the entire
oscillation period [0, 2π]. Similar to Lemma 3.1, we first establish the following property for PCO networks:
Lemma 3.2. For an all-to-all network of N PCOs among which M are compromised and act according to
the stealthy Byzantine attack model in Section 3.4, if the firing of an arbitrary oscillator (either legitimate
or malicious) triggers a phase jump on a legitimate oscillator, then the firing can trigger phase jumps on all
legitimate oscillators.
Proof. Noting that the topology of the network is all-to-all, one can get that an oscillator’s pulse can be
received by all the other oscillators. Hence, Lemma 3.2 can be acquired by following the same line of
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reasoning in Lemma 3.1.
Now we are in position to present the synchronization condition of all-to-all PCO networks in the
presence attacks.
Theorem 3.4. For an all-to-all network of N PCOs among which M are compromised and act according
to the stealthy Byzantine attack model in Section 3.4, if the number of compromised oscillators M is no
greater than b(N − 1)/5c and the initial length of the containing arc is less than π/2 rad, then all legitimate
oscillators can be perfectly synchronized under Mechanism 3.1.
Proof. We divide the proof into two parts. In part I, we will prove that the length of the containing arc of
legitimate oscillators is non-increasing. In Part II, we prove that the length of the containing arc of legitimate
oscillators will decrease to 0.
Part I (The length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators is non-increasing): It can be easily
inferred that the length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators remains unchanged if no legitimate
oscillator jumps in phase. So we only consider the case that an oscillator’s firing (say oscillator i, either
legitimate or malicious) triggers a jump on a legitimate oscillator, say oscillator j where j 6= i. Based on
Lemma 3.2, if the firing of oscillator i triggers a phase jump on a legitimate oscillator j, it will trigger phase
jumps on all legitimate oscillators.
We assume that oscillator i’s firing time instant is ti . Since oscillator i can be a legitimate oscillator or
an attacker, we have to show that in neither case will the length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators
increase.
Case 1: Oscillator i is legitimate.
When oscillator i is legitimate, we have φi (ti ) = 2π rad, i.e., the containing arc of legitimate oscillators includes point 2π rad at time instant ti . Since the number of legitimate oscillators is N − M and the
length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators is less than π/2 rad, the phases of the other N − M − 1
legitimate oscillators can only be distributed in the following three ways at time instant ti , as depicted in Fig.
3.3:
1. all the other N − M − 1 legitimate oscillators’ phases reside in (3π/2, 2π];
2. all the other N − M − 1 legitimate oscillators’ phases reside in [0, π/2);
3. the other N −M −1 legitimate oscillators’ phases reside partially in [0, π/2) and partially in (3π/2, 2π].
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Figure 3.3: Three possible phase distribution of all legitimate oscillators when legitimate oscillator i fires at
time instant ti .
Denoting δ (ti ) as the length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators at time instant ti , one can
easily obtain δ + (ti ) ≤ δ (ti ) in all above three cases by following the same line of reasoning in Theorem 3.1.
Hence, we can get that the firing of a legitimate oscillator cannot increase the length of the containing arc of
legitimate oscillators.

3.4.1

3.4.2

2π 0 k

h

Case 2: Oscillator i is a stealthy Byzantine
attacker.
δ(ti)

2π 0
k
δ(ti)

k a pulse, legitimate oscillator j will jump in phase
According to Mechanism 3.1, upon receiving

when it either fired and received at least λ − 1πpulses in the past quarter
period, or it did not fire but received
π
at least λ pulses in the past quarter period. In both cases, it can be inferred that at least λ oscillators fired in
the quarter period immediately prior to ti .
Under the assumption that the number of compromised oscillators satisfies M ≤ λ , we can get that
at most M − 1 attack pulses can be emitted in the quarter period prior to ti . Because M − 1 ≤ λ − 1 is true and
at least λ pulses are emitted in the past quarter period, one can obtain that at least one legitimate oscillator
fired in the quarter period immediately prior to ti .
Since the PRF in (3.2) is non-positive in [0, π/2], we can get that exchanged pulses can only delay
or have no effect on a receiving legitimate oscillator whose phase resides in [0, π/2]. So it takes at least
T /4 time for a legitimate oscillator to evolve from 0 to π/2 rad. Hence, at least one legitimate oscillator
(who fired in the past quarter period) has phase residing in [0, π/2] at time instant ti . Since the length of the
containing arc of legitimate oscillators is less than π/2 rad, the phases of all N − M legitimate oscillators can
only be distributed in the following two ways at ti , as depicted in Fig. 3.4:
1. all N − M legitimate oscillators reside in [0, π), wherein at least one legitimate oscillator resides in
[0, π/2];
2. the N − M legitimate oscillators reside partially in [0, π/2] and partially in (3π/2, 2π].
Denoting δ (ti ) as the length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators at time instant ti , next we
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Figure 3.4: Two possible phase distribution of all legitimate oscillators when compromised oscillator i fires
at time instant ti .
show that δ (ti ) cannot be increased by the firing of oscillator i in both scenarios, i.e., δ + (ti ) ≤ δ (ti ) always
holds.
1. When the phases of all N − M legitimate oscillators reside in [0, π) at time instant ti , the length of the
containing arc can be described by

δ (ti ) = max {φk (ti )} − min {φk (ti )} = φk̄ (ti ) − φk (ti )
k∈N3

k∈N3

(3.9)

where N3 is the index set of all legitimate oscillators, k = arg mink∈N3 φk (ti ) and k̄ = arg maxk∈N3 φk (ti ).
After the firing of oscillator i, one can get φk+ (ti ) = (1 − l)φk (ti ) for k ∈ N3 . Hence, the length of the
containing arc of legitimate oscillators becomes

δ + (ti ) = max {φk+ (ti )} − min {φk+ (ti )} = φk̄+ (ti ) − φk+ (ti ) = (1 − l)(φk̄ (ti ) − φk (ti ))
k∈N3

k∈N3

= (1 − l)δ (ti )

(3.10)

Sine 0 < l ≤ 1 holds, one can get δ + (ti ) < δ (ti ) whenever δ (ti ) is nonzero.
2. When the N − M legitimate oscillators reside partially in [0, π/2] and partially in (3π/2, 2π], we denote
N4 as the set of legitimate oscillators with phases in [0, π/2] and N5 as the set of legitimate oscillators
with phases in (3π/2, 2π]. Then the length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators at time instant
ti can be described by

δ (ti ) = 2π + max {φk (ti )} − min {φh (ti )} = 2π + φk̄ (ti ) − φh (ti )
k∈N4

h∈N5

(3.11)

where k̄ = arg maxk∈N4 φk (ti ) and h = arg minh∈N5 φh (ti ). After the firing of oscillator i, one can get
φk+ (ti ) = (1 − l)φk (ti ) for k ∈ N4 and φh+ (ti ) = φh (ti ) + l(2π − φh (ti )) for h ∈ N5 . Hence, the length of
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the containing arc of legitimate oscillators becomes

δ + (ti ) = 2π + max {φk+ (ti )} − min {φh+ (ti )} = 2π + φk̄+ (ti ) − φh+ (ti )
k∈N4

h∈N5

= (1 − l)(2π + φk̄ (ti ) − φh (ti )) = (1 − l)δ (ti )

(3.12)

Sine 0 < l ≤ 1 holds, one can get δ + (ti ) < δ (ti ) whenever δ (ti ) is nonzero.
In conclusion, the length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators is non-increasing. In addition,
if the firing of an oscillator triggers a jump on a legitimate oscillator, then the firing will reduce the length of
the containing arc of legitimate oscillators to δ + (ti ) = (1 − l)δ (ti ).
Part II (The length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators will decrease to 0): To prove that the
length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators will keep decreasing, we only need to show that pulses
which trigger phase jumps on legitimate oscillators will keep occurring until the length of the containing
arc of legitimate oscillators reaches zero. Because if none of legitimate oscillators’ phases are trapped in
some sub-interval within [0, 2π], then all legitimate oscillators will keep firing repeatedly within one quarter
period interval from each other (note that as proven before, the containing arc of legitimate oscillators is
non-increasing and hence is always less than π/2 rad). Given that the number of legitimate oscillators is
N − M > λ , it can be easily inferred that at least the firing of one legitimate oscillator will trigger a phase
jump according to Mechanism 3.1 in Section 3.2. Therefore, to prove that the length of the containing arc of
legitimate oscillators will decrease to zero, it is sufficient to show that no legitimate oscillator will stop from
firing.
Given that once the phase of a legitimate oscillator surpasses π rad, it cannot be stopped from firing
(because its phase can only be advanced under the PRF in (3.2)). Further taking into account the fact that
pulses from stealthy attackers alone (no greater than λ ) are not enough to trigger any phase shift according
to Mechanism 3.1 in Section 3.2, we have that at least one legitimate oscillator can fire repeatedly (Note that
if no phase jumps are triggered, then legitimate oscillators will evolve freely and fire periodically).
Next, we proceed to prove that if one legitimate oscillator can fire, i.e., can evolve into the interval
(π, 2π], then all legitimate oscillators can evolve into (π, 2π]. Without loss of generality, we assume that
the legitimate oscillator which can fire surpasses phase π rad at time instant ti . Given that the length of the
containing arc of legitimate oscillators is always strictly less than π/2 rad, as proven before, we have that at
time instant ti , all legitimate oscillators have phases residing in (π/2, 3π/2).
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Noting that the phase of a legitimate oscillator having phase in [0, π] can only be delayed (or unaffected) by received pulses, it can be easily inferred that after the most recent firing from legitimate oscillators,
it took all legitimate oscillators at least T /4 to evolve to the current phase in (π/2, 3π/2), during which no
legitimate oscillators sent any pulse. Therefore, starting from ti , attack pulses will not affect the phase of
legitimate oscillators until at least one legitimate oscillator reaches 2π rad to fire, which takes at least T /4.
So after the at least T /4 time of free evolution, the phases of legitimate oscillators become residing in (π, 2π],
which means that all legitimate oscillators will fire.
Therefore, we can conclude that the length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators will keep
decreasing until it reaches 0, i.e., the achievement of synchronization of legitimate oscillators.
Next, we show that the initial phase distribution requirement in Theorem 3.4 can be removed, i.e.,
Mechanism 3.1 can guarantee synchronization in the presence of attacks even when all legitimate oscillators’
initial phases are arbitrarily distributed in [0, 2π].
Theorem 3.5. For an all-to-all network of N PCOs, within which M oscillators are compromised and act
as stealthy Byzantine attackers, if the number of compromised oscillators M is no greater than b(N − 1)/5c,
then all legitimate oscillators can be perfectly synchronized under Mechanism 3.1 from any initial phase
distribution when the coupling strength satisfies l > 0.75.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we set the initial time instant to t0 = 0. Similar to the proof of Theorem
3.2, we first show that for any time interval [t1 ,t1 + T ] with t1 > T , there exists one firing event which can
trigger a phase jump on a legitimate oscillator.
Assume to the contrary that no pulse can trigger a phase jump on a legitimate oscillator within
[t1 ,t1 + T ]. One can get that the phase distance between any two legitimate oscillators is invariant within
[t1 ,t1 + T ]. Since T is the natural period, every legitimate oscillator will evolve freely for a full cycle on the
unit circle and fire once during [t1 ,t1 + T ]. In other words, N − M legitimate oscillators fired within [t1 ,t1 + T ].
On the other hand, under the stealthy Byzantine attack model in Section 3.4, every attacker can fire at most
twice during [t1 ,t1 + T ]. Hence, at least N − M oscillators fired during [t1 ,t1 + T ].
Under the assumption that no pulse can trigger a jump on any legitimate oscillator within [t1 ,t1 + T ],
we have that condition b) of Mechanism 3.1 cannot be satisfied, i.e., no greater than λ oscillators fired in any
quarter oscillation period within the time interval [t1 ,t1 + T ]. Hence, no greater than λ oscillators fired in the
time interval [t1 ,t1 + T /4] and the same is true for intervals [t1 + T /4,t1 + T /2], [t1 + T /2,t1 + 3T /4], and
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[t1 + 3T /4,t1 + T ]. Therefore, no greater than 4λ oscillators fired within [t1 ,t1 + T ] and one can easily get

4λ < N − M

(3.13)

which contradicts the assumption that at least N − M oscillators fired within [t1 ,t1 + T ]. Therefore, at least
one oscillator’s firing can trigger a phase jump on a legitimate oscillator within [t1 ,t1 + T ]. Based on Lemma
3.2, we further know that the pulse will trigger phase jumps on all legitimate oscillators.
Denoting φk (ti ) as the phase of a legitimate oscillator jumps in phase at time instant ti , one can get
φk+ (ti ) = φk (ti ) + F(φk (ti )). When l > 0.75 is true, phase shift under PRF in (3.2) leads to φk+ (ti ) ∈ (7π/4, 2π]
for φk (ti ) ∈ (π, 2π] and φk+ (ti ) ∈ [0, π/4) for φk (ti ) ∈ [0, π]. Hence, the phase of all legitimate oscillators will
reside in (7π/4, 2π] ∪ [0, π/4) after this firing event and the length of the containing arc will become less
than π/2 rad. Using Theorem 3.4, we have that all oscillators will synchronize despite the presence of
attackers.
Remark 3.4. The proof above also contains the reason for us to set λ to b(N − 1)/5c in Mechanism 3.1:
Our key idea for attack resilience is to avoid attack pulses alone from being able to trigger phase jumps on
legitimate oscillators, so we have to choose λ that is no less than M, the number of attackers. Further taking
into consideration of (3.13), which is necessary to guarantee global synchronization, we can have λ < N/5.
Therefore, we set λ = b(N − 1)/5c, the maximal integer satisfying λ < N/5, to make the Mechanism be able
to tolerate more attackers.
Remark 3.5. It is worth noting that existing resilient pulse-based synchronization approaches in [2] and [3]
cannot guarantee perfect synchronization for all-to-all PCO networks under the considered stealthy Byzantine attackers even when the coupling strength is larger than 0.5, as illustrated by the numerical simulations
in Fig. 3.9 and Fig. 3.10. Hence, our synchronization approach is highly non-trivial and more resilient in
enabling PCO synchronization in the presence of such attackers.
Next, we analyze the convergence speed of Mechanism 3.1. From the proof of Theorem 3.4 and
Theorem 3.5, we know that the speed at which the containing arc of legitimate oscillators decreases to zero
is proportional to the number of effective pulses (i.e., pulses which can trigger jumps on all legitimate oscillators’ phases) and the magnitude of phase jumps. Hence we have the following results on the convergence
speed of Mechanism 3.1:
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Theorem 3.6. Under the synchronization conditions in Theorem 3.5, the time to synchronization of all legitimate oscillators under Mechanism 3.1 is propositional to
λ
l(N − M)

(3.14)

Proof. According to the proof of Theorem 3.4 and Theorem 3.5, we know that the speed at which the containing arc of legitimate oscillators decreases to zero is proportional to the number of effective pulses (i.e.,
pulses which can trigger jumps on all legitimate oscillators’ phases) and the magnitude of phase jumps. One
can easily get that the number of effective pulses is proportional to the number of legitimate oscillators, i.e.,
N − M, but inversely proportional to λ , and the magnitude of phase jumps is proportional to the coupling
strength l under a given phase response function. Therefore, we can get that the time to synchronization is
proportional to (3.14).
Remark 3.6. From Theorem 3.6, and the synchronization derivations in Theorem 3.5, we can get that if
λ were to allowed to be chosen from {1, 2, ..., b(N − 1)/5c} and is no less than the number of attackers
in the network, then synchronization can also be achieved. Furthermore, combining Theorem 3.6 (which
indicates that a larger λ reduces synchronization speed) and Remark 3.4 (which implies that a larger λ leads
to resilience to more stealthy attackers), we have that a trade-off exists between resilience to attackers and
synchronization speed if λ in Mechanism 3.1 were allowed to be chosen from {1, 2, ..., b(N − 1)/5c}. In this
chapter, we set λ to b(N − 1)/5c to guarantee resilience to more attackers.

3.6

Extension to the Case where N is Unknown
In this section, we extend our approach to the case where the total number of oscillators, i.e., N, is

unknown to individual oscillators. In this case, the exact number of compromised oscillators that a network
can tolerate, i.e., λ in Mechanism 3.1, cannot be determined precisely by each individual oscillator. As the
implementation of Mechanism 3.1 requires the knowledge of λ , we have to revise it to accommodate the fact
that λ is unavailable. Based on the observation that under the stealthy attacker model in Section 3.4, each
oscillator can use the number of received pulses to estimate the number of oscillators in a network, we revise
Mechanism 3.1 to make it applicable to cases where N is unknown to individual oscillators. More specifically, we will prove that the revised mechanism can still guarantee global synchronization in the presence of
compromised oscillators as long as their number is no larger than 10% of the total number of oscillators in
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the network.
The same as Mechanism 3.1, we allow each oscillator to evolve freely for the first oscillation period
[0, T ]. So each oscillator’s phase will reach 2π rad at a certain time instant within [0, T ] upon which the
oscillator will emit a pulse. Note that when the network is all-to-all, every oscillator will receive the same
number of pulses. Based on the number of received pulses in the first oscillation period [0, T ], we propose
the following mechanism:
New Pulse-Based Synchronization Mechanism (Mechanism 3.2):
1. The phase φi of oscillator i evolves from 0 to 2π rad with a constant speed ω = 1 rad/second.
2. Once φi reaches 2π rad, oscillator i fires (emits a pulse) and resets its phase to 0.
3. In the first oscillation period [0, T ], each oscillator i counts the number of received pulses, and stores
this number as Pi .
4. When oscillator i receives a pulse at time instant t, it shifts its phase according to (3.1) only when both
of the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) an entire period T has elapsed since initiation;
(b) in the past quarter period, oscillator i fired and received at least b(Pi − 1)/5.5c − 1 pulses, or
oscillator i did not fire but received at least b(Pi − 1)/5.5c pulses within this past quarter period,
where b•c means the largest integer no greater than “ • .”
Otherwise, the pulse has no effect on φi (t).

Next, we show that Mechanism 3.2 can guarantee synchronization even when the total number of oscillators, i.e., N, is unknown to individual oscillators. Under the assumption that the portion of compromised
oscillators is no larger than 10%, we first give a condition for local synchronization, i.e., synchronization
when the initial phases of legitimate oscillators are constrained in a certain range, then we prove that when
the coupling strength is over 0.75, the network can synchronize from an arbitrary initial phase distribution.
Theorem 3.7. For an all-to-all PCO network of N oscillators where no more than 10% of all oscillators
are compromised and act as stealthy Byzantine attackers, if the initial length of the containing arc of all
legitimate oscillators is less than π/2 rad, even with N completely unknown to individual oscillators, all
legitimate oscillators can be perfectly synchronized under Mechanism 3.2.
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Proof. Under Mechanism 3.2, no pulse will trigger a jump on any legitimate oscillator’s phase within the first
oscillation period [0, T ]. So every legitimate oscillator will evolve freely for a full cycle, i.e., every legitimate
oscillator will fire once within the first oscillation period. In the meantime, according to the stealthy Byzantine
attack model in Section 3.4, every stealthy Byzantine attacker can emit at most two pulses within the first
oscillation period [0, T ]. Further more, under all-to-all connection, the number of pulses each legitimate
oscillator receives within the first oscillation period, i.e., Pi , is identical.
The proof follows the same line of reasoning as Theorem 3.4. More specifically, using a same
argument as Part I of the proof of Theorem 3.4, we can obtain that if the number of attackers in the network
is no larger than the b(Pi − 1)/5.5c in step 4). b) in Mechanism 3.2, then a pulse from neither a legitimate
oscillator nor a stealthy Byzantine attacker could expand the containing arc of legitimate oscillators, i.e., the
length of the containing arc is non-increasing. Moreover, following the same argument in Part II of the proof
of Theorem 3.4, we know that if b(Pi − 1)/5.5c ≤ b(N − 1)/5c = λ holds, then at least the firing of one
legitimate oscillator will reduce the length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators and no legitimate
oscillator will stop from firing until synchronization is achieved. Therefore, to prove that synchronization
of legitimate oscillators will be achieved, it suffices to show b0.1Nc ≤ b(Pi − 1)/5.5c ≤ b(N − 1)/5c is true,
where b0.1Nc is the maximal number of attackers in the network and b•c denotes the largest integer no greater
than “ • .”
Based on the assumption that the portion of compromised oscillators is no larger than 10% and every
stealthy Byzantine attacker can emit at most two pulses within the first oscillation period [0, T ], we have the
following relationship:
N − 1 − b0.1Nc ≤ Pi ≤ N − 1 + b0.1Nc

(3.15)

Noticing b0.1Nc ≤ 0.1N, we further have

N − 1 − 0.1N ≤ Pi ≤ N − 1 + 0.1N
⇒0.9N − 2 ≤ Pi − 1 ≤ N − 1 + 0.1(N − 1)
⇒(0.9N − 2)/5.5 ≤ (Pi − 1)/5.5 ≤ (N − 1)/5
⇒b(0.9N − 2)/5.5c ≤ b(Pi − 1)/5.5c ≤ b(N − 1)/5c

(3.16)

One can easily get b0.1Nc ≤ b(0.9N − 2)/5.5c for N ≥ 3. (Note that under the attacker less than 10%
assumption, the network will contain no attackers when N < 3 and hence every oscillator can use Pi to
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precisely estimate the number of oscillators in the network and achieve synchronization according to Theorem
3.1.) Substituting the above inequality into (3.16) lead to

b0.1Nc ≤ b(Pi − 1)/5.5c ≤ b(N − 1)/5c = λ

for N ≥ 3. Therefore, we can get that all legitimate oscillators can be perfectly synchronized under Mechanism 3.2.
Next, we show that the initial phase distribution requirement in Theorem 3.7 can be removed, i.e.,
Mechanism 3.2 can guarantee synchronization in the presence of stealthy Byzantine attacks even when all
legitimate oscillators’ initial phases are arbitrarily distributed in [0, 2π].
Theorem 3.8. For an all-to-all PCO network of N oscillators where no more than 10% of all oscillators
are compromised and act as stealthy Byzantine attackers, even with N completely unknown to individual
oscillators, all legitimate oscillators can be perfectly synchronized under Mechanism 3.2 from any initial
phase distribution as long as the coupling strength satisfies l > 0.75.
Proof. Proof of Theorem 3.8 can be obtained following Theorem 3.5 and Theorem 3.7 and is omitted.
Remark 3.7. It is worth noting that the maximally allowable number of attackers in a PCO network is
b0.1Nc when the network size N is unknown, which is less than the maximally allowable number of composed
oscillators λ = b(N − 1)/5c when the network size N is known. This reduction of maximally allowable
compromised oscillators is consistent with our intuition that less knowledge of a PCO network reduces the
capability of attack-resilient synchronization design.
Next, similar to Theorem 3.6, we present the convergence speed of Mechanism 3.2 where N is
unknown to individual oscillators:
Theorem 3.9. Under the synchronization conditions in Theorem 3.8, the time to synchronization of all legitimate oscillators under Mechanism 3.2 is propositional to
b(Pi − 1)/5.5c
l(N − b0.1Nc)
Proof. Proof of Theorem 3.9 can be obtained following the argument in Theorem 3.6 and is omitted.
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(3.17)

3.7
3.7.1

Simulations
Attack-Free Case
We first considered the situation without attackers. We simulated an all-to-all network of 11 PCOs

under Mechanism 3.1. The initial time was set to t0 = 0 and the phases of oscillators were randomly chosen
from [0, π). Hence, the initial length of the containing arc satisfied δ (t0 ) < π. According to Theorem 3.1, the
network will synchronize. This was confirmed by numerical simulations in Fig. 3.5, which showed that the
length of the containing arc converged to zero.
To verify Theorem 3.2, we randomly distributed the initial phases across the entire oscillation period
[0, 2π] and simulated the network under coupling strength l = 0.51. The evolution of the containing arc was
presented in Fig. 3.6, which confirmed that Mechanism 3.1 can achieve synchronization even when the initial
phases are randomly distributed in the entire phase space [0, 2π].
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Figure 3.5: Phase evolution and the length of the containing arc of 11 PCOs under Mechanism 3.1 in the
absence of attacks. The initial phases of all oscillators were randomly chosen from [0, π). The coupling
strength was set to l = 0.2.

3.7.2

In the Presence of Stealthy Byzantine Attacks
Using the same network, we ran simulations in the presence of stealthy Byzantine attacks. We

assumed that 2 of the 11 oscillators were compromised and acted as stealthy Byzantine attackers. The initial
time was set to t0 = 0 and the initial phases of the 9 legitimate oscillators were randomly distributed in
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Figure 3.6: Phase evolution and the length of the containing arc of 11 PCOs under Mechanism 3.1 in the
absence of attacks. The initial phases of all oscillators were randomly chosen from [0, 2π]. The coupling
strength was set to l = 0.51.
[0, π/2). Hence, the initial length of the containing arc was less than π/2 rad.
The phase evolution of the 9 legitimate oscillators under Mechanism 3.1 is given in Fig. 3.7 (b) and
Fig. 3.8 (b), with the firing time instants of attackers denoted by asterisks on the x-axis. The results confirmed that Mechanism 3.1 is resilient to stealthy attacks. However, conventional pulse-base synchronization
approaches in [2] and [3] failed to achieve synchronization, as illustrated in Fig. 3.7 (a) and Fig. 3.8 (a),
respectively, which confirmed the advantages of the new mechanism.
Theorem 3.5 indicates that Mechanism 3.1 can achieve synchronization in the presence of stealthy
Byzantine attacks even when the initial phase distribution is not restricted, i.e., the phases are randomly
distributed in [0, 2π]. To verify Theorem 3.5, we set l = 0.76 and simulated the network. Results in Fig. 3.9
(b) and Fig. 3.10 (b) confirmed Theorem 3.5. Phase evolution under the same condition was also simulated
under the conventional pulse-based synchronization approaches in [2] and [3], respectively. The results in
Fig. 3.9 (a) and Fig. 3.10 (a) showed that neither of the conventional approaches can achieve synchronization,
which further confirmed the advantages of Mechanism 3.1.
We also ran simulations when the network size was unknown to individual oscillators. For an allto-all network of 20 oscillators, we assumed that two were compromised and acted as stealthy Byzantine
attackers. The initial time was set to t0 = 0 and the initial phases of the legitimates oscillators were randomly
distributed in [0, π/2). Hence, the initial length of the containing arc is less than π/2. According to Theorem
3.7, all legitimate oscillators will synchronize. This was confirmed by numerical simulations in Fig. 3.11
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Figure 3.7: Phase evolutions of an all-to-all network of 11 PCOs, two of which are compromised with firing
time instants represented by asterisks. Plot (a) and (b) present the phase evolutions of the 9 legitimate oscillators under the conventional pulse-based synchronization mechanism in [2] and Mechanism 3.1, respectively.
The coupling strength was set to l = 0.3.
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Figure 3.8: Phase evolutions of an all-to-all network of 11 PCOs, two of which are compromised with firing
time instants represented by asterisks. Plot (a) and (b) present the phase evolutions of the 9 legitimate oscillators under the conventional pulse-based synchronization mechanism in [3] and Mechanism 3.1, respectively.
The coupling strength was set to l = 0.3.
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Figure 3.9: Phase evolutions of an all-to-all network of 11 PCOs, two of which are compromised with firing
time instants represented by asterisks. Plot (a) and (b) present the phase evolutions of the 9 legitimate oscillators under the conventional pulse-based synchronization mechanism in [2] and Mechanism 3.1, respectively.
The coupling strength was set to l = 0.76.
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Figure 3.10: Phase evolutions of an all-to-all network of 11 PCOs, two of which are compromised with firing
time instants represented by asterisks. Plot (a) and (b) present the phase evolutions of the 9 legitimate oscillators under the conventional pulse-based synchronization mechanism in [3] and Mechanism 3.1, respectively.
The coupling strength was set to l = 0.76.
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Figure 3.11: Phase evolutions of an all-to-all network of 20 PCOs, two of which are compromised with
firing time instants represented by asterisks. The network size is unknown to individual oscillators. Plot
(a) shows the phase evolutions of the 18 legitimate oscillators under Mechanism 3.2 with coupling strength
l = 0.3 and the phases of all legitimate oscillators distributing randomly within [0, π/2). Plot (b) shows the
phase evolutions of the 18 legitimate oscillators under Mechanism 3.2 with coupling strength l = 0.76 and
the phases of all legitimate oscillators distributing randomly within [0, 2π].
(a), which showed that Mechanism 3.2 was resilient to stealthy Byzantine attacks even when the number of
oscillators is unknown to individual oscillators.
Moreover, with the total number of oscillators N is unknown to individual oscillators, Theorem
3.8 indicates that Mechanism 3.2 can achieve synchronization in the presence of stealthy Byzantine attacks
even when the phases of legitimate oscillators are randomly distributed in [0, 2π]. Results in Fig. 3.11 (b)
confirmed Theorem 3.8.
We also numerically compared the attack-resilience and the convergence speed of Mechanism 3.1
if λ were allowed to be chosen from 1, 2, ..., b(N − 1)/5c. We considered all-to-all PCO networks within
which zero/one/two/three oscillator(s) were compromised and λ was set to 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The
initial phases of legitimate oscillators were randomly chosen from [0, 2π] and the coupling strength was set
to l = 0.76. Synchronization was defined to be achieved when the length of the containing arc became and
remained less than 1 × 10−6 . The mean synchronization probabilities and times to synchronization of 10, 000
runs under random attackers were shown in Fig. 3.12 and Fig. 3.13 (when 100% synchronization is not
achieved, only synchronized runs were considered in the time-to-synchronization statistics). It can be seen
that when M ≤ λ holds, synchronization of legitimate oscillators can be guaranteed and a larger λ renders
a longer synchronization time; when M > λ holds, a larger λ leads to a higher synchronization probability
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but a lower convergence speed. Similar simulation results were obtained for Mechanism 3.2 but omitted here
due to space limits.
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Figure 3.12: Comparison of synchronization probability and synchronization time under Mechanism 3.1
when λ was set to 1, 2, and 3 in the presence of 0 or 1 attacker. The initial phases of legitimate oscillators
were randomly chosen from [0, 2π] and the coupling strength was set to l = 0.76. Synchronization of the
network was defined to be achieved when the length of the containing arc became and remained less than
1 × 10−6 .
We also numerically compared the performance of Mechanisms 3.1 and 3.2 with the mechanisms
in [2] and [3] under random attacks, which was addressed in [2]. Random attackers inject pulses randomly
in their own pace irrespective of legitimate oscillators’ phases. Note that random attacks may not be stealthy.
The initial phases of legitimate oscillators were randomly chosen from [0, 2π] and the coupling strength
was set to l = 0.3. The attacker(s) sent pulses with a random period uniformly distributed in [T /4, 9T /4].
Synchronization was defined to be achieved when the length of the containing arc became and remained
less than 1 × 10−6 . In the presence of one attacker, the synchronization probabilities under Mechanism 3.1,
Mechanism 3.2 and the approaches in [2] and [3] were given by the red curves in Fig. 3.14 and Fig. 3.15,
respectively. It can be seen that Mechanisms 3.1 and 3.2 are more robust in enabling synchronization in the
presence of random attacks. However, they render a longer synchronization time when compared with the
conventional pulse-based synchronization mechanism in [3], as illustrated by the blue curves in Fig. 3.14 and
Fig. 3.15. Similar conclusions were obtained for the two-attacker case, as illustrated in Fig. 3.16 and Fig.
3.17.
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Figure 3.13: Comparison of synchronization probability and synchronization time under Mechanism 3.1
when λ was set to 1, 2, and 3 in the presence of 2 or 3 attackers. The initial phases of legitimate oscillators
were randomly chosen from [0, 2π] and the coupling strength was set to l = 0.76. Synchronization of the
network was defined to be achieved when the length of the containing arc became and remained less than
1 × 10−6 .

One-Attacker Case
Approach in [3]

Mechanism 3.1

100

70

95

55

Approach in [2]

90

Approach in [3]

Mechanism 3.1

40

85

25

80

Synchronization Time (Second)

Synchronization Probability

Approach in [2]

10
6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Number of Legitimate PCOs

Figure 3.14: Comparison of Mechanism 3.1 and the conventional pulse-based synchronization mechanisms
in [2] and [3] in terms of synchronization probability (red solid marker lines) and synchronization time (blue
hollow marker lines) in the presence of one attacker.
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Figure 3.15: Comparison of Mechanism 3.2 and the conventional pulse-based synchronization mechanisms
in [2] and [3] in terms of synchronization probability (red solid marker lines) and synchronization time (blue
hollow marker lines) in the presence of one attacker.
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Figure 3.16: Comparison of Mechanism 3.1 and the conventional pulse-based synchronization mechanisms
in [2] and [3] in terms of synchronization probability (red solid marker lines) and synchronization time (blue
hollow marker lines) in the presence of two attackers.
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Figure 3.17: Comparison of Mechanism 3.2 and the conventional pulse-based synchronization mechanisms
in [2] and [3] in terms of synchronization probability (red solid marker lines) and synchronization time (blue
hollow marker lines) in the presence of two attackers.

3.7.3

General Interaction Topologies
The new pulse-based interaction approach (Mechanisms 3.1 and 3.2) also shows promising re-

silience to random attacks even under non-all-to-all interaction topologies. One can easily get that perfect
synchronization of legitimate oscillators in a general strongly-connected PCO network cannot be achieved
when some legitimate oscillators are affected by attackers whereas others are not. This is because malicious pulses can exert nonzero phase shifts on affected legitimate oscillators and make them deviate from the
non-affected legitimate ones. So similar to [2], we numerically studied the synchronization error of stronglyconnected PCO networks under random attacks. The synchronization error was quantified as follows:

Synchronization Error = max {min(2π − |φi − φ j |, |φi − φ j |)}
i, j∈N6

where N6 is the index set of all legitimate oscillators. One can get that synchronization is achieved only when
Synchronization Error = 0 holds.
We compared the synchronization errors of the proposed Mechanisms 3.1 and 3.2 with the mechanisms in [2] and [3] under a network of 20 oscillators distributed on a 50m × 40m rectangle. All the oscillators
are fixed in the rectangle with position represented by the blue dots in Fig. 3.18. Two oscillators in the network can communicate with each other if and only if their distance is less than 30 meters. The initial phases
of all oscillators were randomly chosen from [0, 2π] and the coupling strength was set to l = 0.5.
Fig. 3.19 shows the synchronization errors of our approaches (Mechanisms 3.1 and Mechanism 3.2)
50

Legitimate oscillator

Attacker

and existing synchronization approaches in [2] and [3]. In Fig. 3.19, each data point was obtained under
1

2

10, 000 runs. In each run, all approaches used the same initial phase distribution (randomly chosen from
3

[0, 2π]) and are subject to identical malicious pulse patterns (time interval between two consecutive malicious
pulses randomly chosen from [T /4, 9T /4]). The vertical error bars denote standard deviations. It can be seen
4

9

that in the presence of one attacker, our approach (Mechanisms 3.1&3.2) provides not only less average
synchronization error8 but also less standard5 deviations. Fig. 3.20 shows the results in the presence of two
7
6 the proposed approach (Mechanisms 3.1&3.2) led to reduced average
attackers, which also confirmed
that

synchronization errors and standard deviations compared with existing results in [2] and [3]. It is worth
noting that Mechanism 3.2 led to a slightly larger synchronization error than Mechanism 3.1. This reduction
of synchronization performance is consistent with our intuition that less knowledge (the network size N is
unknown to individual oscillators in Mechanism 3.2) reduces the capacity of attack-resilient synchronization
design.
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Figure 3.18: The positions of the 20 oscillators used in simulation.

51

One-Attacker Case

0.9

Synchronization Error

0.8
0.7
Approach in [2]
Approach in [3]
Mechanism 3.1
Mechanism 3.2

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 11 12 13 14 15

Firing Rounds

Figure 3.19: Comparison of Mechanisms 3.1 and 3.2 with the conventional pulse-based synchronization
mechanisms in [2] and [3] in terms of synchronization error when oscillator 7 in Fig. 3.18 was compromised.
The coupling strength was set to l = 0.5.
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Figure 3.20: Comparison of Mechanisms 3.1 and 3.2 with the conventional pulse-based synchronization
mechanisms in [2] and [3] in terms of synchronization error when oscillators 7 and 20 in Fig. 3.18 were
compromised. The coupling strength was set to l = 0.5.
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Chapter 4

An Attack-Resilient Pulse-Based
Synchronization Strategy for General
Connected PCO Networks under
Stealthy Attacks
4.1

Introduction
In this chapter, we present a new pulse-based synchronization strategy for general connected PCOs

that can achieve phase synchronization even in the presence of multiple stealthy Byzantine attackers. Throughout this chapter, we use “general connected” to describe undirected graphs in which there exists a (multi-hop)
path between any pair of nodes. In the pulse-based interaction framework where exchanged messages are
identical and content-free, Byzantine attacks mean compromised nodes injecting pulses using judiciously
crafted patterns to disturb the synchronization process. So compared with existing results in [2, 3, 64] which
address faulty PCO nodes with random or periodic pulse emitting patterns, the situation considered in this
chapter is more difficult to deal with due to the intelligent behavior of malicious attackers. By proposing a
new pulse-based interaction mechanism, we show that phase synchronization of legitimate oscillators can still
be guaranteed as long as their initial phases are distributed within a half oscillation period. The approach is
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applicable even when individual oscillators do not have access to the total number of oscillators in a network.
The result is in distinct difference from our recent results in Chapters 2 and 3 which can only guarantee phase
synchronization under all-to-all topologies.
The main contributions of this chapter are as follows: 1) We propose a new mechanism for pulsecoupled synchronization that employs a “cut-off” algorithm to restrict the number of pulses able to affect
a receiving oscillator’s phase in any three-quarter oscillation period, which is key to enable resilience to
attacks; 2) The “cut-off” algorithm also brings superior robustness to time-varying delays (see the numericalsimulation based comparison with existing algorithms in the absence of attacks in Fig. 4.15 and Fig. 4.16),
making the new pulse-coupled synchronization mechanism fundamentally different from existing ones and
important in its own even in the absence of attacks; 3) We rigorously analyze the condition for an attacker
to stay stealthy in a general connected pulse-coupled oscillator network, and address an attack model that
is more difficult to deal with than existing results like Chapters 2 and 3; 4) We guarantee that the collective
oscillation period is invariant under attacks and identical to the free-running period, which is superior to
existing results (e.g., Chapters 2 and 3) that lead to a collective oscillation period affected by attacker pulses;
5) The results are applicable to general connected topologies whereas existing results on attack-resilience of
pulse-based synchronization all assume an all-to-all topology.
It is worth noting that the analysis method here is also significantly different from the methods in
Chapters 2 and 3. In Chapters 2 and 3, one can prove that the length of the containing arc will decrease to a
value no greater than (1 − l) of its original value after each round of firing, where l ∈ (0, 1] is the coupling
strength. However, in this chapter, while enabling resilience to attacks, the new interaction mechanism also
leads to more complicated dynamics, as reflected by the fact that we cannot prove length reduction in the
containing arc after each round of firing. In fact, in the worse case, we can only prove that the length of
the containing arc will decrease to a value no greater than (1 − l/2) of its original value after every two
consecutive firing rounds.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces a new pulse-based synchronization
mechanism. Under the new mechanism, Section 4.3 presents a synchronization condition for general connected PCOs in the absence of attacks. In Section 4.4, we characterize the condition for an attacker to keep
stealthy, i.e., mounting attacks without being detected. In Section 4.5, we prove that synchronization of legitimate oscillators can be guaranteed in the presence of multiple stealthy Byzantine attackers, with and without
collusion. In Section 4.6, we prove the applicability of our approach even when the total number of oscillators
is unknown to individual oscillators. Simulation results are presented in Section 4.7.
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4.2

A New Pulse-Based Synchronization Mechanism
Consider a network of N pulse-coupled oscillators. Each oscillator is equipped with a phase variable.

When the evolving phase of an oscillator reaches 2π rad, the oscillator emits a pulse. Receiving pulses from
neighboring oscillators will lead to the adjustment of the receiving oscillator’s phase, which can be designed
to achieve a desired collective behavior such as phase synchronization. An edge (i, j) from oscillator i to
oscillator j means that oscillator j can receive pulses from oscillator i but not necessarily vice versa. The
number of edges entering oscillator i is called the indegree of oscillator i and is represented as d − (i). The
number of edges leaving oscillator i is called the outdegree of oscillator i and is represented as d + (i). The
value d(i) , min{d − (i), d + (i)} is called the degree of oscillator i. The degree of a network is defined as
d , mini=1,2,··· ,N {d(i)}. The conventional pulse-based synchronization mechanism is presented below:
Conventional Pulse-Based Synchronization Mechanism [3]:
1. The phase φi of oscillator i evolves from 0 to 2π rad with a constant speed ω = 1 rad/second.
2. Once φi reaches 2π rad, oscillator i fires and resets its phase to 0.
3. Whenever oscillator i receives a pulse, it instantaneously resets its phase to:

φi+ = φi + l × F(φi )

(4.1)

where l ∈ (0, 1] is the coupling strength and F(•) is the phase response function (PRF) given below:

F(φ ) :=



 −φ

 2π − φ

0≤φ ≤π

(4.2)

π < φ ≤ 2π

In the above conventional pulse-based synchronization mechanism, every incoming pulse will trigger a jump on the receiving oscillator’s phase, which makes it easy for attackers to perturb the phases of
legitimate oscillators and destroy their synchronization. Moreover, one can easily get that synchronization
can never be maintained for general connected PCOs under the conventional mechanism, even when the coupling strength is set to l = 1. This is because attack pulses can always exert nonzero phase shifts on affected
legitimate oscillators and make them deviate from unaffected ones. Due to the same reason, existing attack resilient pulse-coupled synchronization mechanisms in Chapters 2 and 3 for all-to-all graphs cannot be applied
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to general connected graphs, either. Motivated by these observations on the inherent vulnerability of existing pulse-based synchronization mechanisms, we propose a new pulse-based synchronization mechanism to
improve the attack resilience of general connected PCO networks. Our key idea to enable attack resilience
is a “cut-off” mechanism which can restrict the number of pulses able to affect a receiving oscillator’s phase
in any three-quarter oscillation period. The “cut-off” mechanism only allows pulses meeting certain conditions to affect a receiving oscillator’s phase and hence can effectively filter out attack pulses with extremely
negative effects on the synchronization process. Noting that all pulses are identical and content-free, so the
“cut-off” mechanism is judiciously designed based on the number of pulses an oscillator received in the past,
i.e., based on memory. This is also the reason that we let an entire oscillation period T = 2π seconds elapse
so that each oscillator can acquire memory.
New Pulse-Based Synchronization Mechanism (Mechanism 4.1):
1. The phase φi of oscillator i evolves from 0 to 2π rad with a constant speed ω = 1 rad/second.
2. Once φi reaches 2π rad, oscillator i fires and resets its phase to 0.
3. When oscillator i receives a pulse at time instant t, it resets its phase according to (4.1) only when all
the following three conditions are satisfied:
(a) an entire period of T = 2π seconds has elapsed since initiation.
(b) before receiving the current pulse, oscillator i has received at least

λi = b(d(i) − bN/2c)/4c

(4.3)

pulses within (t − T /4, t], where d(i) is the degree of oscillator i and b•c is the largest integer no
greater than “ • .”
(c) before receiving the current pulse, oscillator i has received less than λ̄i pulses within (t − 3T /4, t],
where
λ̄i = d(i) − 2λi

(4.4)

Otherwise, the pulse has no effect on φi .

Fig. 4.1 illustrates the phase evolution of oscillator i having degree d(i) = 9 in a network of 11
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PCOs. According to (4.3) and (4.4), we have λi = 1 and λ̄i = 7. So a pulse received at time instant t can shift
oscillator i’s phase when all the following three conditions are met: 1) t > T ; 2) oscillator i has received at
least 1 pulse within (t − T /4, t]; and 3) oscillator i has received less than 7 pulses within (t − 3T /4, t]. Take
the scenario in Fig. 4.1 as an example, only the 11th and the 12th pulses triggered phase jumps on oscillator
i.
φi
2π

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

0

T/4

T/2

3T/4

10 11 12 13

T

5T/4

3T/2

7T/4

2T Time

Figure 4.1: The phase evolution of oscillator i in a network of 11 PCOs under Mechanism 4.1. Indexed red
arrows represent incoming pulses.

Remark 4.1. Following [35, 36, 42], we assume that when a legitimate oscillator receives multiple pulses
simultaneously, it will process the incoming pulses consecutively. In other words, no two pulses will be
regarded as an aggregated pulse.

4.3

Synchronization of General Connected PCOs in the Absence of
Attacks
In this section, we will show that Mechanism 4.1 can guarantee the synchronization of general

connected PCOs in the absence of attacks.
Assuming that all oscillators’ phases rotate clockwise on a unit circle, the containing arc of legitimate oscillators is defined as the shortest arc on the unit circle that contains all legitimate oscillators’ phases.
The leading and terminating points of a containing arc are defined as the starting and ending points of the
containing arc in the clockwise direction, respectively. Based on the definition of containing arc, we can
define phase synchronization:
Definition 4.1 (Phase Synchronization): A network of pulse-coupled oscillators achieves phase synchronization if the length of the containing arc of all legitimate oscillators converges to 0 upon which all legitimate
oscillators fire simultaneously with a fixed period T = 2π seconds.
Remark 4.2. Requiring the firing period to be T = 2π seconds in Definition 1 is important for two reasons.
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First, this requirement guarantees that all legitimate oscillators will not have irregular behaviors. For example, otherwise all oscillators having fixed and constant phases 0 meets the condition of containing arc
converging to 0 but is unacceptable for pulse-coupled oscillators. Secondly, this additional requirement on
firing period guarantees that the collective oscillation period after synchronization is not affected by attacks.
In fact, in existing results [2, 3], Chapter 2, and Chapter 3, the collective firing period could be affected by
attack pulses.
We next give two important properties of general connected PCO networks under Mechanism 4.1.
Lemma 4.1. For a general connected network of N legitimate PCOs evolving under Mechanism 4.1, when
the initial length of the containing arc is less than π rad, the length of the containing arc is non-increasing.
Proof. Following the same line of reasoning as in Theorem 3.1, the containing arc’s length will change only
when an oscillator’s firing triggers a phase jump on at least one other oscillator. We assume that oscillator i
fires at time instant ti whose pulse triggers a phase jump on at least one other oscillator. One can easily get
φi (ti ) = 2π rad and the phase distribution of all the other N − 1 oscillators can only fall within one of the
following three scenarios, as depicted in Fig. 4.2:
1) all the other N − 1 oscillators’ phases reside in (π, 2π];
2) all the other N − 1 oscillators’ phases reside in [0, π);
3) the other N − 1 oscillators’ phases reside partially in [0, π) and partially in (π, 2π].
4.2.1

2π 0

i

4.2.2

2π 0

4.2.3

2π 0

i

i

δ ( t i)

δ ( ti)

π

π

δ ( ti)

π

Figure 4.2: Three scenarios of phase distributions of oscillators when oscillator i fires at time instant ti .
Denoting δ (ti ) as the length of the containing arc at time instant ti , next we show that δ (ti ) cannot be
increased by the firing of oscillator i in any of the aforementioned three scenarios, i.e., δ + (ti ) ≤ δ (ti ) always
holds.
1) When all the other N − 1 oscillators’ phases reside in (π, 2π] at ti , the length of the containing arc can
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be expressed as

δ (ti ) = 2π − min {φ j (ti )}

(4.5)

j∈N , j6=i

where N = {1, 2, · · · , N} is the index set of all oscillators. After the firing of oscillator i, we have
φi+ (ti ) = 0. Since the PRF in (4.2) is non-negative on (π, 2π], the pulse can only trigger a forward
jump or have no effect on an oscillator with phase residing in (π, 2π]. Hence, we have φ j+ (ti ) =
φ j (ti ) + F(φ j (ti )) ≥ φ j (ti ) or φ j+ (ti ) = φ j (ti ) for j ∈ N , j 6= i. In both cases we have φ j (ti ) ≤ φ j+ (ti )
for j ∈ N , j 6= i, which implies
min {φ j (ti )} ≤ min {φ j+ (ti )}

j∈N , j6=i

j∈N , j6=i

(4.6)

The length of the containing arc immediately after oscillator i’s firing at ti becomes
δ + (ti ) = 2π − min {φ j+ (ti )} + φi+ (ti ) = 2π − min {φ j+ (ti )}
j∈N , j6=i

j∈N , j6=i

(4.7)

One can easily get δ + (ti ) ≤ δ (ti ) by combining (4.5), (4.6) and (4.7).
2) When all the other N − 1 oscillators’ phases reside in [0, π) at time instant ti (note that phases 0 and 2π
rad are the same point on the unit circle), noting that under Mechanism 4.1, the pulse can only trigger
a backward jump or have no effect on an oscillator with phase residing in [0, π), one can easily get
δ + (ti ) ≤ δ (ti ) following the same line of reasoning as in Scenario 1).
3) When the other N − 1 oscillators’ phases reside partially in (π, 2π] and partially in [0, π) at time instant
ti , one can easily get δ + (ti ) ≤ δ (ti ) by combining the arguments in Scenario 1) and Scenario 2).
Summarizing the above three scenarios, we get that the length of the containing arc is non-increasing.

Based on Lemma 4.1, next we show that every oscillator will fire at least once within any time
interval of length 3T /2 under Mechanism 4.1.
Lemma 4.2. For a general connected network of N legitimate PCOs with their initial length of the containing
arc less than π rad, every oscillator will fire at least once within any time interval of length 3T /2 under
Mechanism 4.1.
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Proof. From Lemma 1, we know that the length of the containing arc is non-increasing. So the phase distribution of all oscillators at an arbitrary time instant t can only fall within one of the following four scenarios,
as illustrated in Fig. 4.3:
1) all oscillators’ phases reside in [0, π];
2) oscillators’ phases reside partially in [0, π], partially in (π, 2π] and the containing arc includes phase
π rad;
3) all oscillators’ phases reside in (π, 2π];
4) oscillators’ phases reside partially in [0, π], partially in (π, 2π] and the containing arc includes phase
2π rad.
4.3.1

2π 0

π

4.3.2

2π 0

4.3.3

π

2π 0

π

4.3.4

2π 0

π

Figure 4.3: Four possible scenarios of phase distribution at time instant t.

Since all oscillators are legitimate, according to Mechanism 4.1, one can easily get that in Scenarios
1), 2) and 3), all oscillators will evolve towards phase 2π rad and fire within [t, t + T ]. In Scenario 4), given
that the PRF in (4.2) is non-negative on (π, 2π], the pulse can only advance or have no effect on the oscillators
with phase residing in (π, 2π]. Hence, all oscillators residing in (π, 2π] will evolve towards phase 2π rad and
fire within [t, t + T /2]. Since the length of the containing arc is less than π rad and non-increasing, all
oscillators reside in [0, π] immediately after the firing of the oscillator on the ending point of the containing
arc, meaning that the network shifts to Scenario 1). Then all oscillators will evolve towards phase 2π rad and
fire within the following T seconds. Therefore, we can get that in Scenario 4), every oscillator will fire within
[t, t + 3T /2]. By iterating the above argument, we know that every oscillator will fire at least once within any
time interval of length 3T /2.
Now we are in position to present the synchronization condition in the absence of attacks:
Theorem 4.1. For a general connected network of N legitimate PCOs, if the initial length of the containing
arc is less than π rad and the degree of the PCO network satisfies d > bN/2c, then the containing arc of all
oscillators will converge to zero under Mechanism 4.1.
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Proof. Without loss of generality, we denote δ (t) as the length of the containing arc at time t and set the initial
time to t = 0. According to Lemma 4.1, we have that the containing arc is non-increasing and 0 ≤ δ (t) < π
for t ≥ 0. From Lemma 4.2, every oscillator will fire at least once within any time interval of length 3T /2
and hence there exists a time instant t0 > 2T at which the ending point of the containing arc resides at phase
0. Denoting the starting point of the containing arc at this time instant as 0 ≤ ε < π, we have δ (t0 ) = ε. Next,
we separately discuss the 0 ≤ ε < π/2 case and the π/2 ≤ ε < π case to prove the convergence of δ (t) to 0.
4.4.1

2π 0
δ( t 0)

4.4.2

2π 0
δ ( t1 )

π

2π 0

4.4.3

δ (t1+ε/2)

π

π

Figure 4.4: Phase distributions of all oscillators at different time instants in Scenario 1.1.
Case 1 (0 ≤ ε < π/2): If ε is 0, the network is synchronized. So we only consider 0 < ε < π/2.
4.5.1 2π 0
4.5.2 2π 0
4.5.3 2π 0
4.5.4 2π 0
Noting that the ending and starting points of the containing arc reside on phases 0 and 0 < ε < π/2 rad at

( t1+ ε ) freely without
δ ( t 1 ) so after t , δall
δ ( t 0) in Fig. 4.4.1),
( t1oscillators
+ ε/2)
time instant t0 , respectively (as depicted
willδevolve
0
firing for exactly T − ε > 3T /4 seconds before the starting point of the containing arc reaches phase 2π rad

π
π
at time t1 = t0 + T − ε (as depicted inπ Fig. 4.4.2). Meanwhile,
the endingπ point of the containing
arc resides
on phase 2π − ε rad and we have δ (t1 ) = δ (t0 ) = ε.
Given that the PRF in (4.2) is non-negative on [2π − ε, 2π], a pulse can only trigger a forward jump
or have no effect on an oscillator with phase residing in [2π − ε, 2π]. So all oscillators will reach phase 2π rad
and fire no later than t1 + ε and within [t1 , t1 + ε/2], we can only have one of the following three scenarios:
4.6.1 2π 0
4.6.2 2π 0
Scenario 1.1: all oscillators fired within [t1 , t1 + ε/2];

4.6.3

2π 0

4.6.4

2π 0

(t 0)
ε'/2) oscillatorsδjumped
(t1'+these
δ (t 0')fire within δ[t(1t, 1't)1 + ε/2] butδ all
Scenario 1.2: some oscillators did not
in phase
within [t1 , t1 + ε/2];

π
π
π
π
4.6.6
4.6.5
4.6.8 2π 0
2π[t01 , t1 + ε/2].
2π 0 fired nor
2π 0in phase4.6.7
Scenario 1.3: some oscillators
neither
jumped
within
Next, we prove δ (t1 + ε) ≤
(1 − l/2)δ (t1 )δin
based
which we can
( t 1all
) above three
+ ε /2)
δ (t1scenarios,
δ ( ton
1+ ε )
δ (t 1'+ε' )
further prove such a decrease of containing arc after each round of firing and hence the convergence of δ (t)

π of their phases
π all oscillatorsπin an increasing order
π at time instant
to zero. Without loss of generality, we label
t1 , i.e., 2π − ε = φ1 (t1 ) ≤ φ2 (t1 ) ≤ · · · ≤ φN (t1 ) = 2π and denote N f (respectively Nn ) as the index set of
oscillators fired (respectively did not fire) in [t1 , t1 + ε/2].
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Scenario 1.1 (all oscillators fired within [t1 , t1 + ε/2]): One can easily know that in this case N f
contains all oscillators and Nn is an empty set. The phases of all oscillators at t1 + ε/2 should follow the
4.4.1

2π 0

2π 0

4.4.2

2π 0

4.4.3

pattern depicted in Fig. 4.4.3.
/2)
δ t 1 on [0, π],δthe
(t1+εphase
Since the PRFδ (int 0 )(4.2) is non-positive
evolution of an oscillator cannot be

( )

advanced by received pulses when its phase resides in [0, π]. So all oscillators’ phases reside in [0, ε/2] at

π l ∈ (0, 1], one can obtain δ (t1 + ε/2) ≤
time t1 + ε/2, which meansπ 0 ≤ δ (t1 + ε/2) ≤πε/2 = δ (t1 )/2. Given
(1 − l/2)δ (t1 ). According to the non-increasing property of the containing arc in Lemma 4.1, we have
δ (t1 + ε) ≤ (1 − l/2)δ (t1 ).
4.5.1

2π 0
δ ( t 0)

4.5.2

2π 0
δ ( t1)

π

2π 0

4.5.3

4.5.4

δ ( t1+ ε/2)

2π 0
δ ( t1+ ε )

π

π

π

Figure 4.5: Phase distributions of all oscillators at different time instants in Scenario 1.2 and Scenario 1.3.
Scenario 1.2 (some oscillators did not fire within [t1 , t1 + ε/2] but all these oscillators jumped in
phase within [t1 , t1 + ε/2]): At time instant t1 + ε/2, the phase distribution of all oscillators should follow the
pattern depicted in Fig. 4.5.3. The length of the containing arc at t1 + ε/2 can be obtained as
4.6.1

2π 0

4.6.2

2π 0

4.6.3

2π 0

4.6.4

2π 0

δ (t1 + ε/2) = max{φi (t1 + ε/2)} + 2π − min {φ j (t1 + ε/2)}

δ (t 0')

i∈N f

δ (t 0)

ε'/2n)
δ (t1'+j∈N

δ ( t 1' )

(4.8)

Following the same line of reasoning as in Scenario 1.1, one can get φi (t1 + ε/2) ∈ [0, ε/2] for i ∈ N f , i.e.,
4.6.5

π
2π 0

4.6.6

π
2π 0

4.6.7

π
2π 0

4.6.8

π
2π 0

max{φi (t1 + ε/2)} ≤ ε/2

δ (t 1'+ε' )

i∈N f

δ (t1+ ε /2)

δ ( t 1)

(4.9)

δ ( t 1+ ε )

Next, we characterize min j∈Nn {φ j (t1 + ε/2)}. Since all oscillators in Nn jumped at least once within [t1 , t1 +

π
π [t1 , t1 + ε/2]. So the
ε/2], we denote tˆj ∈ [t1 , t1 +πε/2] as the time instant
of oscillator πj’s first jump within
phase of oscillator j immediately before the jump at tˆj is φ j (tˆj ) = φ j (t1 ) + tˆj − t1 . According to the PRF in
(4.2), we have the phase of oscillator j immediately after the jump at tˆj as
φ j+ (tˆj ) = φ j (tˆj ) + (2π − φ j (tˆj ))l = 2πl + (1 − l)(φ j (t1 ) + tˆj − t1 )

62

Noting that the PRF in (4.2) is non-negative on [2π − ε, 2π] and oscillator j can be triggered to jump
multiple times within [t1 , t1 + ε/2], the phase of oscillator j at t1 + ε/2 satisfies
φ j (t1 + ε/2) ≥ φ j+ (tˆj ) + t1 + ε/2 − tˆj = 2πl + (1 − l)φ j (t1 ) + ε/2 − (tˆj − t1 )l
Using the facts φ j (t1 ) ∈ [2π −ε, 2π] and tˆj ∈ [t1 , t1 +ε/2], we have φ j (t1 +ε/2) ≥ 2π −(1−l)ε/2 for j ∈ Nn ,
i.e.,

min {φ j (t1 + ε/2)} ≥ 2π − (1 − l)ε/2

j∈Nn

(4.10)

Combining (4.8), (4.9), and (4.10), we have δ (t1 + ε/2) ≤ (1 − l/2)δ (t1 ). According to the nonincreasing property of the containing arc in Lemma 4.1, one can obtain δ (t1 + ε) ≤ (1 − l/2)δ (t1 ).
Scenario 1.3 (some oscillators neither fired nor jumped in phase within [t1 , t1 +ε/2]): At time instant
t1 + ε/2, the phase distribution of all oscillators should also follow the pattern depicted in Fig. 4.5.3. To prove
δ (t1 + ε) ≤ (1 − l/2)δ (t1 ), we first characterize the number of oscillators in N f and Nn .
We assume oscillator j0 ∈ Nn neither fired nor jumped in phase within [t1 , t1 + ε/2]. Recall that
no oscillators fired in (t0 , t1 ) of duration t1 − t0 = T − ε > 3T /4, according to Mechanism 4.1, oscillator j0
being not triggered to jump in phase within [t1 , t1 + ε/2] implies it receiving no greater than λ j0 pulses within
[t1 , t1 + ε/2] of duration less than T /4, i.e., condition b) of Mechanism 4.1 is not satisfied.
As all oscillators will reach 2π rad and fire within [t1 , t1 + ε], every oscillator k (1 ≤ k ≤ N) should
receive at least d(k) pulses within [t1 , t1 + ε]. Since oscillator j0 was not triggered to jump and hence received
no greater than λ j0 pulses within [t1 , t1 + ε/2], it will receive at least d( j0 ) − λ j0 pulses in (t1 + ε/2, t1 + ε],
i.e., the number of oscillators that did not fire in [t1 , t1 + ε/2] is at least d( j0 ) − λ j0 . In other words, the
number of oscillators in Nn is at least d( j0 ) − λ j0 . According to the definition of λ j0 in (4.3), we have
4λ j0 ≤ d( j0 ) − bN/2c, which further leads to d( j0 ) − λ j0 ≥ bN/2c + 3λ j0 . Given λ j0 ≥ 0 and d( j0 ) > bN/2c,
we always have d( j0 ) − λ j0 ≥ bN/2c + 1. Therefore, the number of oscillators in Nn is at least bN/2c + 1 and
the number of oscillators in N f is at most N − (bN/2c + 1), which is no greater than bN/2c.
Next, we characterize the phases of oscillators at t1 + ε. Since all oscillators in Nn fired within
(t1 + ε/2, t1 + ε], following the same line of reasoning as in Scenario 1.1, we have

φ j (t1 + ε) ∈ [0, ε/2]
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(4.11)

for j ∈ Nn .
To determine φi (t1 + ε) for i ∈ N f , we first determine φi (t1 + ε/2) for i ∈ N f . Recall that all
oscillators in N f fired within [t1 , t1 + ε/2], following the same line of reasoning as in Scenario 1.1, we have
φi (t1 + ε/2) ∈ [0, ε/2] for i ∈ N f . Next, we prove that all oscillators in N f will be triggered to jump in phase
within (t1 + ε/2, t1 + ε].
As has been proven, the number of oscillators in N f is no greater than bN/2c and all oscillators
in N f fired within [t1 , t1 + ε/2]. So every oscillator i in N f can receive at most bN/2c − 1 pulses within
[t1 , t1 + ε/2] (note that oscillator i cannot receive its own pulse) and will receive at least d(i) − (bN/2c − 1)
pulses within (t1 + ε/2, t1 + ε] of duration less than T /4. Using the definition of λi in (4.3), we have d(i) −
(bN/2c − 1) > λi , i.e., there must exist a time instant t˜i ∈ (t1 + ε/2, t1 + ε] for every oscillator i at which it
receives the (λi + 1)th pulse since (but not including) time instant t1 + ε/2, i.e., condition b) in Mechanism
4.1 is satisfied. Next we proceed to prove that at t˜i , condition c) in Mechanism 4.1 is also satisfied (note that
condition a) is always satisfied since we start at t0 > 2T ), and hence all oscillators in N f will be triggered to
jump in phase in (t1 + ε/2, t1 + ε].
As no oscillators fire within (t0 , t1 ) of duration t1 − t0 = T − ε > 3T /4 and oscillator i receives at
most bN/2c−1 pulses within [t1 , t1 +ε/2], we have that within (t0 , t1 +ε/2] of duration t1 +ε/2−t0 > 3T /4,
oscillator i receives at most bN/2c − 1 pulses, which is less than λ̄i − 2λi according to (4.4), implying that
at t˜i , condition c) of Mechanism 4.1 is also satisfied. Therefore, according to Mechanism 4.1, the phase of
oscillator i will be triggered to jump by the pulse received at t˜i , i.e., every oscillator i in N f will be triggered
to jump in phase within (t1 + ε/2, t1 + ε].
Now we are in position to determine the phase of oscillator i for i ∈ N f at time instant t1 + ε. Since
every oscillator i jumped at least once within (t1 + ε/2, t1 + ε], we denote tˆi ∈ (t1 + ε/2, t1 + ε] as the time
instant of oscillator i’s first jump within (t1 + ε/2, t1 + ε]. So the phase of oscillator i immediately before the
jump at tˆi is φi (tˆi ) = φi (t1 + ε/2) + tˆi − (t1 + ε/2). According to the PRF in (4.2), the phase of oscillator i
immediately after the jump at tˆi can be obtained as
φi+ (tˆi ) =(1 − l)φi (tˆi ) = (1 − l)(φi (t1 + ε/2) + tˆi − (t1 + ε/2))

Noting that the PRF in (4.2) is non-positive on [0, π] and oscillator i can be triggered to jump
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multiple times within (t1 + ε/2, t1 + ε], the phase of oscillator i at t1 + ε satisfies
φi (t1 + ε) ≤ φi+ (tˆi ) + (t1 + ε) − tˆi ≤ (1 − l)φ j (t1 + ε/2) + ε/2 + (t1 + ε/2 − tˆi )l

(4.12)

Substituting φi (t1 + ε/2) ∈ [0, ε/2] and tˆi ∈ (t1 + ε/2, t1 + ε] into (4.12) leads to φi (t1 + ε) ∈ [0, (1 −
l/2)ε] for i ∈ N f . In combination with the fact φ j (t1 + ε) ∈ [0, ε/2] for j ∈ Nn in (4.11) and l ∈ (0, 1], we
have that the phases of all oscillators reside in [0, (1 − l/2)ε] at time t1 + ε, i.e., δ (t1 + ε) ≤ (1 − l/2)δ (t1 ).
In summary, we have δ (t1 + ε) ≤ (1 − l/2)δ (t1 ) in all three Scenarios 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3. At t1 + ε,
all oscillators reside in [0, π] and will evolve towards phase 2π rad and fire. By repeating the above analyses,
we can get that the length of the containing arc δ (t) decreases to a value no greater than (1 − l/2)δ (t) after
each round of firing until it converges to 0. Therefore, synchronization can be achieved in Case 1.
Case 2 (π/2 ≤ ε < π): Similar to the reasoning in Case 1, there exists a time instant t0 > 2T at which
the ending and starting points of the containing arc reside on phases 0 and π/2 ≤ ε < π rad, respectively. After
t0 , all oscillators evolve freely for exactly T − ε > T /2 seconds before the starting point of the containing arc
reaches phase 2π rad at t1 = t0 + T − ε. At t1 , the ending point of the containing arc resides on phase 2π − ε
rad and we have δ (t1 ) = δ (t0 ) = ε.
Given that the PRF in (4.2) is non-negative on [2π − ε, 2π], a pulse can only trigger a forward jump
or have no effect on an oscillator with phase residing in [2π − ε, 2π]. So all oscillators will reach phase 2π
rad and fire no later than time instant t1 + ε and within [t1 , t1 + ε/2], only one of the following three scenarios
can happen:
Scenario 2.1: all oscillators fired within [t1 , t1 + ε/2];
Scenario 2.2: some oscillators did not fire within [t1 , t1 + ε/2] but all of these oscillators jumped in phase
within [t1 , t1 + ε/2];
Scenario 2.3: some oscillators neither fired nor jumped in phase within [t1 , t1 + ε/2].
Next, we show that δ (t) will decrease to less than π/2 rad in finite time, meaning that Case 2 will
shift to Case 1 in finite time. Therefore, δ (t) will also converge to 0 for π/2 ≤ ε < π.
Similar to Case 1, we label all oscillators in an increasing order of their phases at t1 , i.e., 2π − ε =
φ1 (t1 ) ≤ φ2 (t1 ) ≤ · · · ≤ φN (t1 ) = 2π and denote N f (respectively Nn ) as the index set of oscillators fired
(respectively did not fire) in [t1 , t1 + ε/2]. Following the same line of reasoning as in Scenario 1.1 and
Scenario 1.2, one can easily obtain δ (t1 + ε) ≤ (1 − l/2)δ (t1 ) in Scenario 2.1 and Scenario 2.2, respectively.
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For Scenario 2.3, i.e., some oscillators neither fired nor jumped in phase within [t1 , t1 + ε/2], we assume

π
oscillator j0 is such an oscillator.
Accordingπto Mechanism 4.1,π there could be two reasons for the not firing
of oscillator j0 in [t1 , t1 + ε/2]:
Scenario 2.3.1: oscillator j0 receives no greater than λ j0 pulses within [t1 , t1 + ε/2], i.e., condition b) of
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Next, we show that in both scenarios, the length of the containing arc will keep decreasing to less
than (1 − l/2) of its original value.
Scenario 2.3.1: Following the same line of reasoning as in Scenario 1.3, all oscillators’ phases reside
in [0, (1 − l/2)ε] at time instant t1 + ε, which means δ (t1 + ε) ≤ (1 − l/2)δ (t1 ).
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Figure 4.6: Phase distributions of all oscillators at different time instants in Scenario 2.3.2.
Scenario 2.3.2: In this case, we cannot prove length decrease in the containing arc by focusing on
the time interval [t0 , t1 + ε] (one firing round), so we extend our considered time span to two firing rounds.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the previous firing round starts at t00 < t0 at which the ending and
starting points of the containing arc reside on phases 0 and ε 0 rad, respectively (as depicted in Fig. 4.6.1). As
the containing arc is non-increasing (Lemma 4.1), we have ε ≤ δ (t00 ) = ε 0 < π. After t00 , all oscillators evolve
freely for exactly 2π − ε 0 > T /2 seconds before the starting point of the containing arc reaches phase 2π rad
at time t10 = t00 + 2π − ε 0 (as depicted in Fig. 4.6.2). At t10 , the ending point of the containing arc resides on
phase 2π − ε 0 rad and we have δ (t10 ) = δ (t00 ) = ε 0 .
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Given that the PRF in (4.2) is non-negative on [2π − ε 0 , 2π], a pulse can only trigger a forward jump
or have no effect on an oscillator with phase residing in [2π − ε 0 , 2π]. So all oscillators will reach phase 2π
rad and fire no later than t10 + ε 0 . The phases of all oscillators at t10 + ε 0 should follow the pattern depicted in
Fig. 4.6.5. Next, we prove δ (t10 + ε 0 ) ≤ (1 − l/2)δ (t10 ). To this end, we need to characterize the number of
oscillators fired within [t10 , t10 + ε 0 /2]. The phases of all oscillators follow the pattern depicted in Fig. 4.6.3 at
time instant t10 + ε 0 /2. We denote N f 0 (respectively Nn0 ) as the index set of oscillators fired (respectively did
not fire) within [t10 , t10 + ε 0 /2] and analyze the numbers of oscillators in the two sets.
Recall that in Scenario 2.3.2, condition c) of Mechanism 4.1 is not satisfied. So oscillator j0 should
receive at least λ̄ j0 − λ j0 pulses within (t1 − 3T /4, t1 ). Since no oscillators fired within (t0 , t1 ), the number of
oscillators fired in (t1 − 3T /4, t0 ] is at least λ̄ j0 − λ j0 . Next, by proving (t1 − 3T /4, t0 ] ⊆ (t10 + ε 0 /2, t10 + ε 0 ],
we show that the number of oscillators fired in (t10 + ε 0 /2, t10 + ε 0 ] is no less than λ̄ j0 − λ j0 . As indicated earlier,
all oscillators will reach phase 2π rad and fire no later than t10 + ε 0 . So we have t0 ≤ t10 + ε 0 . On the other
hand, since the starting point of the containing arc resides on phase π/2 ≤ ε < π at t0 and the PRF in (4.2)
is non-positive on [0, ε], oscillators having phase in [0, ε] will not be advanced by incoming pulses. So it
takes an oscillator at least ε time to evolve from 0 to ε rad. Therefore, we can obtain t0 − t10 ≥ ε. Given
ε 0 < π = T /2 and t1 = t0 + T − ε, one can get
t10 + ε 0 /2 ≤ t0 − ε + ε 0 /2 < t0 − ε + T /4 = t1 − 3T /4
and hence (t1 − 3T /4, t0 ] ⊆ (t10 + ε 0 /2, t10 + ε 0 ], implying that at least λ̄ j0 − λ j0 oscillators fired within (t10 +
ε 0 /2, t10 + ε 0 ]. According to the definition of λ j0 and λ̄ j0 in (4.3) and (4.4), we have 4λ j0 ≤ d( j0 ) − bN/2c and
λ̄ j0 − λ j0 = d( j0 ) − 3λ j0 , which further lead to d( j0 ) − 3λ j0 ≥ bN/2c + λ j0 . Given λ j0 ≥ 0 and d( j0 ) > bN/2c,
we always have d( j0 ) − 3λ j0 ≥ bN/2c + 1. Therefore, the number of oscillators in Nn0 is at least bN/2c + 1
and the number of oscillators in N f 0 is at most N − (bN/2c + 1), which is no greater than bN/2c.
Based on obtained knowledge of the numbers of oscillators in N f 0 and Nn0 , respectively, we can
characterize the phases of all oscillators at time instant t10 + ε 0 . Following the same line of reasoning as in
Scenario 1.3, one can obtain that all oscillators’ phases reside in [0, (1 − l/2)ε 0 ] at time instant t10 + ε 0 , which
means δ (t10 + ε 0 ) ≤ (1 − l/2)δ (t10 ). Note that proving such a length decrease of the containing arc requires
a careful characterization of phase evolution starting from t00 to t1 + ε, which spans two consecutive firing
rounds. After t1 + ε, the phase evolution could follow Scenario 2.1, Scenario 2.2, Scenario 2.3.1 (in which
we can prove such (1 − l/2) length decrease after each round of firing) or Scenario 2.3.2 (in which we can
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prove such (1 − l/2) length decrease after every two consecutive firing rounds).
In summary, we can prove that the length of the containing arc will reduce to (1 − l/2) of its original
value after every firing round in Scenarios 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3.1, whereas in Scenario 2.3.2, we can prove such
a decrease after every two consecutive firing rounds. Since every oscillator will fire at least once within any
time interval of length 3T /2 according to Lemma 4.2, we can get that the length of the containing arc δ (t)
will decrease to a value less than π/2 rad within finite time (in fact, after at most 2m firing rounds with
m satisfying (1 − l/2)m δ (t0 ) < π/2). And then, the containing arc will keep decreasing to 0 following the
derivations in Case 1.
By combining Case 1 and Case 2, one can obtain that δ (t) will always converge to 0 under the
conditions of Theorem 4.1.
Corollary 4.1. Under conditions in Theorem 4.1, Mechanism 4.1 guarantees that all oscillators synchronize
with an oscillation period T = 2π seconds in the absence of attacks.
Proof. The result can be easily obtained from the reasoning in the proof of Theorem 4.1 and hence is omitted.

Remark 4.3. Besides enabling attack resilience, Mechanism 4.1 also has better robustness against timevarying delays. For example, numerical simulations in Fig. 4.15 and Fig. 4.16 show that Mechanism 4.1
has much smaller synchronization errors compared with synchronization mechanisms in [2, 3] and Chapter
3 when the communication is subject to random time-varying delays.

4.4

Stealthy Byzantine Attacks and Attack Detection Mechanism
The concept of Byzantine attacks stems from the Byzantine generals problem [48]. It was used to

describe a traitor commander who sends or relays fake information to other commanders to avoid the loyal
ones from reaching agreement [47]. In the case of PCO synchronization, a node compromised by Byzantine
attacks can emit malicious pulses at arbitrary time instants. However, given that the purpose of Byzantine
attacks is to delay or damage the synchronization of legitimate oscillators, we assume that a compromised
oscillator sends malicious pulses only when such pulses can negatively affect the synchronization process of
legitimate oscillators, i.e., enlarge the containing arc of affected legitimate oscillators.
A compromised node decides the timing of its malicious pulses based on information of other oscillator’s phases that it can perceive from received pulses. Given that in a general connected PCO network,
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an oscillator can only receive pulses from its neighbors, a compromised oscillator can only perceive phase
information of nodes that it can receive pulses from and decide its optimal attacking strategy accordingly.
We consider two types of attacks, non-colluding attacks and colluding attacks. In non-colluding
attacks, an attacker determines its attacking strategy based on its own neighbors’ phase information. In
colluding attacks, two attackers can share perceived phase information about each other’s neighbors, which
is equivalent to expanding the neighbor sets of both attackers to the union of their neighbor sets. The same
concept can be extended to three or more colluding attackers.
Now we proceed to discuss the attacking strategy. If an attacker keeps sending pulses continuously without rest, it can effectively prevent legitimate oscillators from reaching synchronization. However,
such attacks are not energy efficient and will also render themselves easily detectable, just as jamming of
communication channels being easy to detect, isolate, and remove [69]. Therefore, we are only interested in
“stealthy” Byzantine attacks, in which attack pulses are emitted in a way that cannot be detected by legitimate
oscillators in the pulse-based interaction framework.
In PCO networks, since all exchanged pulses are identical without embedded content such as source
or destination information, conventional content-checking based attack-detection mechanisms such as [1] are
inapplicable. We propose to let each oscillator detect potential attacks by monitoring the number of pulses
it receives within a certain time interval. The basic rationale is as follows: In a given time interval, if the
number of received pulses is greater than the maximally possible number of pulses emitted by all legitimate
oscillators, then it is safe to conclude that an attacker is present who injected the superfluous pulses. To this
end, we first characterize the number of pulses that an oscillator can receive within a certain time interval in
the absence of attacks.
Lemma 4.3. For a general connected network of N legitimate PCOs, under Mechanism 4.1, an oscillator i
can receive at most d − (i) pulses within any time interval [t, t + T /2] for t ≥ 0 where d − (i) is the indegree of
oscillator i.
Proof. Noting that the number of edges entering oscillator i is d − (i) in the considered general connected
PCO network, Lemma 4.3 can be obtained following the same line of reasoning as in Theorem 3.3.
Based on Lemma 4.3, we have, under the pulse-number based detection mechanism, that oscillator
i’s receiving more than d − (i) pulses within an arbitrary time interval [t, t + T /2] implies the presence of
attackers among its neighbors. Therefore, to keep stealthy, one compromised oscillator should launch stealthy
attacks by sending pulses with a time separation over T /2 seconds. From the above analysis, we summarize
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the attacking models as follows:
In non-colluding attacks, a Byzantine attacker emits an attack pulse only when the pulse can enlarge
the containing arc of its neighbors. In addition, to keep stealthy, every individual attacker sends malicious
pulses with a time separation over T /2 seconds.
In colluding attacks, a Byzantine attacker emits an attack pulse either when the pulse can enlarge the
containing arc of the union set of colluding attackers’ neighbor sets, or when the pulse can help other attack
pulse to do so.

4.5

Synchronization of PCO Networks under Stealthy Byzantine Attacks
In this section, we address the synchronization of general connected PCO networks in the presence

of stealthy Byzantine attacks. Among N PCOs, we assume that M are compromised and act as stealthy
Byzantine attackers. We first show that the proposed pulse-based synchronization mechanism (Mechanism
4.1) can synchronize legitimate oscillators when attackers do not collude, i.e., every attacker determines its
attacking strategy based on its own neighbors’ phase information. Then we further prove that all legitimate
oscillators can still be synchronized even when attackers collude with each other, i.e., attackers can exchange
phase information of their neighbors. To this end, we first analyze the phase evolution of legitimate oscillators
in the presence of non-colluding attackers.
Lemma 4.4. For a general connected network of N PCOs, within which M ≤ 2×b(d −bN/2c)/4c oscillators
are compromised non-colluding attackers launching attacks following the stealthy Byzantine attack model in
Section 4.4, if the initial length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators is less than π and d > bN/2c,
then under Mechanism 4.1, the N − M legitimate oscillators encounter attack pulses only when their phases
reside partially in [0, π), partially in (π, 2π] with phase 2π belonging to the containing arc.
Proof. According to Mechanism 4.1, all legitimate oscillators will evolve freely for an entire period T = 2π.
Since the initial length of the containing arc is assumed to be less than π, the possible phase distribution of
all legitimate oscillators immediately after the initial period of free evolution can only fall within one of the
following four scenarios, as depicted in Fig. 4.3:
I) all legitimate oscillators’ phases reside in [0, π];
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II) legitimate oscillators’ phases reside partially in (0, π], partially in (π, 2π] with phase π belonging to
the containing arc;
III) all legitimate oscillators’ phases reside in (π, 2π];
IV) legitimate oscillators’ phases reside partially in [0, π), partially in (π, 2π] with phase 2π belonging to
the containing arc.
Since in non-colluding attacks, an attacker will emit an attack pulse only when the pulse can enlarge
the containing arc of its legitimate neighbors, every attack pulse will trigger a phase shift on at least one
legitimate oscillator. Next, we prove that an attacker can trigger a legitimate oscillator (say oscillator j) to
jump in phase only under Scenario IV).
I) All legitimate oscillators’ phases reside in [0, π]. Without loss of generality, we assume that legitimate
oscillator k fires last among all legitimate oscillators at time instant tk . One can easily get that all
legitimate oscillators fired in the past T /2 seconds prior to tk . Recalling d , mini=1,2,··· ,N {d(i)}, we
have M ≤ 2 × b(d − bN/2c)/4c ≤ 2 × b(d(i) − bN/2c)/4c = 2λi . Hence, immediately after the firing
of oscillator k, legitimate oscillator i has received at least d(i) − M ≥ λ̄i legitimate pulses during [tk −
T /2, tk ] for i ∈ NL where NL is the index set of all legitimate oscillators. According to Mechanism
4.1, if legitimate oscillator i received no less than λ̄i pulses within the past 3T /4, no pulse can trigger
oscillator i to jump in phase. Hence, immediately after the firing of legitimate oscillator k, all legitimate
oscillators will evolve freely for T /4 and no pulses can trigger a legitimate oscillator to jump in phase
within this period. After this quarter period, legitimate oscillators will not emit pulses before the
network shifts to Scenario II) and the number of attacker pulses is not enough to trigger a legitimate
oscillator to jump in phase. Given that an attacker sends pulses only when the containing arc of its
legitimate neighbors can be enlarged, no attack pulse will be emitted in this scenario.
II) Legitimate oscillators’ phases reside partially in (0, π], partially in (π, 2π] with phase π belonging to
the containing arc. Following the same line of reasoning as in Scenario I), one can get that no legitimate
oscillators reach phase 2π and fire in this scenario. Because no attack pulse can shift the phase of a
legitimate oscillator, no attacker will emit attack pulses in this scenario.
III) All legitimate oscillators’ phases reside in (π, 2π]. One can get that no legitimate oscillators fire in the
past T /4. Since the number of attacker pulses is not enough to trigger a legitimate oscillator to jump
in phase, no attacker will emit attack pulses in this scenario.
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IV) Legitimate oscillators’ phases reside partially in [0, π), partially in (π, 2π] with phase 2π belonging
to the containing arc. One can get that a portion of legitimate oscillators fired in the past T /4 in this
scenario. So an attacker may be able to emit an attack pulse at a right time instant to trigger legitimate
neighbors to jump in phase and enlarge the containing arc of its legitimate neighbors.
By iterating the above analysis, we can get that an attacker will emit an attack pulse to shift the
phase of a legitimate oscillator only when legitimate oscillators’ phases reside partially in [0, π), partially in
(π, 2π] with phase 2π rad belonging to the containing arc.
Next, we establish the synchronization condition for general connected PCO networks in the presence of non-colluding stealthy Byzantine attackers.
Theorem 4.2. For a general connected network of N PCOs, within which M ≤ 2 × b(d − bN/2c)/4c oscillators are compromised non-colluding attackers launching attacks following the stealthy Byzantine attack
model in Section 4.4, if the initial length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators is less than π rad and
d > bN/2c, then the containing arc of legitimate oscillators will converge to zero under Mechanism 4.1.
Proof. We divide the proof into two parts. In Part I, we prove that the length of the containing arc of legitimate
oscillators is non-increasing. In Part II, we prove that it converges to 0.
Part I (The length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators is non-increasing): It can be easily
inferred that the length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators remains unchanged if no legitimate
oscillators jump in phase. So we only consider the case where a pulse (from either a legitimate oscillator or
an attacker) triggers a phase jump on a legitimate oscillator.
As no legitimate oscillators will be triggered to jump in phase in the first free-running period, we
only consider pulses sent after t = T . We will show that for any pulse sent at ti > T , the length of the
containing arc of legitimate oscillators is non-increasing.
When the pulse is from a legitimate oscillator i, we have φi (ti ) = 2π, i.e., at ti the containing arc of
legitimate oscillators includes phase 2π rad. Following the same line of reasoning as in Lemma 4.1, one can
obtain that the pulse cannot increase the length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators.
When the pulse is from an attacker, according to Lemma 4.4, the pulse can only be sent when
legitimate oscillators’ phases reside partially in [0, π), partially in (π, 2π] with phase 2π rad belonging to the
containing arc. Following the same line of reasoning as in Scenario c) of Lemma 4.1, one can obtain that the
length of the containing arc of all legitimate oscillators cannot be increased by the attack pulse, although the
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containing arc of a subset of legitimate oscillators (an attacker’s neighbor set) will be enlarged, as confirmed
later in the numerical simulations in Fig. 4.9. Hence, we can conclude that the length of the containing arc
of all legitimate oscillators is non-increasing.
Part II (The length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators converges to 0): First, we prove
that every legitimate oscillator will fire at least once within any time interval of length 3T /2. According to
the argument in Lemma 4.4, attack pulses will only be emitted when legitimate oscillators’ phases reside
partially in [0, π), partially in (π, 2π] with phase 2π rad belonging to the containing arc. Following the same
line of reasoning as in Lemma 4.2, we can easily get that every legitimate oscillator will fire at least once
within any time interval of length 3T /2.
Next, we prove that the length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators will decrease to 0.
Without loss of generality, we denote δ (t) as the length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators at t
and set the initial time to t = 0. According to the argument in Part I, we have that δ (t) is non-increasing and
0 ≤ δ (t) < π for t ≥ 0. Since every legitimate oscillator will fire at least once within any time interval of
length 3T /2, there exists a time instant t0 > 2T at which the ending point of the containing arc of legitimate
oscillators resides at phase 0. Denoting the starting point of the containing arc at t0 as 0 ≤ ε < π, we
have δ (t0 ) = ε. Next, we separately discuss the 0 ≤ ε < π/2 case and the π/2 ≤ ε < π case to prove the
convergence of δ (t) to 0.
Case I (0 ≤ ε < π/2): If ε is 0, the network is synchronized. So we only consider 0 < δ (t0 ) < π/2.
At time instant t0 , the ending and starting points of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators reside on phases
0 and 0 < ε < π/2 rad, respectively. According to Lemma 4.4, attack pulses are emitted only when legitimate
oscillators’ phases reside partially in [0, π), partially in (π, 2π] with phase 2π rad belonging to the containing
arc. So after t0 , all legitimate oscillators will evolve freely without perturbation for exactly T − ε > 3T /4
seconds before the starting point of the containing arc reaches phase 2π rad at time t1 = t0 + T − ε. At t1 , the
ending point of the containing arc resides on phase 2π − ε rad and we have δ (t1 ) = δ (t0 ) = ε. Given that the
PRF in (4.2) is non-negative on [2π − ε, 2π], a pulse can only trigger a forward jump or have no effect on
a legitimate oscillator with phase residing in [2π − ε, 2π]. All legitimate oscillators will reach phase 2π rad
and fire no later than t1 + ε and within [t1 , t1 + ε/2], we can only have one of the following three scenarios:
Scenario I.1: all legitimate oscillators fired within [t1 , t1 + ε/2];
Scenario I.2: some legitimate oscillators did not fire within [t1 , t1 + ε/2] but all of these legitimate oscillators jumped in phases within [t1 , t1 + ε/2];
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Scenario I.3: some legitimate oscillators neither fired nor jumped in phase within [t1 , t1 + ε/2].
Next, we prove δ (t1 + ε) ≤ (1 − l/2)δ (t1 ) in all above three scenarios, based on which we can
further prove such a length decrease of containing arc of legitimate oscillators after each round of firing and
hence the convergence of δ (t) to zero.
Following the same line of reasoning as in Scenarios 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 of Theorem 4.1 and using
the fact that the number of attackers M is no greater than 2 × b(d − bN/2c)/4c, we can obtain δ (t1 + ε) ≤
(1 − l/2)δ (t1 ) in Scenarios I.1, I.2, and I.3, respectively. At t1 + ε, all legitimate oscillators reside in [0, π]
and will evolve towards phase 2π rad and fire. By repeating the above analyses, we can get that the length
of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators δ (t) will decrease to a value no greater than (1 − l/2)δ (t) after
each round of firing until it converges to 0.
Case II (π/2 ≤ ε < π): Similar to the reasoning in Case I, there exists a time instant t0 > 2T at
which the ending and starting points of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators reside on phases 0 and
π/2 ≤ ε < π rad, respectively. After t0 , all legitimate oscillators will evolve freely for exactly T − ε > T /2
seconds before the starting point of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators reaches phase 2π rad at time
t1 = t0 + T − ε. At t1 , the ending point of the containing arc resides on phase 2π − ε rad and we have
δ (t1 ) = δ (t0 ) = ε. As the PRF in (4.2) is non-negative on [2π − ε, 2π], a pulse can only trigger a forward
jump or have no effect on a legitimate oscillator with phase in [2π − ε, 2π]. So all legitimate oscillators will
reach phase 2π rad and fire no later than t1 + ε and within [t1 , t1 + ε/2], we can only have one of the following
three scenarios:
Scenario II.1: all legitimate oscillators fired within [t1 , t1 + ε/2];
Scenario II.2: some legitimate oscillators did not fire within [t1 , t1 + ε/2] but all of these legitimate oscillators jumped in phase within [t1 , t1 + ε/2];
Scenario II.3: some legitimate oscillators neither fired nor jumped in phase within [t1 , t1 + ε/2].
Next, we show that δ (t) will reduce to less than π/2 rad in finite time, i.e., Case II will shift to Case
I in finite time, after which δ (t) will convergence to zero, as ready proven in Case I.
Following the same line of reasoning as in Scenario 2.1 and Scenario 2.2 of Theorem 1, one can
obtain δ (t1 + ε) ≤ (1 − l/2)δ (t1 ) in Scenario II.1 and Scenario II.2, respectively. For Scenario II.3, i.e., some
legitimate oscillators neither fired nor jumped in phase within [t1 , t1 + ε/2], we assume legitimate oscillator j0
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is such an oscillator. According to Mechanism 4.1, there could be two reasons for the not firing of oscillator
j0 in [t1 , t1 + ε/2]:
Scenario II.3.1: legitimate oscillator j0 receives no greater than λ j0 pulses within [t1 , t1 + ε/2], i.e., condition
b) of Mechanism 4.1 is not satisfied;
Scenario II.3.2: legitimate oscillator j0 receives over λ j0 pulses within [t1 , t1 + ε/2], but the number of pulses
it received within the past period of length 3T /4 is no less than λ̄ j0 , i.e., condition c) of
Mechanism 4.1 is not satisfied.
Still following the same line of reasoning as in Scenario 2.3.1 and Scenario 2.3.2 of Theorem 1
and using the fact that the number of attackers M is no greater than 2 × b(d − bN/2c)/4c, we can obtain
in Scenario II.3.1 that the length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators will reduce to (1 − l/2) of
its original value after every firing round whereas in Scenario II.3.2 such a reduction occurs after every two
consecutive firing rounds.
Since every legitimate oscillator will fire at least once within any time interval of length 3T /2
according to the reasoning at the beginning of Part II, we can get that the length of the containing arc of
legitimate oscillators δ (t) will always decrease to a value less than π/2 rad within finite time (in fact, after
at most 2m firing rounds with m satisfying (1 − l/2)m δ (t0 ) < π/2), after which it will converge to zero
according to the argument in Case I.
By combining Case I and Case II, one can obtain that the containing arc of legitimate oscillators
δ (t) will always converge to 0 even in the presence of attackers.
Corollary 4.2. Under conditions in Theorem 4.2, Mechanism 4.1 guarantees that all legitimate oscillators
synchronize with an oscillation period T = 2π seconds even in the presence of attacks.
Proof. According to the proof of Theorem 4.2, we know that despite the presence of attacks, the containing
arc of legitimate oscillators will shrink to 0 upon which the phases of legitimate oscillators will not be affected
by attack pulses. Therefore, Mechanism 4.1 can guarantee the T = 2π seconds oscillation period even in the
presence of attacks.
Next, we prove that Mechanism 4.1 can guarantee synchronization of general connected PCO network even when attackers collude with each other and exchange perceived phase information of their neighbors. In this situation, an attacker will emit a malicious pulse either when the pulse can enlarge the containing
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arc of the union set of colluding attackers’ neighbor sets, or when the pulse can help other attack pulse to do
so.
To facilitate the analysis, we first characterize the phase evolution of legitimate oscillators in the
presence of colluding attackers.
Lemma 4.5. For a general connected network of N PCOs, within which M ≤ b(d −bN/2c)/4c oscillators are
compromised colluding attackers launching attacks following the stealthy Byzantine attack model in Section
4.4, if the initial length of the containing arc is less than π rad and d > bN/2c, then under Mechanism 4.1,
the N − M legitimate oscillators will encounter attack pulses only when their phases reside partially in [0, π),
partially in (π, 2π] with phase 2π rad belonging to the containing arc.
Proof. Similar to Lemma 4.4, we know that the phase distribution of legitimate oscillators after the first
free-running period can only fall within one of the four scenarios in Fig. 4.3.
According to the stealth Byzantine attack model in Section 4.4, we know that M attackers can emit at
most M attack pulses in a quarter period. Given M ≤ b(d − bN/2c)/4c ≤ b(d(i) − bN/2c)/4c = λi for i ∈ NL
where NL is the index set of all legitimate oscillators, we know from Mechanism 4.1 that attacks pulses alone
are not enough to trigger a legitimate oscillator to jump in phase. Therefore, following an argument similar
to Lemma 4.4, we know that to enlarge the containing arc of legitimate neighbors, attack pulses are sent
only when the phases of legitimate oscillators reside partially in [0, π), partially in (π, 2π] with phase 2π rad
belonging to the containing arc.
Next, we establish the synchronization condition for general connected PCO networks in the presence of colluding attackers.
Theorem 4.3. For a general-connected network of N PCOs, within which M ≤ b(d − bN/2c)/4c oscillators
are colluding attackers launching attacks following the stealthy Byzantine attack model in Section 4.4, if the
initial length of the containing arc is less than π rad and d > bN/2c, then all legitimate oscillators can be
synchronized under Mechanism 4.1.
Proof. Similar to the proof in Theorem 4.2, we divide the proof into two parts. In Part I, we prove that
the length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators is non-increasing. In Part II, we prove that it will
converge to 0.
Part I (The length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators is non-increasing): It can be easily
inferred that the length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators remains unchanged if no legitimate
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oscillators jump in phase. So we only consider the case where a pulse (from either a legitimate oscillator or
an attacker) triggers a phase jump on a legitimate oscillator.
Following the same line of reasoning as in Theorem 4.2, one can easily get that the firing of a legitimate oscillator cannot increase the length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators. By combining
Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.5, we can also obtain that no attacker pulses can increase the length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators, although the containing arc of a subset of legitimate oscillators (the union
set of colluding attackers’ neighbor sets) may be enlarged. Hence, we can conclude that the length of the
containing arc of all legitimate oscillators is non-increasing.
Part II (The length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators converges to 0): The proof follows
the same reasoning as in Part II of Theorem 4.2 and is omitted.
Remark 4.4. It is worth noting that the maximally allowable number of attackers in a PCO network is
2 × b(d − bN/2c)/4c when attackers do not collude with each other, which is greater than the maximally
allowable number of compromised oscillators b(d − bN/2c)/4c when attackers collude and exchange information.
In the colluding case, some attackers can emit attack pulses even if these pulses themselves do not
enlarge the containing arc (as long as these pulses can help other attack pulses to enlarge the containing arc).
In fact, even if all attackers are allowed to send attack pulses when the containing arc does not change, they
still cannot prevent legitimate pulses from satisfying condition (4.4) to decrease the length of the containing
arc.
Corollary 4.3. For a general connected network of N PCOs, within which M ≤ b(d − bN/2c)/4c colluding
attackers have the ability to emit attack pulses not only when their pulses can enlarge the length of the
containing arc but also when the pulses do not change the containing arc, if the initial length of the containing
arc of all legitimate oscillators is less than π rad and d > bN/2c, then there always exist legitimate pulses
satisfying (4.4) in Mechanism 4.1.
Proof. According the stealthy requirement in Section 4.4, M ≤ b(d − bN/2c)/4c attackers can emit at most
2M attack pulses within an arbitrary three-quarter oscillation period. Since 2M is less than λ̄i , one can get
that (4.4) cannot be made unsatisfied for all legitimate pulses.
Remark 4.5. Following Corollary 4.3 and the proof in Theorem 4.2, one can get that there always exist
legitimate pulses satisfying condition (4.4), which will reduce the length of the containing arc, even though
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attackers can ensure that all their attack pulses do not change the length of the containing arc of legitimate
oscillators. Hence, attackers cannot prevent legitimate oscillators from reaching synchronization by holding
the containing arc constant.

4.6

Extension to the Case where N is Unknown to Individual Oscillators
The implementation of the “cut-off” algorithm in Mechanism 4.1 requires each node to have ac-

cess to N, which may be not feasible in a completely decentralized network. Therefore, in this section, we
generalize our approach to the case where N is unknown to individual oscillators by leveraging the degree
information of individual oscillators. The essence is a new “cut-off” mechanism that is designed based on the
degree information of individual oscillators, as detailed below:
New Pulse-Based Synchronization Mechanism (Mechanism 4.2):
1. The phase φi of oscillator i evolves from 0 to 2π rad with a constant speed ω = 1 rad/second.
2. Once φi reaches 2π rad, oscillator i fires and resets its phase to 0.
3. When oscillator i receives a pulse at time instant t, it simultaneously resets its phase according to (4.1)
only when all the following three conditions are satisfied:
(a) an entire period T = 2π seconds has elapsed since initiation.
(b) before receiving the current pulse, oscillator i has received at least bd(i)/9c pulses within (t −
T /4, t], where b•c is the largest integer no greater than “ • .”
(c) before receiving the current pulse, oscillator i has received less than d(i) − 2 × bd(i)/9c pulses
within (t − 3T /4, t].
Otherwise, the pulse has no effect on φi .

Following a similar line of reasoning in as Theorem 4.1, Theorem 4.2, and Theorem 4.3, we can
prove that Mechanism 4.2 can synchronize legitimate oscillators both in the absence and presence of attackers.
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Corollary 4.4. For an attack-free general-connected network of N PCOs, if the degree of the network satisfies d > b2N/3c and the initial length of the containing arc is less than π rad, then all oscillators can be
synchronized under Mechanism 4.2.
Proof. Proof of Corollary 4.4 can be obtained following Theorem 4.1 and is omitted.
Theorem 4.4. For a general connected network of N PCOs, within which M oscillators are non-colluding
stealthy Byzantine attackers, if M is no greater than 2×bd/9c with d > b2N/3c, then all legitimate oscillators
can be synchronized under Mechanism 4.2 as long as their initial length of the containing arc is less than π
rad.
Proof. The proof follows the same line of reasoning as in Theorem 4.2. More specifically, using the same
arguments as Part I of Theorem 4.2, we can obtain that a pulse from neither a legitimate oscillator nor a
stealthy Byzantine attacker could enlarge the containing arc of legitimate oscillators under Mechanism 4.2,
i.e, the length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators is non-increasing. Then, following the same
argument as in Part II of Theorem 4.2, we know that if d > b2N/3c and M ≤ 2 × bd/9c hold, the length of
the containing arc of legitimate oscillators will keep decreasing until it converges to 0.
Theorem 4.5. For a general connected network of N PCOs, within which M oscillators are colluding stealthy
Byzantine attackers, if M is no greater than bd/9c with d > b2N/3c, then all legitimate oscillators can be
synchronized under Mechanism 4.2 as long as their initial length of the containing arc is less than π rad.
Proof. The proof can be obtained following the same line of argument as in Theorem 4.3 and is omitted.
Remark 4.6. When N is unknown to individual oscillators, d has to be over b2N/3c, which is greater than
bN/2c in the case where N is known. The increased requirement on the connectivity of PCO networks is
intuitive in that less knowledge of a PCO network requires stronger conditions to guarantee synchronization.
Table 4.1 summarizes the conditions for Mechanism 4.1 and Mechanism 4.2 to achieve synchronization.

4.7

Simulations
Consider a network of 30 PCOs distributed on a two-dimension plane as illustrated in Fig. 4.7. Two

oscillators in the network can communicate with each other if and only if their distance is no more than 50
meters. Thus, the degree of the network is d = 24. We set the initial time to t = 0 and chose phases of
oscillators randomly from [0, π). Hence, the initial length of the containing arc satisfied δ (0) < π.
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Table 4.1: Synchronization conditions of Mechanism 4.1 and Mechanism 4.2 (N denotes the total number of
oscillators)
Initial containing
arc length

Degree of
network d

Need knowledge
of N

Number of attackers M
(non-colluding case)

Number of attackers M
(colluding case)

Mechanism 1

less than π

d > bN/2c

Yes

M ≤ 2 × b(d − bN/2c)/4c

M ≤ b(d − bN/2c)/4c

Mechanism 2

less than π

d > b2N/3c

No

M ≤ 2 × bd/9cc

M ≤ bd/9cc
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Figure 4.7: The deployment of the 30 oscillators used in simulations.
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4.7.1

In the Absence of Attacks
We first considered the situation without attackers. As d > b2N/3c = 20, we know from Theorem

4.1 and Corollary 4.4 that the network will always synchronize, whether or not N is available to individual
oscillators. This was confirmed in Fig. 4.8.
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Figure 4.8: Plot (a) and (b) presented the phase evolutions of the 30 PCOs under Mechanism 4.1 and Mechanism 4.2, respectively. The coupling strength was set to l = 0.1.

4.7.2

In the Presence of Stealthy Byzantine Attackers
Using the same network, we first ran simulations in the presence of stealthy Byzantine attacks when

N is known to individual oscillators.
We assumed that 4 out of the 30 oscillators (oscillators 1, 6, 26 and 30) were compromised and acted
as non-colluding Byzantine attackers. As M = 2 × b(d − bN/2c)/4c = 4, we know from Theorem 4.2 that
the network will synchronize. This was confirmed by numerical simulations in Fig. 4.9, which showed that
even under attacks the length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators converged to zero, despite the fact
that the containing arc of oscillator 1’s legitimate neighbors was enlarged by these attack pulses.
When the 4 attackers colluded with each other, according to Theorem 4.3, the maximally allowable
number of colluding attackers is b(d −bN/2c)/4c = 2. Hence, the condition in Theorem 4.3 was not satisfied.
Simulation results confirmed that legitimate oscillators indeed could not synchronize, as illustrated in Fig.
4.10.
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Figure 4.9: Phase evolution and the length of the containing arc of 26 legitimate oscillators under Mechanism
4.1 in the presence of 4 non-colluding stealthy Byzantine attackers (oscillators 1, 6, 26, 30) with attacking
pulse time instants represented by asterisks. The coupling strength was set to l = 0.1.
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Figure 4.10: Phase evolution and the length of the containing arc of 26 legitimate oscillators under Mechanism 4.1 in the presence of 4 colluding stealthy Byzantine attackers (oscillators 1, 6, 26 and 30) with attacking
pulse time instants represented by asterisks. The coupling strength was set to l = 0.1.
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However, when we decreased the number of attackers to 2 (oscillators 1 and 6), all legitimate oscillators synchronized (cf. Fig. 4.11), confirming the results in Theorem 4.3. It is worth noting that the
containing arc of attacker 1’s legitimate neighbors were enlarged by attacker pulses, cf. Fig. 4.11.
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Figure 4.11: Phase evolution and the length of the containing arc of 28 legitimate oscillators under Mechanism 4.1 in the presence of 2 colluding stealthy Byzantine attackers (oscillators 1 and 6) with attacking pulse
time instants represented by asterisks. The coupling strength was set to l = 0.1.
We also ran simulations in the presence of stealthy Byzantine attacks when N is unknown to individual oscillators. We assumed that 4 out of the 30 oscillators (oscillators 1, 6, 18 and 26) were compromised
and acted as stealthy non-colluding Byzantine attackers. According to Theorem 4.4, all legitimate oscillators
can be synchronized under Mechanism 4.2. This was confirmed by numerical simulations in Fig. 4.12, which
showed that the length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators converged to zero.
When all 4 attackers colluded with each other, according to Theorem 4.5, the maximally allowable
number of attackers is bd/9c = 2. Hence, the condition in Theorem 4.5 is not satisfied. Simulation results
confirmed that legitimate oscillators indeed could not synchronize, as illustrated in Fig. 4.13.
However, when we reduced the number of colluding attackers to 2 (oscillators 1 and 6), all legitimate
oscillators achieved synchronization (cf. Fig. 4.14), which confirmed Theorem 4.5.
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Figure 4.12: Phase evolution and the length of the containing arc of 26 legitimate oscillators under Mechanism 4.2 in the presence of 4 stealthy non-colluding Byzantine attackers (oscillators 1, 6, 18 and 26) with
attacking pulse time instants represented by asterisks. The coupling strength was set to l = 0.1.
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Figure 4.13: Phase evolution and the length of the containing arc of 26 legitimate oscillators under Mechanism 4.2 in the presence of 4 colluding stealthy Byzantine attackers (oscillators 1, 6, 18 and 26) with firing
time instants represented by asterisks. The coupling strength was set to l = 0.1.
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Figure 4.14: Phase evolution and the length of the containing arc of 28 legitimate oscillators under Mechanism 4.2 in the presence of 2 colluding stealthy Byzantine attackers (oscillators 1 and 6) with attacking pulse
time instants represented by asterisks. The coupling strength was set to l = 0.1.

4.7.3

Comparison with Existing Results
In the absence of attacks, we compared Mechanism 4.1 with existing approaches in [2, 3] and Chap-

ter 3 under the PCO network in Fig. 4.7 in the presence of time-varying delays. We assume that the delays are
randomly distributed in [0, 0.1T ]. Noting that exact synchronization cannot be achieved in this case, similar
to [2], we evaluated the performance using synchronization errors defined as follows:

Synchronization Error = max {min(2π − |φi − φ j |, |φi − φ j |)}
i, j∈NL

where NL is the index set of all legitimate oscillators.
Fig. 4.15 and Fig. 4.16 show the synchronization errors of Mechanism 4.1 and approaches in [2, 3]
and Chapter 3 when the coupling strength was set to l = 0.3 and l = 0.6, respectively. Each data point
was the average of 10, 000 runs with vertical error bars denoting standard deviations. It can be seen that
our approach renders a smaller synchronization error. It is worth noting that Mechanism 4.2 also renders a
smaller synchronization error than the approaches in [2, 3] and Chapter 3 under the same set up. However,
the results are omitted due to space limitations.
We also compared our proposed approach with existing approaches in [2, 3] and Chapter 3 under
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Figure 4.15: Comparison of our Mechanism 4.1 with the approaches in [2, 3] and Chapter 3 in terms of
synchronization error in the presence of time-varying delays uniformly distributed in [0, 0.1T ]. The coupling
strength was set to l = 0.3.
the PCO network in Fig. 4.7 in the presence of non-colluding and colluding stealthy Byzantine attackers,
respectively.
Fig. 4.17 shows the synchronization errors of Mechanism 4.1 and approaches in [2, 3] and Chapter
3 in the presence of 4 non-colluding stealthy Byzantine attackers (oscillators 1, 6, 26, 30) and Fig. 4.18
shows the corresponding synchronization errors in the presence of 2 colluding stealthy Byzantine attackers
(oscillators 1 and 6). Each data point was the average of 10, 000 runs with vertical error bars denoting
standard deviations. It can be seen that our approach can achieve perfect synchronization whereas all existing
approaches are subject to substantial synchronization errors. It is worth noting that our Mechanism 4.2
also achieved perfect synchronization under the same set up. However, the results are omitted due to space
limitations.

86

Mechanism 4.1
Approach in [2]
Approach in [3]
Approach in Chapter 3

0.9

Synchronization Error

0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0

T

2T

3T

4T

5T

6T

7T

8T

9T 10T 11T 12T

Time

Figure 4.16: Comparison of our Mechanism 4.1 with the approaches in [2, 3] and Chapter 3 in terms of
synchronization error in the presence of time-varying delays uniformly distributed in [0, 0.1T ]. The coupling
strength was set to l = 0.6.

Mechanism 4.1
Approach in [2]
Approach in [3]
Approach in Chapter 3

0.9

Synchronization Error

0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0

T

2T

3T

4T

5T

6T

7T

8T

9T 10T 11T 12T

Time

Figure 4.17: Comparison of our Mechanism 4.1 with the attack resilient approaches in [2, 3] and Chapter 3
in terms of synchronization error in the presence of 4 non-colluding stealthy Byzantine attackers (oscillators
1, 6, 26, 30). The coupling strength was set to l = 0.3.
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Figure 4.18: Comparison of our Mechanism 4.1 with the attack resilient approaches in [2,3] and Chapter 3 in
terms of synchronization error in the presence of 2 colluding stealthy Byzantine attackers (oscillators 1 and
6). The coupling strength was set to l = 0.3.
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Chapter 5

An Attack-Resilient Pulse-Based
Synchronization Strategy for Densely
Connected PCO Networks under
Byzantine Attacks
5.1

Introduction
In this chapter, we propose an approach to synchronizing densely connected PCO networks from an

arbitrary initial phase distribution under Byzantine (arbitrary) attacks. The approach only employs contentfree pulses. It is worth noting that the content-free pulse-based communication reduces the attack surface
and avoids the manipulation of message contents by Byzantine attacks. In fact, what can be manipulated by
Byzantine attacks becomes the timing of attack pulses, which will be elaborated in Section 5.3.
Table 5.1 summarizes the advantage of our approach over existing results on pulse-based synchronization. More specifically, compared with existing results, our contributions are as follows: 1) Under Byzantine attacks, our proposed mechanism can synchronize legitimate oscillators even when their initial phases are
arbitrarily distributed in the entire oscillation period; 2) Our mechanism is applicable to densely connected
PCO networks that are not necessarily all-to-all; 3) We consider an attack model that is much more difficult
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to deal with than existing results like [2, 3, 65–67]; 4) Our mechanism only use contend-free pulses, which is
different from [53–59] relying on the assistance of packet communication to achieve synchronization; 5) Our
proposed mechanism guarantees that the collective oscillation period is identical to the free-running period
irrespective of attacks, which is superior to existing mechanisms (e.g., [3, 65, 66]) that lead to a collective
oscillation period affected by attacker pulses.
Table 5.1: Comparison of attack-resilient pulse synchronization approaches.

```
Unrestricted phase
``` Merits
```
Approaches
` distribution conditions
[2, 3], Chapter 2
Chapter 3
Chapter 4
[54–57]
[58] [59]
[53]
Chapter 5

Not restricted to
all-to-all networks

Attack model is
Byzantine attacks

×

×

×

×

×
√

√

×
√

×

√

√

√

√

√

√

×
√
√

Communication
uses content-free
pulses only
√
√
√
×
×

×

×

√

√

It is worth noting that the results in this chapter are fundamentally different from our recent result in
Chapter 4 in the following aspects: 1) The attack model in this chapter is much stronger. Chapter 4 considers
an attack model in which an attacker is restricted to send at most one attack pulse in any time interval of length
T /2 (to stay stealthy) whereas this chapter allows attackers to send as many attack pulses as possible under a
given communication channel with a fixed bit rate. So synchronization under attacks in this chapter is much
more challenging; 2) This chapter has more relaxed requirement on the initial distribution of oscillator phases
compared with Chapter 4. Chapter 4 requires legitimate oscillators to have initial phases contained in a half
cycle whereas this chapter allows legitimate oscillators’ phases to be arbitrarily distributed in the entire cycle;
3) This chapter proves finite-time synchronization whereas Chapter 4 only proves asymptotic synchronization
even in the case of l = 1. More specifically, Chapter 4 proves that the length of the containing arc of legitimate
oscillators will decrease to no greater than (1 − l/2) of its original value after every two consecutive firing
rounds, and hence can only yield synchronization when time goes to infinity. (It is worth noting that our prior
result on non-all-to-all PCO networks in [65] needs 0 < l < 1 to address the practical case of non-identical
initial phases of legitimate oscillators and hence also only proves asymptotic synchronization.)
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This Chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 reviews the main concepts of PCO networks.
Section 5.3 presents the attack model considered in this chapter. Section 5.4 presents a new pulse-based
synchronization mechanism. Section 5.5 addresses the case of multiple Byzantine attackers and Section 5.6
addresses the case where the total number of oscillators is unknown to individual oscillators. Simulation
results are presented in Section 5.7.

5.2

Preliminaries
Consider a network of N pulse-coupled oscillators. Each oscillator is equipped with a phase vari-

able which evolves clockwise on a unit circle. When the evolving phase of an oscillator reaches 2π rad, the
oscillator fires (emits a pulse). Receiving pulses from neighboring oscillators will lead to the adjustment of
the receiving oscillator’s phase, which can be designed to achieve a desired collective behavior such as phase
synchronization. To define synchronization, we first introduce the concept of containing arc. The containing arc of legitimate oscillators is defined as the shortest arc on the unit circle that contains all legitimate
oscillators’ phases.
Definition 5.1 (Phase Synchronization): We define phase synchronization as a state on which all
legitimate oscillators have identical phases and fire simultaneously with a period of T = 2π seconds.
An edge (i, j) from oscillator i to oscillator j means that oscillator j can receive pulses from oscillator i but not necessarily vice versa. The number of edges entering oscillator i is called the indegree of
oscillator i and is represented as di− . The number of edges leaving oscillator i is called the outdegree of oscillator i and is represented as di+ . The value di , min{di− , di+ } is called the degree of oscillator i. The degree
of a network is defined as d , mini=1,2,··· ,N {di }. Since an oscillator cannot receive the pulse emitted by itself,
the maximal degree of a network of N PCOs is d = N − 1, meaning that the network is all-to-all connected. In
this chapter, we consider dense networks where the network degree d is assumed to be greater than b2N/3c.
Making use of the fact d , mini=1,2,··· ,N {di }, we always have di − b2N/3c − 1 ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2, · · · , N.

5.3

Attacker Model
In this section, we present the model of Byzantine attacks. We assume that Byzantine attacks are

able to compromise an oscillator and completely take over its behavior. Since the communicated messages in
PCO networks are identical and content-free, i.e., pulses, a Byzantine attacker cannot manipulate the content
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of pulses, but rather, it will judiciously craft attacks via injecting pulse trains at certain time instants to
negatively affect pulse-based synchronization.
Because in realistic wireless sensor networks (WSNs), the bit rate of a communication channel
between two connected oscillators is limited, an attacker cannot send infinitely many pulses in any finite time
interval. In other words, there is always a nonzero time interval between two consecutive pulses from an
attacker. Therefore, Byzantine attackers will launch attacks with a time separation greater than ε seconds,
where ε is the minimum time separation between two consecutive pulses that can be conveyed by a channel.
We summarize the Byzantine attacker model in this chapter as follows:
Byzantine Attacker: a Byzantine attacker will emit attack pulses with a time separation greater than
ε seconds, where ε is the minimum time separation between two pulses that can be successfully conveyed by
a communication channel.
Remark 5.1. In PCO networks, the communication messages are all content-free pulses. So the transmission
of one pulse will only occupy the communication channel for a very short time. Only after finishing transmitting one pulse, an attacker can initiate the transmission of another attack pulse. Hence, ε is determined by
the length of the pulse and the bit rate of the communication channel. For example, the bit rate of the IEEE
802.15.4 channel is 250kbps. If we use a control packet (21 bytes) to realize a pulse, then transmitting such
pulses will need time separation ε = (21 × 8)/250000 = 0.672 × 10−3 seconds [14, 70].
Remark 5.2. All existing attack patterns considered under pulse-based synchronization such as random
attacks [2, 64], static attacks [3], and stealthy attacks in Chapters 2-4 are special cases of the attacker model
considered in this chapter.

5.4

A New Pulse-Based Synchronization Mechanism
Motivated by the fact that the conventional pulse-based synchronization mechanism is vulnerable to

attacks, we propose a new pulse-based synchronization mechanism to combat attacks. To present our new
mechanism, we first describe the conventional pulse-based synchronization mechanism.
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Conventional Pulse-Based Synchronization Mechanism [3]:
1. The phase φi of oscillator i evolves from 0 to 2π rad with a constant speed ω = 1 rad/second.
2. Once φi reaches 2π rad, oscillator i fires and resets its phase to 0.
3. Whenever oscillator i receives a pulse, it instantaneously resets its phase to:

φi+ = φi + l × F(φi )

(5.1)

where l ∈ (0, 1] is the coupling strength and F(•) is the phase response function (PRF) given below:

F(φ ) :=



 −φ

 2π − φ

0≤φ ≤π

(5.2)

π < φ ≤ 2π

For l = 1, oscillator i will fire immediately if it has φi+ = 2π rad.

In the above conventional pulse-based synchronization mechanism, every incoming pulse will trigger a jump on the receiving oscillator’s phase, which makes it easy for attackers to perturb the phases of
legitimate oscillators and hence destroy their synchronization. Moreover, we have that synchronization can
never be maintained when attackers only affect part of the network, even when the coupling strength is set to
l = 1. This is because attack pulses can always exert nonzero phase shifts on affected legitimate oscillators
and make them deviate from unaffected ones. This is also confirmed by numerical simulation results in Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9, which illustrate that existing results in [3], Chapter 2, and Chapter 3 cannot achieve
synchronization in the presence of Byzantine attacks when the topology is not all-to-all.
To overcome the inherent vulnerability of existing pulse-based synchronization approaches, we propose a new pulse-based synchronization mechanism (Mechanism 5.1) to improve the attack resilience of
PCO networks. Our key idea to enable attack resilience is a “pulse response mechanism” which can restrict
the number of pulses able to affect a receiving legitimate oscillator’s phase in any oscillation period and a
“phase resetting mechanism” which resets the phase value of a legitimate oscillator upon reaching phase 2π
rad to different values depending on the number of received pulses. The “pulse response mechanism” and the
“phase resetting mechanism” only allow pulses meeting certain conditions to affect a receiving oscillator’s
phase and hence can effectively filter out attack pulses with extremely negative effects on the synchroniza-
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tion process. Noting that all pulses are identical and content-free, Mechanism 5.1 is judiciously designed
based on the number of pulses an oscillator received in the past, i.e., based on memory. The new pulse-based
synchronization mechanism is detailed below:
New Pulse-Based Synchronization Mechanism (Mechanism 5.1):
1. The phase φi of legitimate oscillator i evolves from 0 to 2π rad with a constant speed ω = 1 rad/second.
2. Once φi reaches 2π rad at time t, oscillator i fires (emits a pulse) if it did not fire within (t − ε, t] and an
entire period T = 2π seconds has elapsed since initiation. Then oscillator i resets its phase from 2π rad
to 0 if it received over bN/3c pulses within (t − ε, t], where b•c is the largest integer no greater than
“ • .” Otherwise, it resets its phase from 2π rad to π rad.
3. When oscillator i receives a pulse at time t 0 , it shifts its phase to 2π rad only if φi ∈ [π, 2π] at time
instant t 0 and one of the following conditions is satisfied:
(a) before receiving the current pulse, oscillator i has already received at least di − b2N/3c − 1 pulses
in [t 0 − T /2, t 0 ] and it did not reset its phase from 2π rad to 0 within (t 0 − T, t 0 ).
(b) before receiving the current pulse, oscillator i has already received at least di − b2N/3c − 1 pulses
in (t 0 − ε, t 0 ].
Otherwise, the pulse has no effect on φi who will evolve freely towards 2π rad.

Remark 5.3. Following [13,35,36,42], we assume that when a legitimate oscillator receives multiple pulses
simultaneously, it can determine the number of received pulses and processes them consecutively. In other
words, no two pulses will be regarded as an aggregated pulse.

5.5

Synchronization of PCO Networks in the Presence Attacks
In this section, we address the synchronization of PCO networks in the presence of Byzantine at-

tacks. Among N PCOs, we assume that M are compromised and act as Byzantine attackers. We will show
that Mechanism 5.1 synchronizes legitimate oscillators even in the presence of multiple Byzantine attackers.
Specifically, we will prove that under Mechanism 5.1, legitimate oscillators achieve synchronization even
when their topology is non-all-to-all and their initial phases are distributed arbitrarily in the entire oscillation
period [0, 2π]. More interestingly, when synchronization is achieved, the collective oscillation period of all
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legitimate oscillators is invariant under attacks and is identical to the free-running oscillation period T = 2π
seconds. To facilitate theoretical analysis, we first establish Lemma 5.1 about the properties of floor function
b•c.
Lemma 5.1. For three arbitrary positive integers x, y, and Q, with x > y, the following inequalities always
hold:




by · Q/xc ≥ y · bQ/xc







 by · Q/xc + b(x − y) · Q/xc + 1 ≥ Q

Proof. First, we prove by · Q/xc ≥ y · bQ/xc. Since x and Q are positive integers, dividing Q by x and letting
q and r be the quotient and remainder, respectively, we have Q = x · q + r and 0 ≤ r/x < 1. By substituting
them into by · Q/xc − y · bQ/xc, we have:

by · Q/xc − y · bQ/xc = by · q + y · r/xc − y · bq + r/xc = y · q + by · r/xc − y · q = by · r/xc ≥ 0.

Hence, we obtain by · Q/xc ≥ y · bQ/xc.
Next, we proceed to prove by · Q/xc + b(x − y) · Q/xc + 1 ≥ Q. Dividing y · Q by x and letting q̄ and r̄
be the quotient and remainder, respectively, we have y · Q = q̄ · x + r̄ and 0 ≤ r̄/x < 1. Substituting them into
by · Q/xc + b(x − y) · Q/xc + 1 − Q leads to

by · Q/xc + b(x − y) · Q/xc + 1 − Q =bq̄ + r̄/xc + bQ − q̄ − r̄/xc + 1 − Q
≥bq̄c + bQ − q̄ − 1c + 1 − Q = 0.

Thus, we obtain by · Q/xc + b(x − y) · Q/xc + 1 ≥ Q.
Now we are in position to prove that all legitimate oscillators will synchronize under Mechanism 5.1
in the presence of Byzantine attacks even when legitimate oscillators are under a non-all-to-all connection
and the initial phases are arbitrarily distributed in the entire oscillation period [0, 2π].
Theorem 5.1. For a network of N PCOs among which M are compromised and launch attacks following the
Byzantine attack model in Section 5.3, if the degree of the PCO network satisfies d > b2N/3c and the number
of attackers M satisfies M < d − b2N/3c, then all legitimate oscillators will synchronize under Mechanism
5.1 from any initial phase distribution.
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Proof. We set the initial time instant to t0 . The following proof is divided into two parts. In part I, we prove
that all N − M legitimate oscillators’ phases reside in [π, 2π] at t0 + T from any initial phase distribution.
In Part II, we prove that these legitimate oscillators will reset their phases to 0 at the same time and will
keep having identical phases with a collective oscillation period T = 2π seconds, i.e., they will achieve
synchronization.
Part I (all N − M legitimate oscillators’ phases reside in [π, 2π] at t0 + T ): Since the number of
attackers satisfies M < d − b2N/3c for d ≤ N − 1, using Lemma 5.1, we have

M < d − b2N/3c ≤ N − 1 − b2N/3c ≤ bN/3c.

According to the attacker model in Section 5.3, we know that M < bN/3c attackers can emit at most M <
bN/3c pulses within any time interval of length ε. Since no legitimate oscillator fires within time interval
[t0 , t0 + T ] under Mechanism 5.1, a legitimate oscillator can receive at most M < bN/3c pulses in any time
interval of length ε within [t0 , t0 + T ]. Therefore, upon reaching 2π rad within [t0 , t0 + T ], a legitimate
oscillator will reset its phase to π rad instead of 0.
Since the initial phases of all N − M legitimate oscillators distribute arbitrarily in [0, 2π], at time t0 ,
they can be categorized1)into three
in Figure
2π 0possible scenarios,
2π5.1:
0
2)
2π as0 depicted 3)
Scenario a): all legitimate oscillators’ initial phases reside in [π, 2π];
Scenario b): all legitimate oscillators’ initial phases reside in [0, π);
Scenario c): legitimate oscillators’π initial phases resideπ partially in [0, π) andπ partially in [π, 2π].
a)

2π 0

π

b)

2π 0

π

c)

2π 0

π

Figure 5.1: Three possible initial phase distributions of legitimate oscillators.
Next, we show that no matter which of the three scenarios the initial phase distribution belongs to,
all legitimate oscillators’ phases will reside in [π, 2π] at time t0 + T . We discuss all three scenarios of initial
phase distribution one by one:
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Scenario a): All legitimate oscillators’ initial phases reside in [π, 2π]. After reaching 2π rad within
[t0 , t0 + T ], because a legitimate oscillator will receive less than bN/3c pulses in any time interval of length ε,
it will reset its phase to π rad according to Mechanism 5.1. Therefore, we have that all legitimate oscillators
will reside in [π, 2π] at time t0 + T .
Scenario b): All legitimate oscillators’ initial phases reside in [0, π). According to Mechanism 5.1,
a legitimate oscillator will not respond to incoming pulses when its phase resides in [0, π). So all legitimate
oscillators’ phases will evolve freely towards π rad without perturbation and will enter [π, 2π] no later than
time instant t0 + T /2. After reaching 2π rad within [t0 , t0 + T ], because a legitimate oscillator will receive
less than bN/3c pulses in any time interval of length ε, it will reset its phase to π rad according to Mechanism
5.1. Therefore, we have that all legitimate oscillators’ phases will reside in [π, 2π] at time t0 + T .
Scenario c): Legitimate oscillators’ initial phases reside partially in [0, π) and partially in [π, 2π].
Since legitimate oscillators with phases residing in [0, π) will evolve freely into [π, 2π] under Mechanism
5.1, we have that no later than time instant t0 + T /2, these oscillators’ phase will be in [π, 2π]. Further
making use of the fact that a legitimate oscillator will reset its phase to π rad upon reaching 2π rad since less
than bN/3c pulses will be received by a single oscillator in any time interval of length ε, we obtain that all
legitimate oscillators’ phases will reside in [π, 2π] at time t0 + T .
Summarizing the above three scenarios, we have that regardless of the initial phase distribution, all
legitimate oscillators’ phases will reside in [π, 2π] at time t0 + T despite the presence of attacker pulses.
Part II (all legitimate oscillators will reset their phases to 0 at the same time and will keep having
identical phases with a collective oscillation period T = 2π seconds): From Part I, we know that no legitimate
oscillator fires or resets its phase to 0 within time interval [t0 , t0 + T ] and all legitimate oscillators’ phases
reside in [π, 2π] at time t0 + T . Therefore, all legitimate oscillators’ phases will reach 2π rad and fire at
least once within (t0 + T, t0 + 3T /2]. Without loss of generality, we label all N − M legitimate oscillators
according to the order of their first firing time1 and denote t1 ∈ (t0 + T, t0 + 3T /2] as the first firing time
of legitimate oscillator bN/3c + 1. Only the following two scenarios could happen right before legitimate
oscillator bN/3c + 1 fires at t1 :
Scenario 1.1: no legitimate oscillator has reset its phase to 0 before legitimate oscillator bN/3c + 1 fires at
t1 .
Scenario 1.2: at least one legitimate oscillator has reset its phase to 0 before legitimate oscillator bN/3c + 1
1 For example, if the firing sequence of legitimate oscillators A, B, C is A, A, B, A, C, then oscillators A, B, C are labeled as oscillators
1, 2, 3, respectively.
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fires at t1 .
Next, we show that in both scenarios all legitimate oscillators will reset their phases to 0 at the same time and
will keep having identical phases with a collective oscillation period T = 2π seconds, i.e., they will achieve
synchronization.
We first consider Scenario 1.1, i.e., no legitimate oscillator has reset its phase to 0 before legitimate
oscillator bN/3c + 1 fires at t1 . Since all the N − M legitimate oscillators are labeled according to the order
of their first firing time instants and no legitimate oscillator fired within [t0 , t0 + T ] according to Mechanism
5.1, we have that before the firing of legitimate oscillator bN/3c + 1 at t1 , bN/3c legitimate oscillators fired
within time interval (t0 + T, t1 ] and every legitimate oscillator i for i = 1, 2, · · · , N − M received at least
bN/3c − (N − di ) pulses within time interval (t0 + T, t1 ], where (N − di ) is the number of oscillators which
are not connected with oscillator i. According to Lemma 5.1, we have:

bN/3c − (N − di ) = bN/3c + b2N/3c − N + di − b2N/3c ≥ di − b2N/3c − 1

(5.3)

meaning that before the firing of legitimate oscillator bN/3c+1, every legitimate oscillator i for i = 1, 2, · · · , N −
M has already received at least di − b2N/3c − 1 pulses within time interval (t0 + T, t1 ] (note that this interval
has length less than T /2).
When legitimate oscillator i fires at t1 , at least d legitimate oscillators will receive the pulse. As every
legitimate oscillator has received at least di − b2N/3c − 1 pulses within (t0 + T, t1 ] (as proven in the previous
paragraph), we have that for all legitimate oscillators, the condition 3a) of Mechanism 5.1 is satisfied (note
that in Scenario 1.1 we consider the case that no legitimate oscillators reset their phases to 0 within (t1 −T, t1 ))
and hence all legitimate oscillators that receive the pulse from legitimate oscillator bN/3c + 1 (with quantity
at least d − M) will shift their phases to 2π rad.
Next, we proceed to proved that among the d − M legitimate oscillators whose phases are shifted
to 2π rad by the pulse from legitimate oscillator bN/3c + 1 at t1 , at least d − M − bN/3c of them will fire.
According to condition 2) of Mechanism 5.1, if an oscillator fired within (t1 − ε, t1 ], it cannot fire again at t1 .
Since only bN/3c legitimate oscillators fired before the firing of legitimate oscillator bN/3c+1 at t1 (note that
these oscillators might fire within (t1 − ε, t1 ]), we obtain that among the d − M legitimate oscillators whose
phases are shifted to 2π rad at t1 by the pulse from legitimate oscillator bN/3c + 1, at least d − M − bN/3c of
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them will fire at t1 . From Lemma 5.1 and making use of the fact M < d − b2N/3c, we have

d − M − bN/3c > bN/3c

meaning that the firing of legitimate oscillator bN/3c + 1 will trigger at least bN/3c + 1 other legitimate
oscillators to fire simultaneously at t1 . The firing of these oscillators will further makes every legitimate
oscillator i for i = 1, 2, · · · , N − M to receive at least di − b2N/3c pulses at t1 based on the relationship in
(5.3). Since all legitimate oscillators’ phases reside in [π, 2π], according to Mechanism 5.1, they will be
shifted to 2π rad at t1 . Then, all the non-firing legitimate oscillators except those fired within the past ε time
will fire at t1 .
Recalling that only bN/3c legitimate oscillators fired before legitimate oscillator bN/3c + 1 fires at
t1 , we obtain that at least N − M − bN/3c legitimate oscillators will fire at t1 and every legitimate oscillator i
for i = 1, 2, · · · , N − M will receive at least N − M − bN/3c − (N − di ) pulses from this firing event. According
to Lemma 5.1 and combining the fact M < d − b2N/3c, we have

N − M − bN/3c − (N − di ) = di − M − bN/3c > bN/3c

meaning that every legitimate oscillator receives over bN/3c pulses at t1 . Since every legitimate oscillator
has phase residing on 2π and receives over bN/3c pulses within (t1 − ε, t1 ], all legitimate oscillators’ phases
will reset to 0 after the firing event at t1 .
Next, we proceed to prove that after time instant t1 , all legitimate oscillators will keep having identical phases and their collective oscillation period is T = 2π seconds, i.e., they will achieve synchronization.
From the above analysis, all legitimate oscillators’ phases will be reset to 0 at t1 . Because a legitimate
oscillator’s phase can only be affected by an incoming pulse when it resides in [π, 2π], we have that all
legitimate oscillators’ phases will evolve freely towards π rad within time interval (t1 , t1 + T /2). As soon as
all legitimate oscillators’ phases reach π rad at time instant t1 + T /2, according to Mechanism 5.1, legitimate
oscillator i’s phase can be affected by an incoming pulse at time instant t10 ∈ [t1 +T /2, t1 +T ) only if it receives
over di − b2N/3c − 1 pulses within (t10 − ε, t10 ]. Since the number of attackers satisfies M ≤ d − b2N/3c − 1 ≤
di − b2N/3c − 1 and each attacker can emit at most one attack pulse within a time interval less than ε, so
attack pulses alone are not enough to trigger a phase shift on any legitimate oscillator’s phase. Therefore, all
legitimate oscillators will have identical phases and evolve freely towards 2π rad.
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At time instant t1 + T , all legitimate oscillators reach phase 2π rad and fire simultaneously, which
makes legitimate oscillator i for i = 1, 2, · · · , N − M receive at least N − M − (N − di ) = di − M > bN/3c
pulses. Therefore, all legitimate oscillators will reset their phases to 0 immediately. By repeating the above
analyses, we can get that after time instant t1 , all legitimate oscillators will have identical phases with a collective oscillation period T = 2π seconds, i.e., phase synchronization of all legitimate oscillators is achieved
immediately after time instant t1 .
Next, we consider Scenario 1.2, i.e., at least one legitimate oscillator has reset its phase to 0 before
legitimate oscillator bN/3c + 1 fires at t1 . Without loss of generality, we assume that legitimate oscillator k
is the first legitimate oscillator who resets its phase to 0 within time interval (t0 + T, t1 ] and it resets its phase
to 0 at tk ∈ (t0 + T, t1 ]. According to Mechanism 5.1, legitimate oscillator k must have received over bN/3c
pulses within (tk − ε, tk ].
We assume that legitimate oscillator k receives the bN/3c + 1’th pulse at time tk0 within time interval
(tk − ε, tk ] and the pulse is sent by oscillator k0 . According to condition 2) of Mechanism 5.1, an oscillator
can only fire once within (tk − ε, tk ]. So before the firing of oscillator k0 at tk0 , at least bN/3c oscillators fired
within (tk − ε, tk0 ]. Based on the relationship in (5.3), every legitimate oscillator i for i = 1, 2, · · · , N − M
should have received at least di − b2N/3c − 1 pulses within (tk − ε, tk0 ].
Then following the same line of reasoning in Scenario 1.1, we have that the pulse of oscillator k0
will shift the phases of at least d − M legitimate oscillators (which receive the pulse) to 2π rad and at least
bN/3c + 1 of them will fire at tk0 . Then, all legitimate oscillators’ phases will be shifted to 2π rad and at least
N − M − bN/3c legitimate oscillators will fire at tk0 . Every legitimate oscillator will receive over bN/3c pulses
in this firing event at tk0 and will reset its phase to 0. We can also infer tk0 = tk = t1 .
Next, following the same line of reasoning in Scenario 1.1, we obtain that after time instant t1 , all
legitimate oscillators will have identical phases and their collective oscillation period is T = 2π seconds, i.e.,
phase synchronization of all legitimate oscillators is achieved immediately after time instant t1 .
Remark 5.4. Theorem 5.1 requires that the degree of the network is over b2N/3c, which, according to [24],
also guarantees that the network is strongly connected.
Remark 5.5. The mechanism requires that all legitimate oscillators to start at the same time instant. However, starting at the same time instant does not avoid dealing with arbitrary phase distribution since even
after synchronization, for a non-all-to-all topology on which different attackers can affect different legitimate
oscillators, attackers considered in this chapter can disturb the phases of legitimate oscillators to an arbitrary
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distribution under existing pulse-coupled synchronization strategies.
Remark 5.6. It is worth noting that the theoretical analysis in this chapter is significantly different from our
prior results in Chapters 2-4. In Chapters 2-4, we can prove that the length of the containing arc will decrease
monotonically with time. However, in this chapter, since the initial phases of all legitimate oscillators are
arbitrarily distributed in the entire oscillation period and the considered attacker model is much stronger,
such monotonic decreasing does not exist (see numerical simulation results in Fig. 5.5, Fig. 5.7, Fig. 5.8, and
Fig. 5.9. Instead, we opt to prove that after initiation, our judiciously designed interaction mechanism can
drive the phases of legitimate oscillators to within a half cycle in finite time. Then we proceed to prove that
one legitimate oscillator’s firing can (either directly or indirectly) trigger all legitimate oscillators to reset
their phases to 0 and the interaction mechanism can maintain phase synchronization even in the presence of
attack pulses.
Mechanism 5.1 can also guarantee synchronization of densely connected PCO networks in the absence of attacks, as detailed below:
Corollary 5.1. For a network of N legitimate PCOs, if the degree of the PCO network satisfies d > b2N/3c,
then all oscillators will synchronize under Mechanism 5.1 from an arbitrary initial phase distribution.
Proof. Corollary 5.1 is a special case of Theorem 5.1 when the number of attackers M is set to 0 and hence
is omitted.

5.6

Extension to the Case where N is Unknown to Individual Oscillators
The implementation of Mechanism 5.1 requires each node to have access to N, which may not be

feasible in a completely decentralized network. Therefore, in this section, we propose a mechanism for the
case where N is unknown to individual oscillators. The essence is to leverage the degree information of
individual oscillators, as detailed below:
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New Pulse-Based Synchronization Mechanism (Mechanism 5.2):
1. The phase φi of legitimate oscillator i evolves from 0 to 2π rad with a constant speed ω = 1 rad/second.
2. Once φi reaches 2π rad at time t, oscillator i fires (emits a pulse) if it did not fire within (t − ε, t] and
an entire period T = 2π seconds has elapsed since initiation. Then oscillator i resets its phase from 2π
rad to 0 if it received at least bdi /3c pulses within (t − ε, t]. Otherwise, it resets its phase from 2π rad
to π rad.
3. When oscillator i receives a pulse at time instant t 0 , it shifts its phase to 2π rad only if φi ∈ [π, 2π] at
time instant t 0 and one of the following conditions is satisfied:
(a) before receiving the current pulse, oscillator i has already received at least bdi /6c − 1 pulses in
[t 0 − T /2, t 0 ] and it did not reset its phase from 2π rad to 0 within (t 0 − T, t 0 ).
(b) before receiving the current pulse, oscillator i has already received at least bdi /6c − 1 pulses in
(t 0 − ε, t 0 ].
Otherwise, the pulse has no effect on φi who will evolve freely towards 2π rad.

Following a similar line of reasoning in Section 5.5, we can prove that Mechanism 5.2 can synchronize densely connected PCO networks both in the presence and absence of Byzantine attackers.
Theorem 5.2. For a network of N PCOs among which M are compromised and launch attacks following
the attack model in Section 5.3, if the degree of the PCO network satisfies d > b3N/4c and the number of
attackers M satisfies M < bd/6c, then all legitimate oscillators will synchronize under Mechanism 5.2 from
any initial phase distribution even if N is unknown to individual oscillators.
Proof. We set the initial time instant to t0 . Similar to the proof in Theorem 5.1, the following proof is divided
into two parts. In part I, we prove that all N − M legitimate oscillators will have phases residing in [π, 2π] at
t0 + T . In Part II, we prove that these legitimate oscillators will reset their phases to 0 at the same time and
will keep having identical phases with a collective oscillation period T = 2π seconds, i.e., they will achieve
synchronization.
Part I (all N − M legitimate oscillators’ phases reside in [π, 2π] at t0 + T ): Since the number of

102

attackers satisfies M < bd/6c, we have

M < bd/6c ≤ bd/3c ≤ bdi /3c

for i = 1, 2, · · · , N − M. Following the same line of reasoning in the proof of Theorem 5.1, Part I, we have
that a legitimate oscillator will only reset its phases to π rad within time interval [t0 , t0 + T ] and all legitimate
oscillators’ phases will reside in [π, 2π] at time instant t0 + T no matter what the initial phase distribution is.
Part II (all legitimate oscillators will reset their phases to 0 at the same time and will keep having
identical phases with a collective oscillation period T = 2π seconds): Since no legitimate oscillator fires or
resets its phase to 0 within time interval [t0 , t0 + T ] and all legitimate oscillators’ phases reside in [π, 2π] at
time t0 + T , all legitimate oscillators’ phases will reach 2π rad and fire at least once within (t0 + T, t0 + 3T /2].
Without loss of generality, we label all N − M legitimate oscillators according to the order of their first firing
time and denote t10 ∈ (t0 + T, t0 + 3T /2] as the first firing time instant of legitimate oscillator bd/2c + 1. Only
the following two scenarios could happen before legitimate oscillator bd/2c + 1 fires at t10 :
Scenario 2.1: no legitimate oscillator has reset its phase to 0 before legitimate oscillator bd/2c + 1 fires at
t10 .
Scenario 2.2: at least one legitimate oscillator has reset its phase to 0 before legitimate oscillator bd/2c + 1
fires at t10 .
Next, we show that in both scenarios all legitimate oscillators will reset their phases to 0 at the same time and
will keep having identical phases with a collective oscillation period T = 2π seconds, i.e., they will achieve
synchronization.
We first consider Scenario 2.1, i.e., no legitimate oscillator has reset its phase to 0 before legitimate
oscillator bd/2c + 1 fires at t10 . Since all the N − M legitimate oscillators are labeled according to the order
of their first firing time instants and no legitimate oscillator fired within [t0 , t0 + T ] according to Mechanism
5.1, we have that before the firing of legitimate oscillator bd/2c + 1 at t10 , bd/2c legitimate oscillators should
have fired within time interval (t0 + T, t10 ] and every legitimate oscillator i for i = 1, 2, · · · , N − M should have
received at least bd/2c − (N − di ) pulses within (t0 + T, t10 ], where (N − di ) is the number of oscillators which
are not connected to oscillator i. Since we have d > b3N/4c, one can obtain di ≥ d ≥ b3N/4c + 1 > 3N/4
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for i = 1, 2, · · · , N − M. Using Lemma 5.1 and combining the fact di > 3N/4, we have:

bd/2c − (N − di ) ≥ bd/2c − N + b5di /6c + bdi /6c ≥ b3N/8c + b5N/8c − N + bdi /6c ≥ bdi /6c − 1 (5.4)

meaning that before the firing of legitimate oscillator bd/2c+1, every legitimate oscillator i for i = 1, 2, · · · , N −
M has already received at least bdi /6c − 1 pulses within time interval (t0 + T, t10 ] (note that this interval has
length less than T /2). Then following the same line of reasoning in Scenario 1.1 of Theorem 5.1, we can
prove that every legitimate oscillator i will receive at least bdi /3c pulses at t10 and reset its phases to 0. Then
starting from time instant t10 , all legitimate oscillators will have identical phases with a collective oscillation
period T = 2π seconds, i.e., they will achieve synchronization.
The proof of Scenario 2.2 follows the same line of reasoning in Scenario 1.2 of Theorem 5.1 and is
omitted.
Summarizing the above analyses, we conclude that Mechanism 5.2 can synchronize densely connected PCO networks in the presence of Byzantine attacks even when N is unknown to individual oscillators
and initial phases are distributed arbitrarily.
It is worth noting that Mechanism 5.2 can also guarantee synchronization of densely connected PCO
networks in the absence of attacks when N is unknown to individual oscillators, as shown below:
Corollary 5.2. For a network of N legitimate PCOs, if the degree of the PCO network satisfies d > b3N/4c,
then all oscillators will synchronize under Mechanism 5.2 from any initial phase distribution even if N is
unknown to individual oscillators.
Proof. Corollary 5.2 is a special case of Theorem 5.2 when the number of attackers M is set to 0 and hence
is omitted.
Remark 5.7. According to Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.2, Mechanism 5.1 and Mechanism 5.2 guarantee that
all legitimate oscillators synchronize with a collective oscillation period T = 2π seconds (which is equal to
the free-running period) even in the presence of Byzantine attacks. This is in distinct difference from existing
results where the collective oscillation period is affected by attacks.
Remark 5.8. When N is unknown to individual oscillators, d has to be larger than b3N/4c, which is greater
than b2N/3c for the case where N is known. The requirement of increased connectivity is intuitive in that less
knowledge of a PCO network requires stronger connectivity conditions to guarantee synchronization.
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5.7

Simulations
We considered a network of N = 24 PCOs placed on a circle with diameter 40 meters as illustrated

in Figure 5.2. Two oscillators can communicate if and only if their distance is less than 39 meters. Thus, the
degree of the network is d = 20. We set t0 = 0 and chose initial phases of oscillators randomly from [0, 2π].
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We first considered the attacker-free case. As d = 20 > b3N/4c = 18, we know from Corollary 5.1
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and Corollary 5.2 that the network will always16synchronize from any10initial phase distribution, whether or not
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14 13 by
12 the numerical simulation results in Figure 5.3.
N is available to individual oscillators. This was confirmed

Using the same initial phase0 distribution
5.3, we
10
20as in Figure
30
40
50 alsomsimulated the phase evolution of
PCOs under the pulse-based synchronization mechanism in [3]. It can be seen in Figure 5.4 that the pulsebased synchronization mechanism in [3] cannot achieve synchronization, which shows the advantage of our
new mechanisms even when attack-resilience is not relevant.

5.7.2

In the Presence of Attacks
Using the same network, we also ran simulations in the presence of Byzantine attacks when N is

known to individual oscillators.
We assumed that 3 out of the 24 PCOs (oscillators 1, 8, and 20) were compromised and acted as
Byzantine attackers. As 3 < d − b2N/3c = 4, we know from Theorem 5.1 that the network will synchronize.
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Figure 5.3: Plot (a) and (b) presented the phase evolutions of the 24 PCOs under Mechanism 5.1 and Mechanism 5.2, respectively. ε was set to 0.01T .
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synchronization mechanism in [3]. l was set to 0.021.
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This was confirmed by numerical simulations in Figure 5.5, which showed that even under Byzantine attacks
the length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators converged to zero.

Figure 5.5: Phase evolution and the length of the containing arc of 21 legitimate oscillators under Mechanism
5.1 in the presence of 3 Byzantine attackers (oscillators 1, 8, and 20) with attacking pulse time instants
represented by asterisks. ε was set to 0.01T .
Using the same network, when N is unknown to individual oscillators, according to Theorem 5.2,
the maximal allowable number of attackers is bd/6c − 1 = 2. Hence, the condition in Theorem 5.2 was
not satisfied. Simulation results confirmed that legitimate oscillators indeed could not synchronize as the
collective oscillation period is time-varying and less than T = 2π seconds, which is illustrated in Figure 5.6.
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Figure 5.6: Phase evolution of 21 legitimate oscillators under Mechanism 5.2 in the presence of 3 attackers
(oscillators 1, 8, and 20) with attacking pulse time instants represented by asterisks. N was unknown to
individual oscillators and ε was set to 0.01T .
However, when we decreased the number of attackers to 2 (oscillators 1 and 8), all legitimate oscillators synchronized under Mechanism 5.2 (see Figure 5.7), confirming the results in Theorem 5.2.
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Figure 5.7: Phase evolution and the length of the containing arc of 22 legitimate oscillators under Mechanism
5.2 in the presence of 2 attackers (oscillators 1 and 8) with attacking pulse time instants represented by
asterisks. N was unknown to individual oscillators and ε was set to 0.01T .

5.7.3

Comparison with Existing Results
Under the same PCO network deployment, we also compared our proposed Mechanisms 5.1 and 5.2

with existing attack resilient pulse-based synchronization approaches in [3] and Chapters 2-4 which solely
use content-free pulses in communications. When comparing with [3] and Chapters 2-4, we did not use the
settings in [3] and Chapters 2-4 since they are special cases of our setting, as can be seen in Table 1.
Figure 5.8 showed the evolutions of containing arc length of legitimate oscillators under Mechanism
5.1 and approaches in [3] and Chapters 2-4 in the presence of 3 Byzantine attackers (oscillators 1, 8, and
20) when N was known to individual oscillators. All approaches used the same initial phase distribution
(randomly chosen from [0, 2π]) and identical malicious pulse attack patterns. It can be seen in Figure 5.8
that Mechanism 5.1 can achieve perfect synchronization whereas pulse-base synchronization approaches in
[3] and Chapters 2-4 failed to achieve synchronization even when the coupling strength was set to l = 1. It
is worth noting that similar results were obtained in all 1, 000 runs of our simulation with the initial phases
randomly chosen from [0, 2π] and 40 attack pulses randomly distributed in [0, 3.5T ].
Figure 5.9 showed the evolutions of containing arc length of legitimate oscillators under Mechanism
5.2 and the approaches in [3] and Chapters 2-4 in the presence of 2 Byzantine attackers (oscillators 1 and
8) when N was unknown to individual oscillators. Under the same set up, it can be seen in Figure 5.9 that
Mechanism 5.2 can achieve perfect synchronization whereas existing pulse-base synchronization approaches
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Figure 5.8: The length of the containing arc of 21 legitimate oscillators under Mechanism 5.1 and approaches
in [3] and Chapters 2-4 in the presence of 3 Byzantine attackers (oscillators 1, 8, and 20). The attack pulse
time instants were represented by asterisks. The coupling strength in [3] and Chapters 2-4 was set to l = 1,
N was known to individual oscillators, and ε was set to 0.01T .
in [3] and Chapters 2-4 cannot, which confirmed the advantages of our new mechanism. It is worth noting
that similar results were obtained in all 1, 000 runs of our simulation with the initial phases randomly chosen
from [0, 2π] and 40 attack pulses randomly distributed in [0, 3.5T ].
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Figure 5.9: The length of the containing arc of 22 legitimate oscillators under Mechanism 5.2 and approaches
in [3] and Chapters 2-4 in the presence of 2 Byzantine attackers (oscillators 1 and 8). The attack pulse time
instants were represented by asterisks. The coupling strength in [3] and Chapters 2-4 was set to l = 1, N was
unknown to individual oscillators, and ε was set to 0.01T .
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Chapter 6

Conclusions and Discussion
In this dissertation, we considered attack-resilient pulse-base synchronization. First, by using a carefully designed PRF, we characterize the condition under which an attacker could launch stealthy Byzantine
attacks without being detected and show that perfect synchronization of legitimate oscillators can be achieved
in the presence of a stealthy Byzantine attacker if some initial conditions on legitimate oscillators’ phases are
satisfied. Next, we propose a new pulse-based synchronization mechanism to improve the resilience of pulsebased synchronization. We rigorously characterize the condition for mounting stealthy Byzantine attacks
under the proposed pulse-based synchronization mechanism and prove analytically that synchronization of
legitimate oscillators can be achieved in the presence of multiple stealthy Byzantine attackers even when the
initial phases of legitimate oscillators are unrestricted. Then we present a new pulse-based synchronization
mechanism for general connected PCOs that can achieve phase synchronization even in the presence of multiple stealthy Byzantine attackers, irrespective of whether the attackers collude with each other or not. Under
the proposed synchronization mechanism, we rigorously characterize the condition for stealthy Byzantine
attacks and prove that perfect synchronization of general connected legitimate oscillators can be guaranteed
even when their initial phases are widely distributed in a half circle. Finally, we revised our pulse-based
interaction mechanism to improve the resilience of PCO networks against Byzantine attacks. The revised
mechanism can enable synchronization in the presence of multiple Byzantine attackers even when the PCO
network is not restricted to all-to-all and the initial phases are distributed arbitrarily. Our results are in distinct
difference from most of the existing attack-resilience algorithms which require a priori (almost) synchronization among all legitimate oscillators. The approach is also applicable when the total number of oscillators are
unknown to individual oscillators. Numerical simulations confirmed the analytical results.
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Appendix A

Proof of Lemma 2.2

Without loss of generality, we label all oscillators in the increasing order of their phases, i.e., φ1 (t0 ) ≤
φ2 (t0 ) ≤ · · · ≤ φN (t0 ) where t0 denotes the initial time instant. Since the interaction is all-to-all, i.e., every node
can affect every other node, it can be easily obtained that a time-invariant firing sequence can be guaranteed
if for any pair of non-firing oscillators i and j, their phase relationship will not be affected by the firing of a
third oscillator. In other words, if φi is larger than φ j immediately before oscillators i and j receive a pulse
from a third firing oscillator, then φi will remain no smaller than φ j immediately after receiving the pulse.
We next prove that this relationship can be guaranteed under the PRF given in (2.2). For the sake of
simplicity, we divide the analysis into three cases when an external pulse is received:
1. If both φi and φ j are less than D, then they will not be affected by the pulse. Hence φi is still no smaller
than φ j after the firing of any oscillator.
2. If φi ≥ D and φ j < D hold, then upon firing of a third oscillator, φi will be increased but φ j will not
change according to the PRF in (2.2). Therefore, φi is still no smaller than φ j after the firing event.
3. If both φi and φ j are larger than D, then both of them will increase upon receiving a pulse from a third
node. According to (2.1) and (2.2) , they will become φi+ = φi + l(2π − φi ) and φ j+ = φ j + l(2π − φ j ),
respectively. The difference between φi+ and φ j+ is φi+ − φ j+ = (1 − l)(φi − φ j ) which is non-negative
since 0 < l ≤ 1 and φi > φ j hold. So oscillator i0 s phase is still no smaller than oscillator j0 s after the
firing event.
In conclusion, in a PCO network with PRF (2.2), one oscillator will not surpass another one on the
unit circle, which means that the firing sequence is time-invariant.
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Appendix B

Proof of Theorem 2.1

We first consider statement 1) in Theorem 2.1, i.e., within any time interval of length TL , at most N
pulses can be generated when all oscillators are legitimate. If we can find the shortest time interval TL during
which a network of N legitimate PCOs can emit N + 1 pulses, then we can detect at most N pulses within
[t,t + TL ) for any t.
Without loss of generality, we label all oscillators in an increasing order of their phases, i.e., φ1 (t0 ) ≤
φ2 (t0 ) ≤ · · · ≤ φN (t0 ) where t0 denotes the initial time instant. According to Lemma 2.2, the firing sequence
will not change. So for the network to emit N + 1 pulses, oscillator N has to send out two pulses and all the
other oscillators have to send one pulse each. Therefore, the problem of finding the minimum time interval
to detect N + 1 pulses is reduced to finding the minimum time interval for oscillator N to fire twice.
Apparently, in order to acquire the minimum time interval for oscillator N to fire twice, the initial
phase of oscillator N should be φN (t0 ) = 2π. Furthermore, because the PRF in (2.2) is non-negative, the phase
evolution of an oscillator can only be accelerated or unaffected by exchanged pulses. Therefore, the minimal
time interval is attained when oscillator N 0 s phase is accelerated by the firing of all the other oscillators, i.e.,
its phase should reside in [D, 2π] when other oscillators fire.
According to the above analysis, at the initial time instant t0 , oscillator N 0 s phase should be 2π
and all the other oscillators’ initial phases should be less than 2π − D. So that when they fire, the phase of
oscillator N is larger than D. Because 2π − D ≤ D holds from the definition of the PRF in (2.2), we can get
that oscillators N and N − 1 are the respective ending and starting points of the containing arc and the length
of the containing arc is 2π − (φN (t0 ) − φN−1 (t0 )), which is no greater than δ according to the assumption of
the theorem. So we have φN−1 (t0 ) ≤ δ .
At time instant t0+ , oscillator N emits a pulse and resets its phase to 0, i.e. φN (t0+ ) = 0. Because all
the other oscillators reside in the refractory period, their phases’ evolutions are not affected by the firing of
oscillator N, i.e., φi (t0+ ) = φi (t0 ) for i = 1, 2, · · · , N − 1. At this time instant, oscillator N − 1 has the largest
phase and will reach 2π at t1 = t0 + ∆t1 where ∆t1 = 2π − φN−1 (t0 ). At time instant t1 , we have φN (t1 ) =
2π − φN−1 (t0 ) and φi (t1 ) = 2π − φN−1 (t0 ) + φi (t0 ) for i = 1, 2, · · · , N − 1. Because 0 ≤ φN−1 (t0 ) < 2π − D
holds, we have D ≤ φi (t1 ) ≤ 2π for i = 1, 2, · · · , N.
At time instant t1 , oscillator N − 1 emits a pulse and resets its phase to 0, i.e., φN−1 (t1+ ) = 0. Because
all the other oscillators’ phases reside in [D, 2π], they will be expedited by the firing of oscillator N − 1. Since
their phases immediately before the firing of oscillator N − 1 are φN (t1 ) = 2π − φN−1 (t0 ) and φi (t1 ) = 2π −

114

φN−1 (t0 )+φi (t0 ) for i = 1, 2, · · · , N −2, after the firing of oscillator N −1, their phases become φN (t1+ ) = 2π −
(1 − l)φN−1 (t0 ), φi (t1+ ) = 2π − (1 − l)(φN−1 (t0 ) − φi (t0 )) for i = 1, 2, · · · , N − 2. Then, oscillator N − 2 has
the maximal phase and will fire next at time instant t2 . We have t2 = t1 + ∆t2 where ∆t2 = (1 − l)(φN−1 (t0 ) −
φN−2 (t0 )).
At time instant t2 , oscillator N − 2 emits a pulse and resets its phase to 0, i.e., φN−2 (t2+ ) = 0. Since
the phases of the other oscillators are φN (t2 ) = 2π − (1 − l)φN−2 (t0 ), φN−1 (t2 ) = ∆t2 and φi (t2 ) = 2π − (1 −
l)(φN−2 (t0 ) − φi (t0 )) for i = 1, 2, · · · , N − 3, it can be verified that only φN−1 (t2 ) = ∆t2 resides in the refractory
period and the other oscillators will be expedited by the firing of oscillator N − 2. Therefore, after the firing
of oscillator N − 2, the phases of all the oscillators are φN (t2+ ) = 2π − (1 − l)2 φN−2 (t0 ), φN−1 (t2+ ) = ∆t2 ,
φN−2 (t2+ ) = 0 and φi (t2+ ) = 2π − (1 − l)2 (φN−2 (t0 ) − φi (t0 )) for i = 1, 2, · · · , N − 3.
Repeating the same analysis, we can get that ∆ti = (1−l)i−1 (φN−i+1 (t0 )−φN−i (t0 )) for i = 2, 3, · · · , N −
+
+
1. After the firing of oscillator 1 at time instant tN−1 , we have φ1 (tN−1
) = 0, φN (tN−1
) = 2π −(1−l)N−1 φ1 (t0 ),
+
) = ∑N−1
and φi (tN−1
N−i+1 ∆t j for i = 2, 3, · · · , N − 1. At this time instant, oscillator N has the largest phase and

will fire the second time after a time interval ∆tN = (1 − l)N−1 φ1 (t0 ). Therefore, the total time consumption
for oscillator N to fire twice can be obtained as follows:
N

N−1

TL = ∑ ∆ti = 2π − φN−1 (t0 ) + (1 − l)N−1 φ1 (t0 ) +
i=1

∑ (1 − l)i−1 (φN−i+1 (t0 ) − φN−i (t0 ))

(B.1)

i=2

i−1 − (1 − l)N−1 )ε , we can
Denoting εi = φN−i+1 (t0 ) − φN−i (t0 ) for i = 2, 3, · · · , N − 1 and ε = ∑N−1
i
i=2 ((1 − l)

get
N−1

TL = (1 − l)N−1 (φN−1 (t0 ) −

∑

N−1

εi ) +

i=2
N−1

= 2π − (1 − (1 − l)

∑ (1 − l)i−1 εi + 2π − φN−1 (t0 )

i=2

)φN−1 (t0 ) + ε

(B.2)

Clearly, the minimal TL is obtained when φN−1 (t0 ) is maximized and ε is minimized. Since we
have φN−1 (t0 ) ≤ δ , the maximal value of φN−1 (t0 ) can be obtained as δ . Furthermore, according to the
arrangement of oscillator indexes, we have φN−i+1 (t0 ) − φN−i (t0 ) ≥ 0 for i = 2, 3, · · · , N − 1, which means
that the smallest value of ε is 0 when φN−i+1 (t0 ) = φN−i (t0 ) holds for i = 2, 3, · · · , N − 1. Therefore, the
minimal value of TL can be obtained as 2π − δ + (1 − l)N−1 δ .
Next, we proceed to prove that during any time interval of length TU , we can detect at least N pulses.
Because all oscillators are labeled in an increasing order of their phases and the oscillation firing sequence will
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not change with time, the problem of finding the maximal time period containing N firing events transforms
to finding the maximal time for oscillator 1 to fire, which is obtained when φ1 is not accelerated by the firing
of any other oscillators, and hence is given by 2π − φ1 (t0 ). Given φ1 (t0 ) ≥ 0, the maximal value of TU can be
acquired as TU = 2π seconds.
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Appendix C

Proof of Theorem 2.2

We first consider statement 1). If the conditions in statement 1) are met, the phases of legitimate
oscillators can only be distributed in the following three ways when the malicious pulse is sent, as illustrated
in plots a, b, and c in Fig. C.1:
a) All legitimate oscillators’ phases reside in [D, 2π];
b) All legitimate oscillators’ phases reside in [0, D);
c) Some of the legitimate oscillators’ phases reside in [D, 2π] and the rest reside in [0, D) but phase D
does not belong to the containing arc.
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Figure C.1: a, b, and c correspond to three possible phase distributions satisfying the conditions in statement
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1) of Theorem 2.2. δ and
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δ
δ
are used to denote the length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators

D φ pulse
D φ πto statement 1), we have δ < 2π − D. Next,
π is sent. According
right before and after the malicious

we show that in all the three cases, the malicious pulse cannot increase the length of the containing arc, i.e.,
δ + ≤ δ < 2π − D.
a) All legitimate oscillators’ phases reside in [D, 2π]. Denoting the phases of the starting and ending
points of the containing arc as φ̄ and φ , respectively before receiving the malicious pulse, we have δ = φ̄ − φ .
According to the PRF in (2.2), it can be obtained that the phases of oscillators φ̄ and φ will become φ̄ + =
φ̄ + l(2π − φ̄ ) and φ + = φ + l(2π − φ ) after receiving the malicious pulse. Therefore, the length of the
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containing arc becomes δ + = φ̄ + − φ + = (1 − l)(φ̄ − φ ) which is no larger than the length before receiving
the pulse, i.e., δ = φ̄ − φ . Hence, we obtain that the length of the containing arc will be less than 2π − D after
receiving the malicious pulse;
b) All legitimate oscillators’ phases reside in [0, D). In this case, the malicious pulse cannot affect
the phase of any legitimate oscillator, and the length of the containing arc is not affected, i.e., δ + = δ <
2π − D;
c) Some of the legitimate oscillators’ phases reside in [D, 2π] and the rest in [0, D) but phase D
does not belong to the containing arc. In this case, denote the phases of the starting and ending points of the
containing arc as φ̄ and φ , respectively before receiving the malicious pulse. The length of the containing
arc is δ = 2π − φ + φ̄ . According to the PRF (2.2), it can be obtained that the phases of oscillators φ̄ and φ
will become φ̄ + = φ̄ and φ + = φ + l(2π − φ ), respectively upon receiving the malicious pulse. Therefore,
the length of the containing arc becomes δ + = 2π − φ + + φ̄ + = 2π − φ − l(2π − φ ) + φ̄ , which is no larger
than the length before receiving the pulse, i.e., δ = 2π − φ + φ̄ . Hence, we can obtain that the length of the
containing arc is less than 2π − D after receiving the malicious pulse.
Statement 1) gives conditions under which the containing arc is not expanded by the malicious pulse,
i.e., δ + ≤ δ < 2π − D. Next, we consider statement 2). When the containing arc has phase D in its interior
or as its starting point and its length is less than (1 − l)(2π − D) before the malicious pulse is sent, we can
obtain that the starting point should reside in [D, 2π] and the ending point should reside in [0, D). Denote
the starting and ending points as φ̄ and φ , respectively before receiving the malicious pulse. The length of
the containing arc can be obtained as δ = φ̄ − φ . According to the PRF in (2.2), the phases of oscillators φ̄
and φ will become φ̄ + = φ̄ + l(2π − φ̄ ) and φ + = φ upon receiving the malicious pulse and the length of
the containing arc will become δ + = φ̄ + − φ + = δ + l(2π − φ̄ ), which is greater than δ . Using the facts
δ < (1 − l)(2π − D) and φ̄ ∈ [D, 2π], we have δ + < (1 − l)(2π − D) + l(2π − D) = 2π − D. Hence, we
can get that the length of the containing arc will be increased by the malicious pulse, but its length after the
increment is less than 2π − D.
The situation in statement 2) is visualized in Fig. C.2, where δ and δ + in plot d and plot d 0 represent
the lengths of the containing arc before and after the malicious pulse is sent, respectively.
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Figure C.2: The phase distribution corresponding to statement 2) in Theorem 2.2. δ and δ + denote the
respective length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators right before and after receiving the malicious
pulse. φ̄ and φ represent the starting and ending points of the containing arc, respectively. The dashed and
solid red circles represent the phases of legitimate oscillators right before and after the malicious pulse is
sent, respectively.
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Appendix D

Proof of Theorem 2.3

We first consider condition 1) of Theorem 2.3. According to Theorem 2.2, the first malicious pulse
cannot increase the length of the containing arc if condition 1) of Theorem 2.3 is met. In this proof, we
will first show that if the phases of legitimate oscillators satisfy condition 1) of Theorem 2.3 when the first
malicious pulse is sent, then they will still satisfy condition 1) of Theorem 2.3 when the following malicious
pulses are emitted. Therefore, we can reach the conclusion that no malicious pulses can increase the length
of the containing arc. Further making use of Lemma 2.1, we can show that synchronization of legitimate
oscillators can be guaranteed.
Without loss of generality, we assume that oscillator N is compromised and emits malicious pulses
at time instants Tk for k = 1, 2, · · · , ∞. Denote ∆Tk = Tk+1 − Tk as the time interval between the kth and k + 1th
malicious pulses. According to Definition 2.1, ∆Tk can be time-varying but resides in the interval [TL , TU ].
Similar as before, let the phase of oscillator i be denoted as φi (t) and the length of the containing arc of all
legitimate oscillators at time instant t as δ (t). At time instant T1 , we label all legitimate oscillators in an
increasing order of their phases, i.e., φ1 (T1 ) ≤ φ2 (T1 ) ≤ · · · ≤ φN−1 (T1 ).
The following proof is divided into three parts to make the logical flow smooth. Part I is for the
scenario where the containing arc of legitimate oscillators resides in [D, 2π] when the first malicious pulse is
sent; Part II is for the scenario where the containing arc of legitimate oscillators resides in [0, D) when the
first malicious pulse is sent; Part III is for the scenario where the containing arc resides partially in [0, D) and
partially in [D, 2π] but phase D does not belong to the containing arc when the first malicious pulse is sent.
Part I (The containing arc of legitimate oscillators resides in the interval [D, 2π] when the first
malicious pulse is sent):
Since all legitimate oscillators reside in the interval [D, 2π], the length of the containing arc at
this time instant is determined by δ (T1 ) = φN−1 (T1 ) − φ1 (T1 ) and it satisfies δ (T1 ) ≤ δ1 according to the
assumption in condition 1) of Theorem 2.3. After receiving the first malicious pulse, we have φi (T1+ ) =
2π − (1 − l)(2π − φi (T1 )) for i = 1, 2, · · · , N − 1. The next malicious pulse will be sent after ∆T1 . According
to Theorem 2.1 and Definition 2.1, to stay stealthy, the compromised oscillator will send the second malicious
pulse after some time ∆T1 ∈ [TL , TU ] where


 TL = 2π − δ1 + (1 − l)N−1 δ1

 TU = 2π
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(D.1)

Because δ1 ≤ 2π − D is true, one can easily get TL > D ≥ 2π − D. Therefore, it follows φi (T1+ ) +
TL > 2π for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1 which means that every legitimate oscillator will fire at least once before the
second malicious pulse is emitted. Next, we proceed to characterize the phases of all legitimate oscillators
when the second malicious pulse is sent at time instant T2 by carefully analyzing the evolution of all legitimate
oscillators’ phases.
At time instant T1+ , φN−1 is the largest phase and will reach 2π freely after time ∆t1 = (1 − l)(2π −
φN−1 (T1 )). Denoting t1 = T1 + ∆t1 , we have φi (t1 ) = 2π − (1 − l)(φN−1 (T1 ) − φi (T1 )) for i = 1, 2, · · · , N − 1.
Then, oscillator N − 1 emits a pulse and resets its phase to 0 at time instant t1+ . Meanwhile, its pulse will
trigger the phase shift of other legitimate oscillators, which leads to φi (t1+ ) = 2π − (1 − l)2 (φN−1 (T1 ) −
φi (T1 )), for i = 1, 2, · · · , N − 2.
After the firing of oscillator N − 1, φN−2 becomes the largest and will reach 2π after time ∆t2 =
(1 − l)2 (φN−1 (T1 ) − φN−2 (T1 )). Denoting t2 = t1 + ∆t2 , we have φN−1 (t2 ) = ∆t2 and φi (t2 ) = 2π − (1 −
l)2 (φN−2 (T1 ) − φi (T1 )) for i = 1, 2, · · · , N − 2. At time instant t2+ , oscillator N − 2 will emit a pulse and
reset its phase to 0. It can be derived that φN−1 (t2 ) ∈ [0, D) which means that oscillator N − 1 still resides
in the refractory period. So we have φN−1 (t2+ ) = ∆t2 and φi (t2+ ) = 2π − (1 − l)3 (φN−2 (T1 ) − φi (T1 )) for
i = 1, 2, · · · , N − 3.
Repeating the above analysis, we can deduce that the time between the firing events of oscillators
i + 1 and i is ∆tN−i = (1 − l)N−i (φi+1 (T1 ) − φi (T1 )) for i = 1, 2, · · · , N − 2. After the firing of oscillator 1 at
+
+
time instant tN−1 , the phase of all legitimate oscillators are given by φ1 (tN−1
) = 0 and φi (tN−1
) = ∑N−1
N−i+1 ∆t j

for i = 2, 3, · · · , N − 1. At this time instant, oscillator N − 1 has the largest phase and oscillator 1 has the
smallest phase.
Denoting Γ1 as the total time it takes for all legitimate oscillators to fire once since T1 , we have
N−1

Γ1 =

N−2

∑ ∆ti = (1 − l)(2π − φN−1 (T1 )) + ∑ (1 − l)N−i (φi+1 (T1 ) − φi (T1 ))

i=1

(D.2)

i=1

According to the derivation below (D.1), one has ∆T1 > Γ1 and hence as the process evolves, the
second malicious pulse will be emitted after time ∆T1 − Γ1 at time instant T2 . Under no interaction, the phase
+
of oscillator N − 1 will reach 2π the second time after 2π − φN−1 (tN−1
). Next, we prove that it is larger than

∆T1 − Γ1 , which means that the phase of oscillator N − 1 will be no larger than 2π at time instant T2 .
Based on (D.2) and the relationship ∆T1 ∈ [TL , TU ], which is specified in (D.1), we have 2π −
+
φN−1 (tN−1
) − (∆T1 − Γ1 ) = 2π − ∆T1 + ∆t1 ≥ 0. Therefore, the phase of oscillator N − 1 is no larger than 2π
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at time instant T2 , and hence all legitimate oscillators’ phases will be no larger than 2π at time instant T2 . So
+
) for
the phases of all legitimate oscillators at time instant T2 can be obtained as φi (T2 ) = ∆T1 − Γ1 + φi (tN−1

i = 1, 2, · · · , N − 1.
+
Next, we proceed to examine the lower and upper bounds of φi (T2 ). Let Γ01 = Γ1 − φi (tN−1
), then

the phases of all legitimate oscillators at time instant T2 can be represented as
φi (T2 ) = ∆T1 − Γ01

(D.3)

The lower and upper bounds of φi (T2 ) can be acquired by examining the lower and upper bounds of Γ01 and
+
∆T1 . At time instant tN−1
, oscillator N − 1 has the largest phase and oscillator 1 has the smallest phase. So

we have
+
+
Γ1 − φN−1 (tN−1
) ≤ Γ01 ≤ Γ1 − φ1 (tN−1
)
+
+
0
0
Recall φN−1 (tN−1
) = ∑N−1
i=2 ∆ti and φ1 (tN−1 ) = 0, one can get ∆t1 ≤ Γ1 ≤ Γ1 . The lower bound of Γ1 can

be obtained when ∆t1 is minimized and the upper bound of Γ01 can be obtained when Γ1 is maximized.
Since ∆t1 is determined by (1 − l)(2π − φN−1 (T1 )), it is minimized when φN−1 (T1 ) is maximized. Given
φN−1 (T1 ) ∈ [D, 2π], we get the lower bound of ∆t1 as 0 when φN−1 (T1 ) is 2π.
Next, we determine the maximal value of Γ1 . Denoting εi = φi+1 (T1 ) − φi (T1 ) for i = 1, 2, · · · , N − 2
N−i )ε , we have the following equation from (D.2):
and ε = ∑N−2
i
i=1 ((1 − l) − (1 − l)
N−2

Γ1 = (1 − l)(2π − φN−1 (T1 )) +

∑ (1 − l)N−i εi = (1 − l)(2π − φ1 (T1 )) − ε

(D.4)

i=1

Γ1 is maximized when φ1 (T1 ) and ε are minimized. Because φ1 (T1 ) ∈ [D, 2π] and εi ≥ 0 for i =
1, 2, · · · , N − 2 hold, which means that the minimal value of φ1 (T1 ) and ε are D and 0, respectively. Therefore,
the maximal value of Γ1 can be obtained as (1 − l)(2π − D). Hence, the upper and lower bounds of Γ01 can
be acquired as:
0 ≤ Γ01 ≤ (1 − l)(2π − D)

(D.5)

Using the fact ∆T1 ∈ [TL , TU ] and combining (2.5), (D.3), and (D.5), give the upper and lower bounds
of φi (T2 ) as D ≤ φi (T2 ) ≤ 2π, which means that when the second malicious pulse is sent at time instant T2 ,
all legitimate oscillators’ phases will reside in the set [D, 2π].
On the other hand, according to Theorem 2.2, the first malicious pulse could not increase the length
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of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators, i.e., we have δ (T2 ) ≤ δ (T1 ) ≤ δ1 . Therefore, at time instant
T2 , all conditions for the derivations conducted at T1 still hold. So repeating the above analysis, we can get
φi (Tk ) ∈ [D, 2π] and δ (Tk ) ≤ δ1 for i = 1, 2, · · · , N −1 and k = 1, 2, · · · , ∞, i.e., no malicious pulse can increase
the length of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators.
Part II (The containing arc of legitimate oscillators resides in [0, D) when the first malicious pulse
is sent):
Because oscillators will not respond to pulses when their phases resides in the refractory period,
the first attack pulse does not affect the legitimate oscillators’ phases, i.e., we have φi (T1+ ) = φi (T1 ) for
i = 1, 2, · · · , N − 1.
Since all legitimate oscillators are labeled in an increasing order of their phases, i.e., φ1 (T1 ) ≤
φ2 (T1 ) ≤ · · · ≤ φN−1 (T1 ), the starting and ending points of the containing arc are φN−1 and φ1 , respectively.
Since ∆T1 > D and φi (T1 ) ≥ 0 hold for i = 1, 2, · · · , N − 1, we know that when receiving the second malicious
pulse at time instant T2 , all legitimate oscillators’ phases have already passed the phase D.
On the other hand, since φN−1 is the starting point of the containing arc, it is not affected by the
firing of all the other legitimate oscillators (when other legitimate oscillators fire, oscillator N −1 resides in the
refractory period since the length of the containing arc is less than δ1 which is less than D). Therefore, at time
instant T2 , the phase of oscillator N −1 is determined by ∆T1 and φN−1 (T1 ). If ∆T1 +φN−1 (T1 ) ≤ 2π is true, we
have φN−1 (T2 ) = φN−1 (T1 ) + ∆T1 ≤ 2π, which means that all legitimate oscillators reside in the set [D, 2π] at
time instant T2 . On the other hand, if ∆T1 + φN−1 (T1 ) > 2π is true, we have φN−1 (T2 ) = φN−1 (T1 ) + ∆T1 − 2π.
Since ∆T1 ∈ [TL , TU ] and φN−1 (T1 ) ∈ [0, D) hold, one can get that the upper bound of φN−1 (T2 ) is less than D
in this situation, which means that all legitimate oscillators may reside in the set [0, D), or partially in [D, 2π]
and partially in [0, D) but with phase D not in the interior or on the starting point of the containing arc of
legitimate oscillators.
Furthermore, according to Theorem 2.2, the first malicious pulse cannot increase the length of the
containing arc and we have δ (T2 ) ≤ δ (T1 ) ≤ δ1 . Therefore, at time instant T2 , the phases of legitimate
oscillators still satisfy the phase distribution conditions in condition 1) of Theorem 2.3.
Part III (The containing arc resides partially in [0, D) and partially in [D, 2π] but phase D does not
belong to the containing arc when the first malicious pulse is sent):
Without loss of generality, we assume φ1 (T1 ), φ2 (T1 ), · · · , φ j (T1 ) reside in [0, D) and φ j+1 (T1 ),
φ j+2 (T1 ), · · · , φN−1 (T1 ) reside in [D, 2π]. Because phase D does not belong to the interior or on the starting
point of the containing arc, we have δ (T1 ) = 2π − (φ j+1 (T1 ) − φ j (T1 )) and δ (T1 ) ≤ δ1 .
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After receiving the first malicious pulse at time instant T1 , we have φi (T1+ ) = φi (T1 ) for i = 1, 2, · · · , j
and φi (T1+ ) = 2π − (1 − l)(2π − φi (T1 )) for i = j + 1, j + 2, · · · , N − 1. At time instant T1+ , φN−1 is the largest
and will reach 2π freely after time ∆t1 = (1 − l)(2π − φN−1 (T1 )). Denoting t1 = T1 + ∆t1 , we have φi (t1 ) =
2π − (1 − l)(φN−1 (T1 ) − φi (T1 )) for i = j + 1, j + 2, · · · , N − 1 and φi (t1 ) = φi (T1 ) + ∆t1 for i = 1, 2, · · · , j.
Then oscillator N − 1 emits a pulse and resets its phase to 0 at time instant t1+ . At this time instant,
its pulse will trigger the phase shift of legitimate oscillators whose phases reside in the set [D, 2π], which
leads to φi (t1+ ) = 2π − (1 − l)2 (φN−1 (T1 ) − φi (T1 )) for i = j + 1, j + 2, · · · , N − 2.
Similar to the analysis in Part 1), we can acquire the time between the firing events of oscillators
i + 1 and i for i = j + 1, j + 2, · · · , N − 2 as ∆tN−i = (1 − l)N−i (φi+1 (T1 ) − φi (T1 )).
At time instant tN− j−1 , oscillator j + 1 reaches 2π for the first time. It emits a pulse and resets
+
+
its phase to 0, i.e, φ j+1 (tN−
j−1 ) = 0. The phase of all the other legitimate oscillators become φi (tN− j−1 ) =
j−1
N− j−1
+
φi (T1 ) + ∑N−
∆tk for i = 1, 2, · · · , j and φi (tN−
j−1 ) = ∑k=N−i+1 ∆tk for i = j + 2, j + 3 · · · , N − 1. At this
k=1

time instant, oscillator j has the largest phase and oscillator j + 1 has the smallest phase.
Denoting Γ2 as the total time it takes for all legitimate oscillators residing in the set [D, 2π] to fire
once, we have
N− j−1

Γ2 =

∑

N−2

∆ti = (1 − l)(2π − φN−1 (T1 )) +

i=1

∑

(1 − l)N−i (φi+1 (T1 ) − φi (T1 ))

(D.6)

i= j+1

Because ∆T1 > D ≥ 2π − D and Γ2 ≤ 2π − D hold, the second malicious pulse will be emitted after
time ∆T1 − Γ2 . Letting Γ02 = ∆T1 − Γ2 , we proceed to examine the minimal value of Γ02 . Since ∆T1 and Γ2 are
independent of each other, the minimal value of Γ02 is obtained when ∆T1 is minimized and Γ2 is maximized.
N−i )ε where
We first determine the maximal value of Γ2 . Denoting ε = ∑N−2
i
i= j+1 ((1 − l) − (1 − l)

εi = φi+1 (T1 ) − φi (T1 ) holds for i = j + 1, j + 2, · · · , N − 2 and substituting them into (D.6), one can get
N−2

Γ2 = (1 − l)(2π − φN−1 (T1 )) +

∑

(1 − l)N−i εi = (1 − l)(2π − φ j+1 (T1 )) − ε

(D.7)

i= j+1

Γ2 is maximized when φ j+1 (T1 ) and ε are minimized. Because εi ≥ 0 holds for i = j + 1, j +
2, · · · , N − 2, the minimal value of ε is 0 which is obtained when φ j+1 = φ j+2 = · · · = φN−1 is true. Next we
proceed to check the minimal value of φ j+1 (T1 ). Since φi (T1 ) ∈ [D, 2π] for i = j + 1, j + 2, · · · , N − 1 and
φi (T1 ) ∈ [0, D) for i = 1, 2, · · · , j hold and the length of the containing arc at time instant T1 is no larger than
δ1 , the minimal value of φ j+1 (T1 ) is 2π − δ1 . Hence, the maximal value of Γ2 is (1 − l)δ1 .
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Since ∆T1 resides in the interval [TL , TU ], the minimal value of ∆T1 is TL which is given in (D.1).
Therefore, the minimal value of Γ02 can be obtained as follows
Γ02 = TL − Γ2 = 2π − (2 − l − (1 − l)N−1 )δ1

(D.8)

Combing (2.5) and (D.8) gives the minimal value of Γ02 :
Γ02 = 2π − D −

(1 − l)2 − (1 − l)N
(2 − l − (1 − l)N−1 )l
(2π
−
D)
+
D
=
(2π − D) + D
1 − (1 − l)N−1
1 − (1 − l)N−1

(D.9)

+
Since N ≥ 2, we have Γ02 ≥ D, which means that at time instant tN−
j−1 the second malicious pulse

will be sent after at least a time interval of length D. Because oscillator j + 1 has the smallest phase which
+
is equal to 0 at time instant tN−
j−1 , when the second malicious pulse is sent at time instant T2 , the phase of

oscillator j + 1 will be no less than D. Therefore, the phases of all legitimate oscillators will pass or be equal
to phase D at time instant T2 .
+
On the other hand, oscillator j has the largest phase at time instant tN−
j−1 and it is the starting point

of the containing arc, hence the phase evolution of oscillator j is not affected by the firing of all the other
legitimate oscillators. The phase of oscillator j can be formulated as follows:
+
+
0
0
1. If φ j (tN−
j−1 ) + Γ2 ≤ 2π is true, we have φ j (T2 ) = φ j (tN− j−1 ) + Γ2 ≤ 2π, which means that at time

instant T2 , all legitimate oscillators reside in the set [D, 2π];
+
+
+
0
0
2. Ifφ j (tN−
j−1 )+Γ2 > 2π is true, we have φ j (T2 ) = φ j (tN− j−1 )+Γ2 −2π. Since φ j (tN− j−1 ) = φ j (T1 )+Γ2

and Γ02 = ∆T1 − Γ2 hold, we can get φ j (T2 ) = φ j (T1 ) + ∆T1 − 2π. Further noticing ∆T1 ∈ [TL , TU ] and
φ j (T1 ) ∈ [0, D), we can get φ j (T2 ) < D at time instant T2 , which means that all legitimate oscillators’
phases may reside in [0, D), or partially in [D, 2π] and partially in [0, D) but with phase D not in the
interior or on the starting point of the containing arc of legitimate oscillators.
In addition, according to Theorem 2.2, the first malicious pulse does not increase the length of the
containing arc and we have δ (T2 ) ≤ δ (T1 ) ≤ δ1 . Hence, at time instant T2 , the phases of legitimate oscillators
still satisfy condition 1) in Theorem 2.3.
Summarizing the analysis on the three parts, we can conclude that when the first malicious pulse
is sent at time instant T1 , if the length of the containing arc of all legitimate oscillators is no larger than δ1
and the initial phase conditions are satisfied, then the length of the containing arc of all legitimate oscillators
is still no larger than δ1 when the second malicious pulse is sent at time instant T2 , and the phases will still
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satisfy condition 1) of Theorem 2.3. Repeating the above argument, we can conclude that the length of
the containing arc will not be increased by any of the malicious pulses sent at Tk for k = 1, 2, · · · , ∞ and it
is always less than δ1 . Further invoking Lemma 2.1 leads to the conclusion that all legitimate oscillators
will synchronize because the interactions among legitimate oscillators will always decrease the length of the
containing arc.
The proof of Theorem 2.3 under condition 2) can be obtained following the same line of reasoning
and is omitted.
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